Flashpoint Taiwan Part 5
Flashpoint Taiwan Part 5
A Lethal Minds War Game
Note from Lethal Minds:
This is the fifth of several articles feeding into our upcoming war game and crisis simulation Flashpoint Taiwan. The purpose of this simulation is to simulate a diplomatic crisis in the Taiwan Strait which triggers an invasion of Taiwan by the PLA. This simulation will feature both military practitioners and foreign affairs students and professionals. The following article will be instructions and logistics for the war game and instructions on where to find additional content.
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Participants will be assigned to factions in the simulation at random, although preference to leadership positions will be given to those who interact with these articles and with the Zoom classes we will be hosting.
The next zoom class will be held at 8pm Eastern Time 09 November 2023. You can find a link to the zoom class in our bio on Instagram.
At the end of this article will be a thought exercise. We encourage you to write a brief response to that question and send it in to our email at lethalmindsjournal@gmail.comAt the end of this article will be a thought exercise. We encourage you to write a brief response to that question and send it in to our email at lethalmindsjournal@gmail.com
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The Sino Taiwanese Conflict Part Five: Command and Control
Like its logistical capabilities, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Command and Control (C2) capabilities is a least discussed topic regarding an invasion of Taiwan. The ability of the PLA to coordinate between the forces during amphibious operations will be important for several reasons. The reasons range from providing effective joint fires during the landing operations to the coordination of operations between service branches. The reasons also include the PLA’s ability to coordinate any logistical operations from southeastern China to any beachheads or ports they captured in Taiwan. The article will describe the PLA’s C2 capabilities related to how it would conduct an amphibious landing in Taiwan. The article will also describe the political will of the PLA and its effect on the operations C2 functions. There will be a section at the end of the article to discuss Taiwan’s C2 capabilities regarding how it would resist an invasion.
PLA Joint C2 Capabilities
The PLA undertook reforms beginning in 2013 to reform the PLA to change several important aspects of the organizations. The goals of these reforms included increasing the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) control over the PLA and improving its ability to ‘fight and win wars.' Another goal would be for the CCP to remove the rampant corruption found within the PLA’s ranks. These reforms focused on increasing the PLA’s C2 capabilities by creating new commands and integrating joint C2 concepts into the command structure. However, the PLA still has significant issues regarding several aspects of its C2 that would cause significant issues in its ability to conduct an invasion of Taiwan.
Theater Commands
The 2016 reforms implemented by the PLA modernized and more importantly changed the PLA’s command structure. The most fundamental change was the creation of five Theater Commands (TC) from the previous seven Military Regions (MRs). These TCs were tasked with creating a joint command structure, called a joint operations command system that will be used during both peacetime and conflicts. Furthermore, the TC commanders were entrusted with more power and greater C2 than the previous MRs commanders. One of the main functions of the TCs is to be in charge of operations and is the only top joint operations command in their respective area of operations. This emphasis on joint operational C2 contrasts with the previous MRs, which were largely dominated by the People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA) that were focused focusme administration. The result of moving to TCs is the strengthening of jointness within the PLA through making joint operations and training its main focus. For example, the Eastern Theater Command (ETC) would be the main entity responsible for and form the nucleus of any force tasked with invading Taiwan. However, units from the Northern Theater Command (NTC) and Southern Theater Command (STC) would also be under the ETC’s operational control.
Joint Operations Doctrine
The reforms of the C2 capabilities also extended to how the PLA will incorporate its joint operations doctrine into its command structure. Integrated Joint Operations (IJO) 一体化联合作战 is the new joint operations doctrine that will form the basis for how the PLA will conduct joint operations for the next ten or so years. The PLA textbook Science of Campaigns 战役学 defines IJO as the following:
Operations “using integrated methods and information technology, blending an operational system from all services and arms and other types of armed strengths with operational units to form an integrated whole.”
The TCs will rely on IJO to integrate nearly all PLA forces under its command since they will need to have the ability to successfully command each service during peace and wartime. The concept accomplishes this by enabling the individual services to communicate with the TC more effectively and between the services.
For example, the PLA views IJO as highly integrated, networked operations utilized by joint groups down to the tactical level. They view the development and deployment of integrated communication architectures as a requirement for networked operations for use in future joint operations. The PLA also views integrated communication architecture as a key requirement for achieving a common operating picture among units at each level. However, like many of aspects of the 2016 reforms, the concept is likely to evolve or change to fit PLA’s requirements for joint operations. There are discussions that IJO will likely evolve to either Multi-Domain IJO or Joint Operations under the Conditions of Intelligentization but these are akin to theorical works than actual doctrine.
The All-Domain Operations (ADO) 全域作战 concept is a relatively new concept that replaced the Information System-Based System of Systems Operational Capability. However, ADO’s definition is not clearly defined since the PLA has no clear doctrinal definitions for domain 域. The PLA will use domain 域 to refer to a geographic area or region or use the U.S. military’s definition of the word, i.e. a sphere of activity such as land, sea, air, etc. Another reason why ADO is not clearly defined is due to theory having no clear concept or definition. The PLA held a seminar in 2016 to outline the services’ potential roles in the PLAA’s ADO concept. The seminar resulted in unspecified tasks the individual services to implement the theory created there. However, both the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) also discussed how they would implement ADO involving their own marine and airborne forces. The discussion likely means that the kinds of ADO discussed during the seminar was in the physical spheres. In addition to the PLA seminar, several authors also tried to define ADO or define its foundation through articles and forum posts on various websites.
PLA Joint C2 at Tactical Level
Another issue with the PLA’s C2 capabilities is seen in the tactical level regarding the combat units the PLA would use during the invasion’s initial stages. The issue stems from the lack of integration and coordination between People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps’ (PLANMC), PLAAF’s, and PLAA Combined Arms Brigades (CABs). Furthermore, the lack of integration and coordination is also seen at both the battalion and company levels as well. One 2018 battalion-level joint landing exercise between the PLAA and PLANMC illustrated these problems. The PLAA battalion received heavy losses because it did not wait for the PLANMC battalion to destroy the enemy’s firepower in depth before launching its assault. Furthermore, coordination issues also extend to the six PLAAF’s 16th Airborne Corps CABs since there is a lack of joint training between it, the PLAA, and PLANMC. The lack of joint exercises between the three service branches indicates that the 16th Airborne Corps would run into issues
Other articles and reports indicated there are coordination issues related to joint fires between PLAA and PLANMC units, especially with attack helicopters. The lack of training is significant the PLANMC currently does not have attack helicopters to provide close air support (CAS) during operations. However, the PLAA aviation brigades and PLANMC units rarely conduct joint training of any kind. Any training conducted by PLAA aviation, and the PLAN is limited to landing operations with various kinds of PLAN landing ships and civilian vessels, not with the PLANMC. The lack of coordination also extends to some degree to the other joint fires such as artillery support between both the PLAA and PLANMC as well as fixed aviation CAS support from the PLAN and PLAAF.
Political Will and its Potential Effects on Invasion
Another aspect of the PLA’s C2 capabilities would be the effects that the CCP would have on any operation to invade Tawain. The reason why the CCP would affect the operation is due to the PLA being the armed wing of the political party. Furthermore, the CCP believes that the PLA should be subordinate to it and follow its directives without question. The reforms that modernized the PLA – including those to modernize tis C2 capabilities – but also increased the CCP’s control over the PLA. The CCP’s control over the PLA would become apparent during any Taiwan invasion through several issues that will negatively impact the command’s C2 capabilities. The most significant of these issues is the continued emphasis on centralization of authority during any joint operation such as a Taiwan invasion. Centralization will likely complicate efforts to achieve an effective balance of responsibilities between the Joint Staff Department (JSD) and TC levels in two ways— micromanagement and buck-passing. The Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman Xi Jinping may decide that the joint operation for the invasion requires personal oversight. The personal oversight would likely be either one or a group of high-level commissars becoming part of the operation’s command structure to observe and report back to the CMC and to Xi. The reason for the close oversight is due to the direct connection between the failure of a Taiwan invasion and the continued survival of the CCP regime. The connection will likely lead to an increased likelihood of micromanagement at the theater level.
The second way centralization will negatively affect C2 in any Taiwan invasion is buck-passing or hesitancy by TC commanders to make decisions without the explicit approval from the CMC. The reason for the hesitancy is due to the pervasive risk aversion that still exists among the PLA officer corps due to the political dimensions of any invasion campaign. CCP leaders would likely place any blame on any failures or mistakes on the TC commanders or other PLA officers in command positions. The potential for being blamed for any mistakes would cause the commanders to want to receive higher authorization for all major and minor decisions. The ETC Party committee could decide to transfer any decision they do not want to make to the next-highest committee, which is at the CMC level. The buck-passing could lead to a merger of two tendencies: the JSD pushing decisions to TC commanders, who could be easily blamed for any failures and the upward pressure to send decisions to the TC. The mixing of the tendencies will likely lead to either significant delays or paralysis without anyone taking leadership responsibilities.
Taiwanese Military C2 Capabilities
Since at least 2017, Taiwan instituted several reforms to achieve ‘resolute defense and multi-domain deterrence.’ The strategy ranges from the Taiwanese military striking PLA units in assembly areas in Southeast China to when the PLA land on the beaches. However, the strategy also includes reforms for the island’s C2 capabilities to increase emphasis on joint operations and increasing flexibility. One of the most significant changes was beginning the process of creating combat theater commands from the Taiwanese Army corps in 2021. The new commands would be formed from the Army’s Penghu, Huadong, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Army Corps commands and called first to fifth combat theater commands. The leaders of the new combat theater commands would be responsible for the coordination of all units in the region during both peacetime and conflict. However, the reforms also make it possible for air force generals or navy admirals to lead the new commanders after the reorganization. The reforms also emphasized on developing decentralized C2 to make the structure more resilient and survivable against both kinetic and non-kinetic attacks. The goal is to create redundant, cross-domain, survivable C2 capabilities through using various long-range, survivable, mobile, and A.I.-enabled assets. Both the new theater commands and decentralized C2 will enhance the survivability of the Taiwanese military during an invasion by enabling commanders to act even when communications are cut off or jammed.
Another key reform Taiwan enacted is to strengthen and make more efficient joint C2 communications through various ways. One of the most significant of these ways was the creation of interchangeable redundancy Command Posts (CP) and lower-level operations centers throughout the theater command’s operations of area. These centers will maintain effective C2 over the units located in the command area to maintain effective joint coordination and functions. The Taiwanese military also increased the number of datalink recipients in all branches to strengthen C2 efficiency by integrating C2 systems and various platforms.
Conclusion
The PLA’s C2 capabilities will have a profound effect on the outcome of any invasion of Taiwan due to being vital for all aspects of the operation. However, there are several issues related to the organization’s ability to effectively conduct the operations using its C2 capabilities. One significant issue is that the PLA is still developing various doctrine on how to conduct joint, large-scale operations. Another issue is the relative lack of coordination between units at the tactical level witnessed during exercises. However, the most significant issue is the detrimental effect the CCP leadership would have on the operation’s C2. Taiwan’s military undergoing reforms to its C2 capabilities is so the island can continue to resist any PLA invasion until assistance from other countries arrives or they defeat China.
TDG: How would the CCP’s influence (direct and indirect) on an invasion operation affect the PLA’s Command and Control/decision making with any aspect of the operation?
Below are more articles regarding the PLA’s and Taiwan C2 capabilities:
China
Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan
In Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/Chairman-Xi/Chairman-Xi.pdf
China Maritime Report No. 19: The PLA Airborne Corps in a Joint Island Landing Campaign
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/19
Taiwan
Reconstructing Taiwan's Military Strategy: Achieving Forward Defense through Multi-Domain Deterrence
The Future is Small and Fast: Assessing Taiwan’s 2021’s Quadrennial Defense Review and U.S. Defense Posture in the Indo-Pacific
https://indsr.org.tw/uploads/indsr/files/202202/ba595006-02f1-4458-a9a3-aee8a5fc6640.pdf
Quadrennial Defense Review: The Republic of China 2021
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21054744/110-qdrying-wen-zheng-shi-ban-_ocr.pdf
Quadrennial Defense Review: The Republic of China 2023
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23973306/taiwan-national.pdf
Bibliography
Cozad, Mark R. ‘Toward a More Joint, Combat-Ready PLA?.’ In Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, edited by Phillip C. Saunders, Arthur S. Ding, Andrew Scobell, Andrew N.D. Yang, and Joel Wuthnow, 203-226. Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 2019. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/Chairman-Xi/Chairman-Xi.pdf.
Garafola, Christina L. “People's Liberation Army Reforms and Their Ramifications.” RANDBlog. September 23, 2016. https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/pla-reforms-and-their-ramifications.html.
Garafola, Cristina L. "China Maritime Report No. 19: The PLA Airborne Corps in a Joint Island Landing Campaign" (2022). CMSI China Maritime Reports 19. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/19.
Kennedy, Conor. "China Maritime Report No. 15: The New Chinese Marine Corps: A "Strategic Dagger" in a Cross-Strait Invasion" (2021). CMSI China Maritime Reports. 15. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/15.
McCauley, Kevin. PLA Systems of Systems Operations: Enabling Joint Operations. The Jamestown Foundation. Washington D.C.: January, 2017. https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/System-of-Systems-Enabling-Joint-Operations.pdf.
“Quadrennial Defense Review: The Republic of China 2023.” Ministry of National Defense Republic of China. September 1, 2023. https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23973306/taiwan-national.pdf.
Solen, Derek. “Chinese Views of All-Domain Operations.” China Aerospace Studies Institute. June 30, 2020.
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/
Shattuck, Thomas J. “The Future is Small and Fast: Assessing Taiwan’s 2021’s Quadrennial Defense Review and U.S. Defense Posture in the Indo-Pacific,” Institute for National Defense and Security Research 10, Is. 1 (June 2021): 9-18. https://indsr.org.tw/uploads/indsr/files/202202/ba595006-02f1-4458-a9a3-aee8a5fc6640.pdf.
Wuthnow, Joel. ‘Who Does What? Chinese Command and Control in a Taiwan Scenario.’ Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan, edited by Joel Wuthnow, Derek Grossman, Phillip C. Saunders, Andrew Scobell, Andrew N.D. Yang, 277-303. Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 2022, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/crossing-the-strait/crossing-the-strait.pdf?ver=VFL9qlF8Flii9svD4EI31g%3d%3d.
Yasuyuki, Sugiura. “The PLA’s Pursuit of Enhanced Joint Operations Capabilities.” NIDS China Security Report 2022, N/A, 2022. http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2022_A02.pdf.
Yeo, Mike. “Taiwan Unveils Army Restructure Aimed at Decentralizing Military.” Defense News. May 17, 2021. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2021/05/17/taiwan-unveils-army-restructure-aimed-at-decentralizing-military/.
TDG:
What are the primary difficulties created by C2 systems for the PRC? For Taiwan?