Lethal Minds Volume 19
Lethal Minds Volume 19
Volume 19, Edition 1 01FEBRUARY2024
LETHAL MINDS JOURNAL
Lethal Minds Volume 19
Volume 19, Edition 1 01FEBRUARY2024
Letter from the Editor
It’s been a minute since I wrote you. The Lethal Minds Journal staff took the holidays as a chance to recharge, an opportunity I hope you also had. For our still serving readers, I hope the new year finds you on the range, patrolling the training areas, in the libraries, or at the gym. For our veteran and civilian readers, I hope you’re sharpening whatever steel you now carry, be it physical or mental. We need you all at your best, it’s a particularly wild time in a perpetually wild world and you never know what tomorrow will bring.
My current situation drives that home for me. A week ago I was in a muddy cornfield on Maryland’s Eastern Shore, hunting geese and duck in the waning days of waterfowl season. As I write you, I am in a boutique hotel an hour’s drive away from a war, with an app on my phone to warn me of incoming rockets. On check in, the bellman showed me where to shelter if necessary. Now, I am finishing a delicious breakfast after a night in a luxurious bed. The coffee is strong, the orange juice is simply the best I’ve ever had. Meanwhile, about the same distance from me as I drove to board my dogs before leaving, people are trying to scrape together enough food to stay alive for another day.
Maybe that will be me next week. Things can change in the time it takes you to wonder why nothing ever changes.
I left active service in the Marine Corps in 1998 because nothing was ever going to happen. I joined the Marine Reserve because some part of me knows I have a propensity for being wrong. On September 11, 2001, I went for a run on a beach, marveled that any one day could be so impossibly beautiful, and wondered how short I could make my work day. At 9:03:02 I watched a second plane hit a second building and knew my life was forever changed. Three years later I was a reservist at war. Two years after that, I was an active duty Marine again, a profession in which I remained till 2021. Things change and you go places you never expected to do things you always wondered about.
Now I write. It’s another road I took somewhat by happenstance, as recognition that I don’t know what’s going to happen so I might as well do something that matters to me while waiting to see what else the world has in store.
One thing I do know however, is we need your help. Lethal Minds Journal is an all-volunteer, for vets, by vets, labor of love. As staff members lives change, so does the staff. If you would like to help edit the Lethal Minds Journal, let us know. Don’t worry about experience, we will teach you. If you want to publish, that’s why we’re here. For any of it, reach us at lethalmindsjournal@gmail.com.
Fire for Effect,
Russell Worth Parker
Editor in Chief – Lethal Minds Journal
Submissions are open at lethalmindsjournal@gmail.com.
Dedicated to those who serve, those who have served, and those who paid the final price for their country. Submissions are open at lethalmindsjournal@gmail.com.
Dedicated to those who serve, those who have served, and those who paid the final price for their country.
Sponsors:
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Recent episodes include:
23. Rich Jordan on Empowering A Team
41. How to use Chapter 31 Veterans Readiness and Employment benefits with Max
51. What If My Passion Has Nothing To Do With What I'm Doing Now with Bill Kieffer
In This Issue
Across the Force
Reading and Writing in the Ranks
The Dragon Dances at Night
Combat Shooting
A Fistful of Sand; Part 1: Seeing the Elephant
The Written Word
#Maneuver Warfare Write-up
Backcountry Hunters and Anglers Armed Forces Initiative
Poetry and Art
Forever
Tears
OP-ED
Rebuttal to assessment of why Scout Snipers were eliminated
The United States Needs Missile Defense for Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century
Across the Force
Written work on the profession of arms. Lessons learned, conversations on doctrine, and mission analysis from all ranks.
Reading and Writing in the Ranks
By Joshua Sulentic
The Greek philosopher Thucydides said, "The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools." Thankfully for the Marine Corps, the organization does a great job of promoting reading throughout the ranks. The Commandant's Reading List has a plethora of titles for all ranks, promoting warfighting initiatives and thought, as well as building a culture of leadership throughout the Corps.
Unfortunately, many younger enlisted Marines shy away from reading and writing, opting instead to focus solely on physical and tactical proficiency. This is not necessarily a negative thing; the closer a Marine is to the fireteam level, the more their ability to do their job relies on their physical capability and tactical training. A Lance Corporal needs to be more knowledgeable on immediate action drills than on Clausewitz's theories of strategy or Hannibal's tactics at the Battle of Cannae. But at the same time, training can only progress so far.
General James Mattis once said, "By reading, you learn through others' experiences, generally a better way to do business, especially in our line of work where the consequences of incompetence are so final for young men." General George C. Marshall (US Army), said in a forward for the book Infantry in Battle "There is much evidence to show that officers who have received the best peacetime training available find themselves surprised and confused by the difference between conditions as pictured in map problems and those they encounter in campaign…” Marshall concludes by stating By the use of numerous historical examples, the reader is acquainted with the realities of war and the extremely difficult and highly disconcerting conditions under which tactical problems must be solved in the face of an enemy."
Lessons learned on the battlefield are the primary way both doctrine and tactics are developed, but the Marine Corps is currently in a time where battlefield experience is strongly lacking in the rank and file. Our service’s most recent "conventional" combat engagement took place during the evacuation of Kabul in August 2021, when the Marines of 1st Battalion (BN) 8th Marine Regiment (MAR) and 2nd BN 1st MAR secured Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) and found themselves face-to-face with massive crowds Islamic State militants took advantage of to attack American peacekeepers. Though the experience gained by the Marines and sailors present there is invaluable, it can only translate so much towards a force-on-force kinetic engagement, where fire and maneuver is being exercised at all levels of command to close with and destroy the enemy. We have no way of sending Marines into combat zones to develop experience under fire, such as what Military Advisory Command Vietnam - Special Operations Group (MACV-SOG) practiced in the Recondo Course in the Vietnam War; where the final test to pass was a real-life combat operation. As it stands, the best way for Marines at the small unit level to learn from combat is to read the experiences of combat in the past.
To accomplish the endstate of a learned and experienced Marine Corps, through reading, leaders at all levels should promote reading focusing on the tactics and techniques of the past, gleaned from the combat experience of authors who learned their lessons the hard way. Many Marines may shy away from books that focus on the big-picture engagements or those more biographical in nature, so promotion should go to titles focusing on small unit tactics from these past wars. Books such as H. John Poole’s series from Posterity Press provide such lessons, especially the popular titles The Last Hundred Yards, Strategic Rifleman, and Super Squad, among many others. These books focus on squad and fireteam-level combat, both historical and theoretical. They also look into tactics used by foreign powers such as China, North Korea, Vietnam, and radical Islamic militants. Small unit leaders being well versed in the tactics of the enemy will be exponentially decisive in the next conflict where we very well may be facing forces trained using those same tactics from Korea and Vietnam.
There are other sources of reading focused on future Warfare, such as 2034 by Elliot Ackerman and James Stavridis or the Brute Krulak Center's Destination Unknown comics. They fall under the category of "useful fiction," described in a Marine Corps Gazette article of the same name by August Cole (author of Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War). In his article, Mr. Cole writes that by… "Using creative approaches like short stories, visual art, and other narrative techniques, Marines at all levels are allowed to battle test ideas and concepts before the stakes are life and death." Reading about fictional warfare helps develop the ability for Marines to think outside of the box so when unexpected conditions or enemy capabilities present themselves on the battlefield, warfighters have already developed the cognitive function to think through the problem and attack it effectively.
We must also encourage enlisted Marines, especially Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), to contribute to the professional dialogue taking place in publications such as the Marine Corps Gazette, as well as other professional sources such as The Warfighting Society's website "The Maneuverist" and the Lethal Minds Journal.
Another way for NCOs to be able to write about their knowledge and experiences in a less formal manner is through Instagram. Pages such as @strategic_enabler, @buckskin_gunfighter, @doctrinally_sound, and many others are run by NCOs who genuinely care about the profession of arms and focus on promoting a "lethality first" mindset. By contributing to the professional dialogue taking place in print and on the internet, Marines are preventing the stagnation of information and ensuring the best tactics, techniques, and procedures are being circulated through the force for utilization, improvisation, and improvement. We also have to discourage the idea experience and rank are qualifiers and/or disqualifiers for participation. Oftentimes junior members of a team can bring valuable insight to the table, and telling them to keep quiet is not always the best way of going about making sure they learn. Progressing as a professional is strongly reliant on trial and error, and allowing people to air their opinions and responding with professional critiques is one of the best ways for an individual to learn and grow; rather than allow them to keep to themselves a distorted opinion due to the worry of being looked down on for being "stupid."
Imagine a service where every member is passionate about continually learning from the battles of the past through a willing utilization of historical accounts and potential future issues. It will prevent old problems from becoming current ones and allow those lessons that were learned through blood in the past to be learned again through the same means in the present and future. At the same time, it will enable generations of warfighters to recognize potential threats and friction points on the battlefield and help them quickly find vulnerabilities that can be exploited to gain victory over the enemy or prevent our own vulnerabilities from turning into future failures. We should never forget what Gerhard von Scharnhorst said in June of 1793 on the matter of education: "In general, I have found that only well-educated people sought to alleviate the horrors of war and that uneducated officers were just as bestial as the rank and file."
The Dragon Dances at Night
By Bryce Allen
It had been eight days in the Straits and the Captains finally had their orders. Sensors had picked up United States Los Angeles class attack submarines entering the Taiwan Strait three days ago. Some aspiring midshipman declared the signature of the latest Sea Wolf class present and clear. Our intelligence efforts were not in vain. South Korea either knowingly or unwittingly played into our hands and soon they will be embroiled in a full conflict against our belligerent neighbors the DPRK, with the United States forced to support their long ally. The false removal of the Eastern general emboldened the Philippines to show their hand. A successful cyber defense was unexpected but not out of the realm of possibility. Deployment of anti-ship sea drone swarms from infiltrated militia vessels will soon overwhelm their small navy.
It is appreciated they betrayed our trade deal, leaving much of our surface to air defense network on the Senkaku Islands in place. Our electronic warfare (EW) boats are in position. The undersea cables will be cut and with the diplomatic negotiations leading to the capitulation of Taiwan’s air defenses of the islands of Kinmen and Penghu. The province will finally be brought to heel. The last thing the rebel independence forces see on their scopes will be amphibious ships moving east towards the western shore; till ballistic missiles, cyber-Denial of Service, and sabotage blankets the island in darkness…
Sounds like a scene from the latest military thriller, right? Or how about the next video game or movie? Maybe a Tom Clancy, Brad Thor, or Jack Carr?Unfortunately, it’s not the latest book, modern warfare game, or another spell binding Christopher Nolen film. This excerpt is the final play in a geopolitical and military wargame, that took place early December at the Elliot School of International Affairs, developed with several partners from Lethal Minds Journal, @Sino_talk and @Quantico_warfighting_soecity on Instagram. The wargame “Flash Point Tawain” gathered a group of students, military, and DoD personnel for the three-day event, the goals of which were to discover the general diplomatic, intelligence, military and economic (DIME) consequences for a predatory China pouncing on a crisis in Taiwan to advance its regional territory and display its dominance to the international world.
As a reader of the Lethal Minds Journal, a veteran, and a student of intelligence, I found this opportunity fascinating and leaped at the chance to attend. Driving a few hours to the nation’s capital, I found myself sitting amongst brilliant aspiring minds, knowledgeable officers, and a few knuckle-dragging dudes such as myself.
Broken into groups and then assigned countries, I found myself on the “dark side.” That’s right, yours truly, a representative of the People's Republic of China, Ministry of Defense (MoD). Weeks ago, I prepared for this special project by playing wargame simulators (video games). But getting my ass whooped by 19-year-old college students in LA was not my only experience coming into this. Part of intelligence is Preparation of the Battlespace so Lethal Minds dropped a five-part series of understanding the conflict between China, Taiwan, and the neighboring countries of Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.
The informative articles ran through the politics, geography, weather, military command, and logistics structure of the major players. Zoom classes brought an in-person perspective from subject matter experts (SMEs) who worked in the military and international affairs in Pacific Asia. Being the nerd I am, I wanted to understand the enemy further. So, off to the internet, I went to study FM 7-100.3 Chinese Tactics, Hybrid Warfare, and many open source intelligence pages such as @Sino_talk on Instagram and substack.
However, the culmination of the knowledge came from a gentleman on a Discord chat. He is a Singaporean military member and said something to me that made certain things click. When I asked, “How do the Chinese see their neighbors and what are their ambitions from the perspective of a very close nation to a powerful regional nation-state?” He replied simply about how they play Mahjong. Baffled, I asked for more. He informed me that to win Mahjong, one needs their pieces to touch the corners of the board. Most players would start at an edge or a corner and work their way across.
“The Chinese,” he says “would start in the center. Countering each of your moves until they have kept you from reaching your goal but have spread out across the board. Laying the final tile, the Chinese would complete the match in total victory.”
Lessons abounded from this interaction, from the catchphrase hybrid warfare, which integrates non-military actions and tactics into a strategic plan to the restructuring of units into Combined Action Brigades with overwhelming fire power and personnel. Battle tactics built around deception, information warfare, and psychological warfare lured powerful adversaries into disadvantage and saw them surrounded. The lessons I carried into the wargame armed me with the ability to view warfare through the lens of the Chinese, allowing me to participate by playing as closely to the actor as I could.
The performance of the war game was both exhilarating and rewarding. The hardest part was letting the others on my team have the reigns to explore as well. The wargame, through its interaction with other humans, graded through a proprietary “simulator,” became a challenging environment that was engaging from start to finish.
“Flash Point Taiwan” kicked off with an urgent humanitarian crisis leading to an economic blockade of PLAN ships around Taiwan. Being told we were operating under the assumption that the PLA had full access to its military forces and current technologies, our group took the advantage and conducted a full deployment around the island and to the north and south of Chinese territorial waters. Knowing the military make-up of ships, planes, missiles, and bombs, I informed my group that being allowed to do this gave us the advantage to invade whenever we chose. To be the best example of China, we had to choose the best time to invade, one where we have the full spectrum of geopolitical influence.
The team split into MoD and Ministry of Foreign Services (MFS) and set to work making deals and pushing the allied nations apart one move at a time. We used aggressive actions that were in the norm, such as calling the deployment of the Japanese defense force advancing with humanitarian ships as inflammatory, hostile actions pushing the Japanese on the defensive. Or playing on South Korean and DPRK tensions, which allowed political moves to capitalize on covert cyber-attacks on Taiwan all the while testing security around areas capable of amphibious landings in preparation for later.
The White Cell served to throw wrenches into our plans by creating scenarios meant to escalate and deescalate tensions such as the sinking of an Australian ship by PLAN as a reaction to bad weather and broken radios following the capture of smuggled U.S. small arms. Or the attack of the Philippine Navy on PLAN Militia vessels, destroying two vessels and all their crew. This tactic countered the United States team’s focus by forcing their hand in support of their partners in the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan at the same time all while keeping the higher moral and legal ground. We enforced the policy of peace at every turn but always with firm defense of CCP’s influence and Chinese boundaries, all the while working our military into position.
The final turn saw the most intrigue: a plan to influence South Korea, not the DPRK, to launch an attack. Could we give them false intelligence on their nuclear arsenal? Or the location of the Supreme Leader? Could Chinese special forces hit DPRK nuclear facilities, drawing the South and US into a protracted conventional war? These ideas were not the only ones. In fact, the South Korean Team surprised us the most. Their plan was to initiate the war by sneaking a rogue ROK submarine armed with an inert DPRK cruise missile that would launch from North Korean waters and strike the recently evacuated capitol building in Soul.
We got our chance to plan the invasion, however, after the ROC capitulated to political pressures and moved their anti-air defense units off the Kinmen and Penghu islands. A blackout would then commence taking the islands, anti-submarine destroyers would hunt the U.S. subs, and the amphibious ships would be seen headed for the west coast of Taiwan before a massive EW attack would hinder Taiwan’s sensors as a massive missile barrage, DOS attack, and cutting of undersea cables happen simultaneously. The landings would not on the west coast but swing south to landing sites.
That was the plan anyway. We ‘ENDEXed’ the turn before; the wargame’s goals were reached as the impatient U.S. team steamed a single destroyer into Chinese waters. In the end, we were justified in invading Taiwan and further throwing shade under the subtle tones of Red Alert’s “Hell March”.
Did we win? Well… I don’t know. Did we “think Chinese”? I’d like to think so. That’s why these games take place. To place SMEs, students, scholars and diplomats, military joes and average bros like me. Give us tools and knowledge and let us loose to influence others through power plays, economics, spy games and military action. Throw these actions into a simulator and test our responses.
Will we go for the throats? Or will we exercise restraint? Will we practice through another culture’s lens, playing an adversary through a way of thinking unlike our own, attempting to emulate the unknown? We might fail to do so in the process, or we might surprise ourselves and despite how close we come to the shiny red button, prefer peace and dance in the night one more time.
Combat Shooting
“Hey Snipers, can you guys run a short training package for one of the Rifle Company platoons next week?”
As a member of a unit sniper cell, it is not uncommon to conduct internal training for other elements of your larger organization. Regardless of your setting, be it Police, Military, or the private sector, snipers are commonly viewed as the go-to people when it comes to marksmanship training expertise. In most cases this is for good reason- sniper qualified personnel have typically passed a lengthy course or training evolution, that places a premium on the theoretical and practical application of polished marksmanship techniques. Further, given the generally small scale of sniper programs and teams, there typically exists a well-rounded level of instructional talent, and an ability to efficiently convey critical information to a student. However, it should be noted that as with many skills within the sphere of individual combat proficiency, high-level sniping (insofar as the marksmanship aspect) is merely the execution of existing basic skills, albeit at a more refined level.
Accordingly, the scope of this article is to provide an overview of what practical marksmanship training the non-qualified sniper can conduct, in order to level up their individual shooting ability. For maximum relevance across a varied spectrum of readers, this will intentionally focus on broad concepts as opposed to specific training drills or serials. In this way, regardless of the character or nature of your shooting experience or role, the goal is to pass on fundamentally oriented lessons learned that will benefit a diverse audience. In short, the information to follow is aimed at replicating what your respective organization's resident sniper team may pass on in the context of training non-sniper-qualified personnel.
Note: As terminology varies across the globe, it is important to clarify whether this relates to long-range (LR) or extended-range (ER) marksmanship. Therefore CQB, Combat Shooting, or Room Floor Combat is outside the scope of this article. ER or LR may have differing names depending on your organization, but the working definition of this article is an engagement beyond the standard effective or training range of the issued weapon system. In the Infantry context, for example, this would be the distances beyond what members are expected to qualify for.
Take it Back to Basics
The first step is to ascertain the current level of proficiency of your training audience. This is admittedly not sexy training, and may even be met with anguish from your students. In personal experience, some training audiences were surprised when on day one of supposedly ‘advanced’ marksmanship training, the snipers would have them sitting in front of a whiteboard refreshing the foundational skills.
In the long-range shooting world, there can be no productive work done at long distances without first preparing at short distances. In the context of developing marksmen, this sees the need to revise basic principles, both in the theoretical and practical setting. Your aspiring shooters may have a surface-level understanding of concepts such as grouping, zeroing, and marksmanship principles. However, there will invariably be those who have developed bad habits, let their knowledge fade, or are at a junior level to begin with. Accordingly, taking the opportunity to quiz your audience on said basics will both develop the group collectively, and allow you as an instructor to identify key gaps. Critically, this must be done in a non-judgmental and open learning environment. If the training audience feels like they are under attack, or being chastised for forgetting the basics, you will create a climate of resentment and decay the entire purpose of your training.
But Which Theory Matters Most?
From personal observation, one of the key foundational marksmanship concepts snipers typically understand better than riflemen is that of expected scoring area (ESA). ESA may have a different name depending from where you are reading this, but the concept is universal. ESA relates to the individual grouping capacity of the firer, the weapon, and ammunition. Simply put it is the average and anticipated group size of a given shooter, with a given weapon at a given distance.
ESA is one of the most basic concepts of marksmanship and is taught at the introductory level across most organizations. However, for this reason, a deeper understanding of its importance is often lost on even more experienced shooters. Having an intimate understanding of an ESA is what allows a sniper to understand their effectiveness at any given distance, and how to accurately make corrections for any misses. For this reason, it is critical knowledge for a sniper team, both for self and for team-mates.
In this way, the sub-tension rule (also fundamental knowledge for LR or ER worth revising) tells us a shooter who can consistently group five rounds within 150mm at 100m, will have an ESA of 450mm at 300m. Importantly, the average male shoulder width is between 400-450mm. With this knowledge, our shooter can theoretically consistently hit a man-sized target at 300m. Conversely, a shooter with a grouping capacity of 200mm at 100m will have an ESA of 600mm at 300m. This means they are statistically incapable of hitting a 300m target consistently. More importantly, when the deviation is compounded by positional instability, fatigue, poor visibility, and, most critically, wind, said shooter will struggle to make corrections, as any misses may be attributed to either the individual or external factors.
Accordingly, the importance of ESA backtracks through the other basics at play here. That is, in order to understand and work with your ESA, you must understand sub-tension. To understand the effects of sub-tension, you must be able to group well. In order to group well, you must execute the basics consistently. To execute the basics consistently, you must understand them beyond a surface level. We can begin to see the flow-on effect of how understanding=power in the skill of long-range marksmanship.
Sure is Blowing Down There
Wind is the largest non-deterministic variable when it comes to the external environments impact on your bullet in flight (Brian Litz, Applied Ballistics). The wind is also another component of long-range shooting where snipers excel, and the routinely trained rifleman is inexperienced. Most basic school-qualified shooters are provided the theory behind wind; however, seldom do they get to fire at the distances where its impact is most felt. Training for wind is, unfortunately, a skill best left to the practical setting, as few theory training aides can faithfully recreate the task of reading both wind direction and speed and subsequently applying a correction. For this reason, firing in a field setting away from the canalized and artificial setting of a flat rifle range is the best way to experience the effects of wind as a marksman.
The why behind training in non-permissive wind conditions is evident. However, the how will depend on your organization and training area or facility resources. As a theoretical starting point, it is always beneficial to revise the wind speed charts. These will commonly refer to flags or vegetation. However, another often under-utilised method is that of feeling. For example, at 3mph, the wind is felt on the cheek and exposed skin; at 9mph, the wind will cut through a light layer or shirt; and at 18mph, the wind can be felt chilling through an outer or thick layer of clothing. Further, wind in terms of its effect on bullet displacement should be covered in the form of a chart, or by providing key ranges.
Other methods can be simplified further, such as the venerable mild, fresh, strong labelling convention and the associated wind representation. These three speeds are then given according to hold-offs for the shooter represented as lateral target widths.
Training wind to a high level ultimately takes practical application of the knowledge. Accordingly, your training serial should be developed with the ability to shoot targets in challenging wind conditions in mind.
We Have Lasers For That
Once the fundamentals have been revised, the basics dialed in, knowledge confirmed, and wind understood, another key component of long-range marksmanship is judging distance. That is, the ability of the shooter to accurately estimate the range to the target in their preferred unit of measure. The importance of this as a companion skill is lost on many until they’re thrown into the deep end of long-range engagements. Logically, if you don’t know how far away something is, how can you possibly hope to engage it? Judging distance is a foundation fieldcraft skill, that snipers hone to a high degree of accuracy.
However, the average shooter training within their standard qualification distances is unlikely to experience such training opportunities or even be exposed to circumstances that demonstrate its importance. Accordingly, the best way to train marksmanship combined with this basic but critical skill is through unknown distance serials, or ‘UKD’s’. UKDs are a favorite practice for sniper range days for good reason; they test the ability to develop a distance solution to a target followed by an engagement. The bullet will ultimately reveal the truth as to the efficacy of your distance estimation. However, UKD’s need not be a mysterious sniper dark art. Since the introduction of the ACOG, modern prismatic combat optics have been equipped with range-estimating stadia lines that are a valuable asset in the range-finding tool box. In practice, a UKD training serial sees shooters engaging steel targets in a field fire setting, preferably across a broad frontage. Shooters should be given a series of multiple targets at unknown distances, and should use their ranging optics, or even the assorted eyeball methods to judge the target distance.
Of course, laser range finder optics and weapon ancillaries exist, however as with all technology our Mk1 Eyeball must be developed for redundancy. Additionally, the conflict in Ukraine drew attention to individual laser-detection systems. These helmet mounted units alert the individual to a potential laser, and provide a back-bearing and distance to the source. With such systems only likely to proliferate further, maintaining analogue skill sets in the face of technology is arguable more important than ever.
When it comes to marksmanship, it pays to remember no matter what technological, equipment, digital, or optical companions are presented, the basic skills will always remain an underlying constant. Your ability to comprehend and apply the foundation skills you likely have already been taught should be both an individual and collective responsibility. Accordingly, the more advanced the training, the more refined your fundamental skills must be. In this way, the boring reality is there is no secret drill that will instantly improve your long-range game. But simply the polishing of your existing base of knowledge.
A Fistful of Sand; Part 1: Seeing the Elephant
By Tyler Heisey
1300 BCE Mesopotamia provided us with some of the earliest writings of conflict and the mental anguish associated with those experiences. Assyrian soldiers who engaged in conflict experienced symptoms congruent with what we now consider Post Traumatic Stress. During the battle of Marathon recorded by Herodotus of Ancient Greece in the fifth century (January 1, 401 AD), he noted soldiers experienced dreams that brought them back to the battlefields and seeing ghosts of their slain adversaries.
Mental health, and Post Traumatic Stress in particular, are terms many of us are familiar with, however they have a greater depth than many may be aware of. Throughout the existence of humanity, there has been terms associated with the mental consequences of soldiering. Nostalgia and “Seeing the Elephant” were used around the time of the Civil War. World War I brought with it its own terms and the first time in history in which mental distress of soldering was described in literary autobiographies by English, German, and French authors such as Robert Graves (Goodbye to All That, 1929), Ernst Junger (In Stahlgewittern [Storm of Steel],1920), or Henri Barbusse (Le Feu, 1916). Terms such as battle hypnosis, shell shock, and war neurosis came into existence to describe this mental turmoil that some individual's experienced after fighting.
World War II was no different than other wars in the sense of the mental anguish and new terms that were used to describe these issues. Exhaustion, psychoneurosis, and operational fatigue. Vietnam declared these issues as combat stress and shell shock. Throughout all of the varying terms associated with Post Traumatic Stress, PTSD did not come into existence until after the Vietnam War when the diagnostic category was created by medical professionals.
Warriors of all cultures have experienced conflict and anguish associated therein. Western culture has taken a medical approach to “fixing” this issue. Initially these problems were considered malingering in World War I for soldiers having a desire to get off the front lines. Soldiers were executed for these issues, some were electrocuted in a medical setting to try to “fix” these issues, and others were lobotomized in an attempt to “fix” the issues.
Throughout the many years of research and study conducted it was determined these issues did not come from a somatic etiology (origin), such as microscopic brain lesions or concussions that would cause tremors, nightmares, or other symptoms. These issues come from the individual's psyche. Their values, beliefs, upbringing, religion, and love.
All of this is shared for the intention to shed light to conflict. Conflict has caused mental turmoil since the beginning of conflict, and through the copious amounts of research conducted on the subject it was determined that there is nothing wrong with the soldier. It is the experiences they survive and how their brain and heart are able to process them.
The following articles to come will go over aspects that you the warfighter can incorporate into your own toolbox for staying healthy, helping others, and upholding our legacy.
Remember, we are all together on this patrol called life.
The Written Word
Fiction and Nonfiction written by servicemen and veterans.
#Maneuver Warfare Write-up
By Ian Brown
Game Summary: #Maneuver Warfare: The Card Game is a deck construction-style wargame exploring the complexities of war today and tomorrow. Players build decks from a card arsenal ranging from guerrillas to underwater drones to social media influencers. Conflict takes place across the land, sea, air, space, and information domains. This game puts the maxim that “war is a clash of wills” directly on the table—players do not achieve victory through destruction, but by draining their opponent’s “Will” to zero. “Will,” comprised of its own cards, represents the player faction’s national commitment to the conflict underway, and is the game’s currency for every action players take.
There are hundreds—nay, thousands—of wargames out there, many from long-established and highly esteemed game designers. So: why this game?
I started this process for a number of reasons, some personal, some from professional experiences in my last few years as a Marine. The latter came into play first—from 2019 onward, from the Commandant of the Marine Corps on down, wargaming of all types experienced a renaissance of attention and employment. From my seat at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Future Warfare at Marine Corps University during this time, I quickly discovered that the Corps’ new enthusiasm for wargaming was tempered by several obstacles. Of these, one of the largest was the fact that there were very few accessible and operationally relevant wargaming options that I could put in front of Marines and have them say, “yes, this helps me better understand the challenges of the future.” Thus, while I used those extant wargaming options with our students, I began thinking that, maybe, I could create my own option. The confidence I gained in wargaming facilitation and scenario development from 2019 onward made me believe I might actually be able to design something new.
My design philosophy was guided by this desire to create something accessible and relevant—primarily, but not exclusively—for Marines. One major influence on my approach came from an earlier gaming passion of mien: the Star Wars-themed deck construction card game to which I devoted hours and hours (and almost all my disposable income) as a teenager. The Star Wars game was fun and playable to victory in less than an hour—there was the accessibility piece. But from my military experience I soon realized the game’s aspect of deck construction also hit the theme of relevancy. “Deck construction” is the result of the player’s pre-game planning process of deciding what strategy they will follow, what cards they’ll need to advantageously execute that strategy, and what possible actions by their opponent for which they need to plan. The player needed plan offense and have contingencies for defense, all with constrained resources reflected in the maximum card count allowed in the deck. Present in the process of designing one deck of cards were all the problems we placed in front of military students—indeed, military planners of any type. That seemed pretty relevant.
When I settled on deck construction as the framework for my own game, I started thinking more deeply about accessibility and relevancy. I knew that Marines already played many card games, be it classics like “Spades” or other deck construction games like Magic: The Gathering. Part of why card games are popular with Marines is that they’re sufficiently compact to fit in a cargo pocket. So “fit it in a cargo pocket” meant I needed to constrain the required deck size that each player had to bring. I settled on 60 cards, which is definitely small enough for a cargo pocket, while keeping in mind that one player must bring all the Domain (terrain) cards. Thus, I had to put constraints on that separate stack as well. Given the austere environments Marines are often sent to, I also wanted the entirety of the game to be only cards; I didn’t want to to burden players with wooden playing pieces or dice that could wander off. Taken together, you only had to worry about one game component, the whole thing fit on your pocket, and with the reduced physical footprint of a card game, the only other things you’d need to play were a flat space and a light source.
As to relevancy, I wanted to cover a few things. First, to engage with my initial target audience—Marines—I “gamefied” terminology from our foundational warfighting philosophy. My hope was the cards could bring to life how certain terms and concepts might work on a battlefield (yes, that included calling the game #Maneuver Warfare; I am not a subtle person). Hence cards are named Focus and Friction, and unit attributes reference striking power and resisting power. I went so far as to take the maxim that “war is a clash of wills” very literally: “Will” is the player’s resource for taking action, and draining the opponent’s Will is the victory condition. (There were limits to gamefying Marine concepts, based on some very difficult lessons learned by other game designers I know who created Marine-centric wargames. That’s the reason, for example, why my ground combat units are Maritime Infantry or Naval Infantry and not Marines…details can be provided by the Trademark Office)
Second, I wanted players to interact with current, emergent, and future capabilities and concepts, and do so across the 21st century framework of domains. Hence Blue’s force structure is borrowed from the Marine Corps and elements of the other services, and Red is a mixture of Russia, China, and some non-state violent extremist organizations thrown in for good measure.
Beyond existing force structures, I regularly scanned the news for developments in new technologies, or novel employment of existing tech, on fields of conflict around the world. It was a tragedy of history that I started work on this game in the midst of Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. But as a military professional, I felt an obligation to learn what I could from the war to better understand what future conflicts for Marines might look like. Thus, my design process included the frequent building and updating of new cards based on what I was seeing in Ukraine, so that players could ponder these insights within the game’s context. That’s why Blue has a “tractor towing team” that can steal and repurpose Red’s armored vehicles, and why Red has prison convicts who can act as bullet sponges to soak up battlefield damage.
A final aspect of relevance dovetailed with a hard play-testing practicality on my part. I have no artistic talent in my body—stick figures are the limit of my graphic skills. While I did my best with the talents the good Lord gave me, I feared my drawings might negatively impact interest in my game when much of the game’s premise was built on presenting players with a picture of future warfare. Also, I had a huge variety of prototype cards to play-test, and eventually I’d run out of new and interesting ways to illustrate my little stick figure warriors. My solution was to look seriously at generative artificial intelligence programs, which up to that point I’d largely considered a mildly amusing novelty. To move forward in card prototyping, I needed a way to create, on demand, large quantities of unique images in styles that matched my vision of futuristic warfare. Generative AI let me do that, and so I turned that novelty into an intense production pipeline. Then as I used the generative AI to paint my future picture, it occurred to me that I’d unintentionally added another layer of relevancy to the game. Not only would players build their decks using cards illustrating future technologies, the cards themselves—with their AI-generated images—showed the players an aspect of what could be done with one of those very technologies.
#Maneuver Warfare: The Card Game is available for pre-order from the Dietz Foundation.
Backcountry Hunters and Anglers Armed Forces Initiative
By Trevor J Hubbs
Backcountry Hunters and Anglers’ Armed Forces Initiative is a conservation-focused non-profit formed in 2020. Our mission is to instill within the Military Community, a knowledge of conservation theory, a love of wild places, and a desire to elevate America's public wildlands as fundamental components of American freedom.
At the Armed Forces Initiative, we introduce the Military Community to public lands and waters by providing outdoor adjunct therapy to enhance their mental, spiritual, and emotional well-being while providing them with a new mission as conservationists. We host events all over the United States and Canada teaching participants how to hunt, fish, camp, hike, and recreate outdoors through the lens of conservation. Our events focus on conservation principles ensuring participants not only learn how to hunt and fish but why hunting and fishing are critical components of wildlife management. We don’t offer once-in-a-lifetime experiences but the knowledge and skills for a lifetime of experiences.
Our Theory of Change:
1. Provide short-term medicine – We know that being outdoors, hiking, hunting, fishing, camping, bike riding, etc. has a positive effect on transitioning veterans, or anyone experiencing symptoms of PTSD. We know there is a correlation between time spent outdoors and reduced stress, feelings of depression, and anxiety. Our first goal is to take members of the military community and show them an amazing time outdoors while teaching them to replicate the experience without being dependent on an organization to take them the next time. We like to say, we don’t do once in a lifetime experiences, we create a lifetime of experiences.
2. Build A Tribe – We know another issue being faced by the military community, particularly after transition, is a lack of a community or tribe. By introducing our event attendees to people with the same life experiences, who also like hunting and fishing, we can ensure that our events are not simply a one-off event or a once in a lifetime experience. Upon leaving our event each candidate should have the skillset to repeat the experience and a peer group with whom to get outdoors.
3. Inspire a Mission of Conservation – The last piece to this puzzle is the most important. We know from surveys and outside studies that having a cause bigger than oneself is hugely important to mental health in the military community. Service to a cause bigger than themselves is why most of our members chose to enlist in a time of war. Fortunately, with hunting and fishing, conservation offers a cause greater than catching a fish or harvesting a bull elk. Conservation is a cause that ensures an experience that meant so much to a participant, is there for another comrade in arms. Supporting conservation efforts is a way for members of the military community to continue to serve their country by protecting public lands that only exist in the United States. BHA wants everyone who leaves their events to understand not only how to recreate outdoors, and to have a peer group with whom to recreate but also to become so passionate about their chosen pursuit that they cannot help but get involved. BHA wants to give the military community a new mission, one of conservation.
So far, the Armed Forces Initiative has taken over 6000 participants and hosted over 100 events annually all over North America. To get involved or get someone you care about involved please visit https://www.backcountryhunters.org/armed_forces or email armedforcesinitiative@backcountryhunters.org and follow us on social media @BHA_AFI.
Poetry and Art
Poetry and art from the warfighting community.
Forever
By Kyle Herl
The sun, rising
The smoke, rising
The smell of death, rising
The cigarette smoke filled my lungs
My eyes rose to survey
A hand, rising from the soil
Detached, clutching at the sky
A bird lands
A bird flys
Feeding itself
Covering itself
With the scraps of death
The radio crackles
The sun, risen
The smoke, gone
The smell of death, forever
Tears
By Kyle Herl
How many of our young men must die
A generation culled by old men
Before we hear our mother cry?
Rallied to a familiar cry
For country! For Family! For brothers left and right!
How many of our young men must die?
Gold stars and folded flags go by
Black hats, black dresses and black suits
As we hear our mother’s cry
With boots on the ground and wings in the sky
On foreign land we shed our blood
How many of our young men must die?
For generations we have gone to die
Exhorted to greatness by spineless men
But they won’t hear our mother’s cry
For now we raise our glasses high
Over fields of poppy red
How many of our young men must die
Before we hear our mothers cry?
OP-ED
In rebuttal to Gunner Kostielney’s assessment of why Scout Snipers were eliminated from the Marine Corps
By Michael R. Tucci
First, I want to establish that anyone can call me out for not knowing or having any experience even remotely close to the Gunner’s. My background was as a logistics officer in the Marine Corps from 1990-1994. I have never seen combat. My goal in joining the Marine Corps was to become an infantry officer and take the test to become a reconnaissance officer. Of course, the Marine Corps had other things in store for me – needs of the Marine Corps, and all. But, from time I was 13 years old in 1980, I have been studying low-intensity conflict, insurgency, and terrorism, something that I still continue today.
Now, into this analysis. First off, I think the key to rebutting Gunner’s assessments is the very title of his piece: “Evolve or die on the vine.” What does that mean? It means that if not properly employed or properly executed, then you must learn proper employment or evolve tactics to the situation. There is no implicit “get rid of it” just because it is not working, or the snipers are not doing their jobs properly. If the snipers “have failed to evolve in the areas of reconnaissance, surveillance, combat reporting, tactical communications, and fires” as the Gunner states, then that is a leadership issue and/or a training issue.
From there, the Gunner goes on to explain how sniper teams are failing “to provide timely, accurate, and actional information in support of the intelligence cycle” and that they “failed to avoid compromise, achieve effective communications, report accurately on target, refine the fire support plan on the objective, and accurately call for an adjust fires.” All of these are training issues. Do we get rid of infantry lieutenants because it takes them time to learn to effectively communicate, make use of their combined arms assets, and aren’t good at calling for fire and adjusting fire? No, they need to learn, become better, practice, and be mentored.
My big question is – if sniper teams did succeed (as many did and were invaluable in Iraq and Afghanistan) on all these points, then should they still be eliminated?
Now, let’s look at the projected distributed operations across the Indo-Pacific, with our focus on fighting China. If we look back to our original island-hopping campaign in WWII, we see snipers were needed and effective. The modern sniper came about primarily out of necessity in the trench warfare of WWI. On the modern battlefield in Ukraine, we can see that they have been vital parts of not only defensive and offensive combat, but they, as they have historically, provide a huge psychological impact on the enemy.
If we have small units on distributed islands across the Pacific, do we intend to fight completely over the horizon with long-range fires directed by these units? If we were going to plan on that as our sole means of combat, then why put Marines on these islands in the first place? Why not direct all these fires from satellites, drones, and the F35, which is designed to integrate ground, naval, and air fires from throughout the battle zone?
We know that long-range fires will be integral to the success of the campaign in the Pacific, but China has bold ground strategies as well, some of which are well outlined by @vermilion_china, just as an example. I don’t believe for a second China wouldn’t like to occupy island chains across the Pacific, especially because they will have a much more difficult time logistically supplying their forces across the Pacific than we will with our fine-honed logistics machine that can support all-out war anywhere on the globe.
What that means is that there will be landings on islands with relatively small detachments of Marines. Those Marines will need to defend themselves, and vital to that defense would be surveillance, reconnaissance, overwatch, and the psychological effects of accurate, long-range sniper fire.
Carlos Hathcock, at one time, single-handedly kept an entire battalion pinned down for several days. On relatively small islands with relatively small units of Marines on them, they may be assaulted by much larger Chinese forces, and what better force multiplier than snipers to hold them at bay…or attempt to?
Also, what if we combined sniper teams with drone teams? The information that can be gathered by that combined team could be immense. And, if those drone teams also have attack drones as well as surveillance drones, then between the accurate long-range fires of the snipers and the “no one can hide” effectiveness of the drones, you could potentially have a four-man team that can truly stop a battalion in its tracks.
We have activated and trained snipers for every war since WWI. After WWI, WWII, and Korea, we shut down the sniper schools, only to reopen them with vast amounts of lost knowledge because of the time gaps where there was no training or schoolhouse once the next war began. It was finally in the 70’s that the Marine Corps decided to open the scout sniper schools permanently, and they have arguably produced the most effective snipers in the world ever since.
Let’s learn from those mistakes of the past and not have to play catch up once China decides its borders can no longer contain its ambitions.
The United States Needs Missile Defense for Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century
By Braydon Murphy
During a dangerous and unforgettable thirteen days in October 1962, President John F. Kennedy successfully navigated through a crisis that could have led to the nuclear annihilation of the United States. The Cuban missile crisis is the closest we ever came to a nuclear confrontation. Over 60 years later, we still face the same threat of nuclear war.
The adversaries of the United States possess nuclear arsenals capable of destroying life as we know it. To eliminate this threat, the United States should heavily invest in missile defense. New systems and expanding our missile defense arsenal will allow the United States to protect its civilian population and strategic interests from incineration.
Missile defense technology has progressed rapidly in recent years. There have been many successful weapons systems tests that destroy an incoming nuclear missile, such as THAAD and the SM-3. Soon, there will be laser-based weapons systems like Israel’s Iron Beam, which can destroy an incoming missile for just $3.50. While the United States possesses these systems, we only employ them to be able to counter threats from North Korea, which has a small arsenal. We need a much larger arsenal to counter the nuclear threats from Russia and China.
We need missile defense because we cannot rely on the doctrine of mutually assured destruction or MAD. This doctrine of catastrophic consequences provides strategic stability and dissuades any state from using nuclear weapons. However, mutually assured destruction is, at some point, inevitably going to fail. Given enough time, there will be instances where miscalculations or mistakes are made that will eventually lead to a nuclear confrontation.
Expanding missile defense weapon systems would ensure that the United States can defend against a nuclear attack, thereby protecting American civilians. The United States would no longer be subject to nuclear annihilation. We would no longer live in fear whenever a nation armed with nuclear weapons became aggressive on the world stage.
In addition to ensuring the survival and well-being of American civilians, missile defense would protect against threats posed to America’s allies. Just as the American nuclear umbrella covers NATO member states, an expanded missile defense would protect against nuclear attacks. Missile defense systems would decrease the need for our allies to acquire their own nuclear weapons for deterrence.
An expanded missile defense is necessary to stay technologically ahead of our adversaries. China has begun to develop and test weapon systems to take out incoming missiles. China is also a rising and aggressive power on the world stage. If the United States does not work to expand its missile defense, it will fall behind other nations that show no concern with disrupting the balance of power.
Critics argue that expanding our missile defense systems would risk upsetting the strategic balance. This argument assumes that the strategic balance has yet to be upset. Russia already sees the existence of missile defense as an existential threat. China is pursuing its own missile defense with a similar view to the Russians. Therefore, the United States is receiving all the consequences of disrupting the balance of power with none of the benefits of protection.
The United States must pursue an expanded missile defense to protect against the risk of nuclear annihilation. We can’t rely on there always being a statesman like John F Kennedy to navigate through the next crisis successfully. We can no longer risk living under the nuclear sword of Damocles that hangs above our heads. We can use the emerging technology at our disposal to make nuclear weapons obsolete and create a better and safer world.
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This ends Volume 19, Edition 1, of the Lethal Minds Journal (01FEBRUARY2024)
The window is now open for Lethal Minds’ twentieth volume, releasing March 1st, 2024.
All art and picture submissions are due as PDFs or JPEG files to our email by midnight on 20 February 2024.
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