Lethal Minds Volume 3
Lethal Minds Volume 3
Volume 3, Edition 1 01AUGUST2022
Lethal Minds Volume 3
Volume 3, Edition 1 01AUGUST2022
Volume 3
A lot has happened since the release of the last Volume. We’ve crossed into the social media micro influencer territory at almost 10,000 followers. We’ve released Bulletin From The Borderlands, our first paid subscription publication. As part of adding our second publication, we’ve expanded to partner with some truly talented intelligence analysts and independent journalists from across the social media community.
We are now past the proof of concept stage with Lethal Minds. We think we’ve created something pretty special, something that can only happen with the continued support of all those who write in every month. We have a lot of new avenues ahead, and quite a few projects going behind the scenes. The one I can talk about here is an upcoming release for soft goods, and a Year In Review physical copy of the journal, featuring the best works from this years Volumes in a single hard copy edition. Our year in review will be released via drop shipping, and will be made to order.
As always, this project is not possible without you, our readers. For that, we are forever grateful.
Be informed, be prepared, be lethal.
Graham (CPT US Army)
Editor of Lethal Minds Journal
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Logistics Infiltration: Are There Gas Stations on Spratly Island? - Hunter Keeley
Ever since videos documenting miles and miles of stationary tank columns emerged following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the phrase ‘amateurs talk tactics, experts talk logistics’ has been in vogue. Indeed, the haphazard and halting campaign waged by the Russian military highlights the complex logistical challenges militaries face in the modern era. One memorable tweet apologized to logisticians. Bearing witness to the Russian military machine locking up in a country adjacent to Russia made the tweeter grateful for years of relatively well-fueled operations in countries which do not share a border with the United States. The tweeter concluded that, in fact, logisticians may not all be POGs. Incompetence and graft notwithstanding, the Russian fiasco grimly reminds that logistics of interstate warfare make-or break campaigns. Logistics should now be firmly centered in the mind of U.S. military planners, particularly as the U.S. contends with ‘peer or near-peer’ adversaries for the first time in thirty odd years.
A hypothetical battle against a peer adversary is the yardstick by which the United States Marine Corps is today measuring its own readiness. Concluding that the Marine Corps is ill-equipped and unprepared for such a battle, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Berger, embarked on a massive redesign of the USMC’s operating construct, titled Force Design 2030. The planners and strategists behind Force Design 2030 foresee that a war, today, against our peer/near-peer adversary would occur in the Pacific Theater and involve small units of highly trained Marines operating within the enemies’ WEZ (weapon engagement zone), unmasking and re-masking long range artillery pieces to strike at the enemies’ critical military infrastructure, and setting conditions for the Navy to float its own assets into the battlespace.
To the degree that the current Russian invasion of Ukraine can in any way be mapped onto a theoretical war in the Pacific between great powers, General Berger’s predictions at what the future-fight might look like have in fact borne out in some ways. Most importantly, since the donation of U.S.’ HIMARS and M777 Howitzer artillery pieces, battles in the Donbas region of Ukraine have devolved largely into artillery duels. Geographic similarities between the Donbas region and the South Pacific at first glance seem sparse. Nonetheless, the open terrain in the Donbas mitigates the efficacy of ambush and hit-and-run tactics which previously were so effective in the fighting surrounding the Ukrainian capital, Kiev. A similar mitigating effect is achieved by the geography of Pacific island chains, each separated by miles upon miles of open water. If dueling artillery is in fact where the tactical money will be made in the future fight, as the Marine Corps’ embrace of the mobile HIMARs system and the Ukraine experience suggests, then planners face a series of harsh questions surrounding the fueling and sustainment of these artillery assets.
Operating inside the enemies’ WEZ, particularly inside a sophisticated enemies’ WEZ, is no easy task. Avoiding enemy surveillance and reconnaissance as a foot-mobile infantry unit is in and of itself technically and tactically demanding. Throw in a HIMARs system and the barriers to remaining undetected skyrocket. At the very least, it can be expected that in the run-up from a cold war to a shooting war, units staged on islands throughout the South Pacific would become highly mobile, moving locations under the cover of darkness and bedding down in the day in an intense effort to remain hidden. Then, as the situation becomes kinetic, artillerists and their accompanying infantry will engage in “shoot and scoot” tactics, unmasking and firing and retreating before counter-battery fires can achieve effects. At all stages of the operation, incredibly weighty artillery units must be shuttled back and forth, to and fro, always moving in order to evade enemy detection and fires. The sustained mobility of artillery units will be an essential capability should conflict arise in the Pacific Theater.
Now, to the central question of this article. Where will HIMARs systems refuel and rearm? The remote Spratly Island Chain in the South Pacific is highly contested, and one could ostensibly foresee Marine Units operating there. But the Spratlys lack pre-existing infrastructure. How can fuel, replacement parts, or spare ammunition be delivered to units across the Pacific, when their survival depends on stealth? If a naval warship is unable to enter the enemies’ WEZ, then under whose auspices will an oil tanker enter the same WEZ? Driving these queries is the incontrovertible tension between the increasing technological complexity of warfare and the dispersion imposed by the oceanography of the Pacific. If units require a ready supply of rockets to be effective, but are spread thin across a vast ocean, and cannot at any cost be detected by enemy surveillance, then extreme pressure will be placed on logisticians to deliver miracles, achieving the unthinkable both in terms of distance and stealth.
SOPs for artillery duels are still emerging, but it seems that participating artillery will rapidly consume gasoline- not to mention rockets or shells. It is conceivable to envision a HIMARS being paired with a fuel truck and an ammo truck as a mobile team which can carry the fight beyond first contact. Of course, the signature of the HIMARS will increase proportionally with each added crutch, but to sustain operations a HIMARS alone will not be sufficient. Such a ‘team’ construct does not totally solve the problem of resupplying HIMARS, but simply kicks down the road the inevitability that at some point a link must be formed between our forward deployed assets in the Pacific and a resupply ship.
To the task of conducting resupply under the watchful eye of an enemy hypersonic missile there is no silver bullet. Instead, those training for battle in the Pacific need to embrace unconventional logistics. The Marine Corps’ Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations is already moving in this direction, noting that the energy intensive and high signature logistics chains of the legacy construct are sitting ducks in today’s world. The Manual coins the term ‘logistics infiltration,’ and proposes a slew of innovations including “power generation and storage, additive manufacturing, autonomy, AI, electric engines, [and] energy harvesting.”
Regarding ‘logistics infiltration’ it is imperative to recognize that the above-mentioned capabilities are not presently developed nor integrated into the operating forces. Top-down innovation alone is insufficient. Additional bottom-up innovation is needed across specialties and branches to meet the needs of a force standing-in the enemies’ WEZ. In the future fight we won’t witness columns of immobile American tanks. However, if we can’t make farfetched logistical capabilities commonplace we may well see stranded HIMARS, taken out of the fight not by an enemy missile but by our own inability to stealthily deliver supplies across great distances. (1)
The tip or handle of Russia's Geopolitical Spear? - AGP
The Wagner Group, PMC Wagner, or however you decide to call them, is a group whose global escapades have been well noted in both non and mainstream media. With movie appearances and an apparent fandom from their members, they are in all aspects a significant piece of the Kremlin’s geopolitical spear. The Wagner Group has been involved in a myriad of conflicts with the earliest one being during the 2014 war in Donbass, which saw alleged members of Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin’s group aiding Russian backed separatists during the conflict. The group has also been extensively used in order to restore and eventually grow the Kremlin’s sphere of influence in regions such as the Middle East and Africa, regions it once had a prominent hand in prior to the dissolution of the USSR.
One could argue that large PMC groups that operate out of countries such as China, South Africa and the USA are just extensions of their respective host nation’s foreign policy. However, there are glaring differences between how a PMC such as Executive Outcomes and Wagner operate.
This article will look into the Wagner group’s capabilities in regards to their deployments, with a particular focus being shown for their African deployments, which are typically less documented on in-respect to their Ukraine and Syria deployments.
The Africa Adventure:
Throughout recent years, the Wagner group has seen an unprecedented amount of action in the African continent. From the Central African Republic to Mozambique, the PMC has been deployed to perform a plethora of tasks ranging from (but not limited to); The protection of mining concessions in Madagascar1 and the CAR2. The training and restructuring of the CAR’s military. Aiding the Mozambican government in defeating an insurgent uprising.
In order to discuss their effectiveness in the African continent in comparison to a PMC such as EO, it is important to highlight one thing. Doctrine is not universal, what works in one environment will not work in another, the inability to understand that will lead to one’s downfall. Africa is a glaring example of that, as many post-colonial African armies have had dismal combat records, in many cases, this was and is due to many of their militaries utilizing the same or an adaptation of the Euro-centric doctrines their former colonial masters utilized. You cannot fight a war in the bush whilst utilizing the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP’s) of an army that was meant to fight in the flatlands of Europe.
The Wagner Group’s deployment in Mozambique, which was linked to Russian economic interests in the area and was preceded by a meeting between Russian president Vladimir Putin and his Mozambican counterpart Filipe Nyusi, can be described as one of their most glaring defeats.
They were tasked with providing training and combat support to the Mozambican Armed Forces (FADM) counter-insurgency operation in the Cabo Delgado region, a region which was and still is being plagued by ISIS-linked insurgents. The arrival of the approximately 200-strong Wagner contingent was also complemented by the arrival of approximately two Mi-17 helicopters and one mi-24 attack helicopter which were hauled to the country using an AN-124-100 (RA-82038) which belongs to the 224th flight unit. The aircraft and accompanying hardware can be seen in Nacala Airport, Mozambique, below:
Now what do these images really show? For one, they show a PMC that is able to directly and efficiently utilize governmental resources for otherwise non-governmental tasks, which is not something very common amongst conventional PMC’s.
How did Wagner fare in this conflict? Well, many accounts relate to a total of 7 dead within the first week of their deployment, many of which were killed in ambushes and subsequently beheaded. This grim reality sets the tone for their entire deployment, as they were meant to be the “elite” component of this war, a component of which would mimic the saviour image given to the Mozambican government by the USSR during the cold war. The end result was a myriad of basic operational failures that resulted in a sense of distrust amongst Mozambican and Wagner troops, so much so that there were reports of joint patrols not taking place anymore, furthermore, failures such as the over-reliance of “high-tech” equipment in an environment that favours mobility and concealment, an environment of which an enemy can blend in with the populus and strike at their favour, the lack of intelligence prior to assignments and a general sense of absence in terms of understanding the nuances of the target culture and area. This is where the subject of doctrine comes in, you cannot generalize environments in the context of Africa and in particular Mozambique. In the end, the Wagner group had underestimated their enemy, what was once thought to be a rag-tag group of insurgents proved to be a very capable group with an impressive intelligence gathering capability.
CAR
It would be a disservice to mention Wagner in Africa without briefly touching on their deployment in the Central African Republic (CAR), as this was one of the many deployments that had made it to the limelight for a myriad of reasons. The CAR deployment occurred in late-March of 2018 with speculations of being hinted as early as January of that year. The deployment saw an initial batch of 175 troops being sent to the country, or, according to the Russian government “5 military and 170 Russian civilian instructors were also sent there to train CAR military personnel”. This Wagner contingent was involved in direct combat operations, training the CAR military and presidential guard duties. There were reports of Wagner personnel guarding mines.
The CAR deployment can be described as one of the larger deployments in the region, given that there were an approximate 1,400 troops within late May of 2018 alone. This deployment also saw the involvement of many other entities linked to Wagner, such as PMC Patriot which is tasked with providing close protection to VIPs. This, as well as the fact that many prominent figures of the group such as Col. Konstantin Pikalov were based there for brief periods of time exemplifying the importance of the CAR deployment had when it came to establishing a firm but widespread foothold in an extremely resource-rich country.
Cultural Warfare:
As is known, Wagner is utilized as an influence tool by the Kremlin. There are varying degrees of influence that one might expect from a PMC of the same scope as Wagner. One of the not-so-spoken about factors is their inherit rise to stardom (depending on who you ask) in cinema. Movies such as “Granit” and “Tourist” reference their deployments in Mozambique (Granit) and the CAR (Tourist), interestingly enough, the movie Granit does appear to attribute it’s namesake to a Wagner unit commander that was killed in Mozambique.
Despite the comedic value these movies may bring, they are not to be taken lightly. The CAR and Mozambique have strong ties with their former Russian (or Soviet) allies in a cultural level, and these ties are exploited when it comes painting the Russians as “Saviours”. This is represented in the movie Granit during a “present-day” scene in which one of the characters who had worked with the soviets as a soldier shows his grandson a picture of him and 5 soviet soldiers, he then proceeds to tell his grandson that the Soviets were seen as “Gods” to them… This obviously becomes integral to the plot as when the boy meets the Wagner men he his reminded of what he was told about Soviets.
Comparison:
When writing and/or researching about PMCs in Africa, the name Executive Outcomes will tend to pop-up more often than not. For good reason. Executive Outcomes can be described as a pioneer in the PMC space, it is a PMC that understood the nuances of conducting successful campaigns in Africa and the value of adapting their doctrine in accordance to their environment. EO first major operation took place in Angola. They were tasked with liberating the port town of Soyo from an aggressive presence of soldiers from the political party called the “National Union for the Total Independence of Angola” (UNITA) , which at the time had placed the Angolan government in a precarious position as this town is where a large portion of their oil revenue originated from.
In order to retake Soyo from the strong UNITA presence, EO had airlifted 40 of their men into the area of Soyo, which, in conjunction with their Angolan Armed Forces counterparts, managed to push UNITA out of Soyo. One can measure the success of this operation by the fact that the Angolan government had immediately requested 500 more of EO’s men once Soyo was liberated. EO’s success in Angola can also be measured by the fact that their presence resulted in the first general elections taking place in the country, with one of the defining requests that UNITA had made towards the Angolan government was that EO be removed from the country.
In regards to Wagner however, the story is a bit different, as it is important to highlight that in the context of Mozambique they were not fighting an ‘Unknown’ enemy that could wage both conventional and unconventional warfare such as UNITA in Angola. They were fighting a relatively new movement that essentially moved in an unhindered fashion throughout the area, an enemy that also, as previously mentioned, possessed adequate levels of intelligence in order to enable them to mount ambushes. So can we say that we are blessed with hindsight and thus have the ability to criticize the Wagner group’s shortcomings in this environment? No. The fact of the matter is there was a clear level of underestimation taking place when it came to their enemy and the capability of said enemy. So much so that some reports from the South African news agency “dailymaverick” reported on information received from supposed government sources in Mozambique that indicated that Wagner troops would sometimes go into Areas of Operations without having adequate intelligence beforehand. This hints at a level of overconfidence that was all too costly for them.
The first differentiator in capability between Wagner PMC and Executive outcomes comes down to one thing. Culture. Executive Outcomes mainly hired former South African Defence Force (SADF) personnel and former 32 Battalion personnel (many of which were former Angolans themselves prior to being inducted into the SADF). This selection of talent had given Executive Outcomes an unparalleled level of skill when it came to operating in Sub-Saharan Africa, as many of these men were expert trackers and knew the subtle and not-so subtle cultural nuances which in turn would enable them to efficiently gather intelligence on their enemy. Wagner on the other hand was chosen due to their relatively cheap cost compared to Southern African PMC’s.
All in all Wagner PMC ultimately reinforces the narrative and term “African solutions to African problems”, an idea of which the founder of Executive Outcomes, Eeben Barlow, is an avid supporter of. (2)
Belarus: The Hypothetical Invasion in Ukraine - S2 FWD
In the hypothetical scenario where Belarus invades Ukraine, Belarus will almost certainly attack western Ukraine, specifically territory originally held by Poland prior to 1939, under the pretext of NATO aggression or self-defense. However, in reality, their addition to the conflict would stem from direct pressure from Russian President Putin to Belarusian President Lukashenko. Any overt military involvement in Ukraine will most likely destabilize Belarus through economic isolation from the international community and civil unrest, which could be stabilized through the establishment of the Union State. The specific areas Belarus would attack in western Ukraine would be the Volynsika, Livivsika, Zakarpatsika, Rivnensika, Ternopilsika, and the Ivano-Frankivsika Oblasts. While their military has no combat experience, Belarus’ goal would be to create another front in northwestern Ukraine to divert Ukrainian resources and personnel from the Donbas region, which would assist Russia with achieving their goals in southern Ukraine. This attack from Belarus in northwestern Ukraine could also be used to block any ground incursions from Polish/NATO forces.
Belarusian Support to Russia:
Over the course of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Belarus has been sitting on the sidelines while providing aid to Russian troops but not directly involving themselves in the conflict. Belarus has been Putin’s chief ally regarding the invasion – Russia used their country as a launching point to attack northern Ukraine, launching points for ballistic missile strikes, and allowed Russia to use their airfields to conduct (failed) air assaults. Even from the political backlash and imposed sanctions, this alliance hasn’t faltered during the invasion – in fact, the invasion only deepened Belarusian and Russian partnership.
“Within the next several months, we will transfer to Belarus the Iskander-M tactical missile systems, which are known to use both ballistic and cruise missiles, both conventional and nuclear,” Russian President Putin told Belarusian President Lukashenko in a meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia while the G7 meeting took place in the Bavarian Alps. Putin also said Russia would help Belarus upgrade its fleet of Su-25 fighter jets to make them capable of carrying nuclear weapons. "This modernization should be carried out in aircraft factories in Russia and the training of personnel should start in accordance with this," he added after Lukashenko asked him to "adapt" the planes. In May, Lukashenko also stated that Belarus had bought Iskander nuclear-capable missiles and S-400 anti-aircraft anti-missile systems from Russia. The Iskander-M is a road-mobile short-range ballistic missile system that replaced the Soviet Scud missile. Its two guided missiles have a range of up to 500km (300 miles) and can carry conventional or nuclear warheads.
Belarusians voted in February, days after Russia invaded Ukraine, to allow the country to host nuclear weapons and Russian troops permanently. On February 28th, Belarus decided to give up on its non-nuclear status as it voted to allow the country to host nuclear weapons and Russian forces permanently as part of a package of constitutional reforms that also extended the rule of leader Alexander Lukashenko. Central Election Commission head Igor Karpenko said that 65.16 per cent of referendum participants voted in favor of the amendments and 10.07 per cent voted against. The voter turnout stood at 78.63 percent.
Recent Belarusian Support to Russia:
On July 7th, Oleksiy Gromov, Deputy Chief of the Main Operative Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, stated Belarus has given "full control" of the Zyabrovka airfield located in the Gomel region, near the Ukraine-Belarus border to Russia. On the same day, "Belarusian Hajun'' reported that the Belarusian authorities extended the flight restriction zone for civil aviation for another three months (until October 7th), extending the threat of missile attacks originating from Belarus.
Why would Belarus join Russia in their “special military operation” in Ukraine?
The only reason why Belarus would send troops into Ukraine would be as a result of Russian coercion, most likely from direct pressure from President Putin to President Lukashenko. Lukashenko almost certainly is aware that the majority of Belarusians would not support the war if Belarus instigated it – their hypothetical involvement would likely stem from self-proclaimed self-defense or through the rhetoric of NATO aggression.
Belarus will likely become unstable if any overt military support to Russia was announced. According to the Atlantic Council,” the Belarus dictator is anxious to avoid upsetting the country’s military and fears potential mutiny if he gives the order to invade. He is also acutely aware that the anti-regime mood that sparked nationwide protests in 2020 has been suppressed but not extinguished, despite the presence of over 1,200 political prisoners currently languishing in Belarusian prisons.” To justify attacking Ukraine, it is probable that Belarus would deflect the blame to either NATO as a whole, or specifically Poland and Lithuania, who Belarus has already deemed as a threat towards their security.
Which NATO countries would Lukashenko accuse of threatening Belarus and/or Russia?
Belarus’ main rivals along their borders are Poland and Lithuania, both of which have been vocal on the presence of Russian troops in Belarus even prior to the invasion of Ukraine.
Political and military leaders in Belarus have stated their belief that Poland will attempt to seize western Ukraine and Belarus to re-establish the territory it held prior to World War 2. Reuters reported on May 23rd that Lukashenko was concerned about what he called moves by the West to "dismember" Ukraine and accused Poland of seeking to seize the Western part of the country without providing evidence supporting his claims.
"What worries us is that they are ready, the Poles and NATO, to come out, to help take western Ukraine like it was before 1939," Lukashenko said during a televised meeting with President Putin. Moscow has in the past suggested that Poland seeks to establish control over historical Polish lands in Ukraine, a claim that Warsaw denies as disinformation.
This claim isn’t new and has been mentioned before by Russian’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) since the beginning of the invasion. On April 28th, Sergei Naryshkin, the chief of Russia's SVR, cited unpublished intelligence that he said showed the United States and Poland, were plotting to restore Polish control over part of western Ukraine. "According to the intelligence received by Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, Washington and Warsaw are working on plans to establish Poland's tight military and political control over its historical possessions in Ukraine," Naryshkin said in a rare statement released by the SVR.
This rhetoric was echoed by Belarusian military leaders in a recent announcement. Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Belarus, Major General Ruslan Kosygin, said on July 7th that in the event of "Western provocations", Belarusian forces will strike primarily on the infrastructure of Poland.
"The territory of Poland, as well as the Baltic States, is turning into a testing ground where the United States plans to unleash another bloody conflict in Europe against the Russian Federation and its allies," Kosygin said. He pointed to the holding of military exercises, as well as "attempts by individual Polish politicians to initiate the return of the so-called native Polish lands, which mean the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus".
Major General Ruslan Kosygin called all this "preparation for conducting military operations eastwards" against the background of "the degradation of Western European countries and the actual loss of their independence in decision-making".
"At the same time – and this should be understood first of all by the Polish leadership – in the event of a conflict, the territory of Poland with its military infrastructure becomes a priority target of the strike, namely decision-making centers, elements of the control system, points of permanent deployment of the National Armed Forces, arsenals and bases, as well as critical objects of their economy and transport infrastructure," Kosygin said. He concluded that "the West should clearly understand that our response to any armed provocations will definitely be adequate and tough".
Poland has repeatedly denied any aspirations to reclaim any territory lost since World War 2.
"The lies about Poland's alleged plans to attack western Ukraine have been repeated for several years," said Stanislaw Zaryn, spokesman for Poland's special services coordinator. "The aim of Russian propaganda is to foster distrust between Ukraine and Poland, to undermine PL-UA cooperation."
Regarding Lithuania, the southernmost Baltic State has blocked the transit of goods subject to European sanctions traveling across its territory from Russia, through Belarus, to Russia’s Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad. Russia has termed it a “blockade”, but Lithuania says it affects only 1% of the normal goods in transit on the route, and that passenger traffic is unaffected. The sanctioned goods include coal, metals, construction materials, and advanced technology, which make up 50 percent of Kaliningrad imports, according to the region’s governor, Anton Alikhanov. Russia has demanded the restrictions be lifted, claiming that Lithuania’s actions as “openly hostile” against Kaliningrad. President Lukashenko also said Lithuania's move was "a sort of declaration of war" and "unacceptable".
Russia also made vague threats towards Lithuania. “Russia will certainly respond to such hostile action,” Nikolai P. Patrushev, the head of the Kremlin’s Security Council and one of President Vladimir V. Putin’s closest advisers, warned during a visit to Kaliningrad. He said that Russia would take measures “in the near future” that “will have a serious negative impact on the population of Lithuania.”
The perceived threat from NATO and economic isolation from western countries has caused Russia and Belarus to reaffirm their commitments to the “Union State”.
What is the “Union State”?
The Union State is the economic and military alliance between Belarus and Russia, which was signed in 1997 to mend relations that dissolved after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. President Putin has said on July 1st that Russia and Belarus are being pushed to “accelerate the unification processes” in response to “unprecedented political and social pressure” from the “collective West”, and the sanctions imposed following the invasion of Ukraine are pushing Belarus to integrate more quickly with Russia. Putin also vowed to strengthen the technological, industrial, agricultural, and cultural ties with Belarus. These comments come days after NATO formally invited Finland and Sweden to join the military alliance on June 29th. “After all, together it is easier to minimize the damage from the illegal sanctions imposed, easier to launch the manufacturing of popular products, develop new competencies and expand cooperation with friendly countries,” Putin said at the Forum of Russian and Belarusian Regions.
This isn’t the first time that the creation of the Union State was brought up since the invasion of Ukraine – in fact, Belarus and Russia reaffirmed their commitment to the strength of the Union State several days after the invasion started. "We are taking coordinated measures to protect our economic security and the technological sovereignty of Russia and Belarus," Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin said after meeting his Belarusian counterpart Roman Golovchenko in Moscow on March 14th. "Above all, we consider it necessary to strengthen integration in the Union State," he added.
It is likely that Putin doesn’t view the Union State as just a military and economic alliance, but also as an extension of ancient Russian land and cultural brotherhood dating back to the 11th century. Rusi, an independent think tank based out of the UK stated, “The war in Ukraine has starkly revealed in practice the importance to Russia of the Slavic Brotherhood (slavyanskoye bratstvo). Putin has cast himself as the gatekeeper of Russia’s national interests – with his own version of what that might mean – in which Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine are an inextricable ancient trinity, united by their centuries-old historical, linguistic and cultural ties. This idea goes beyond mere spheres of influence and back to Ancient Rus’, the cradle of Russian civilization. It is a concept that Putin has referred to in his articles published over the past year, with Moscow playing a central role in unifying Russia’s lands to protect them from invading armies.”
The claim that Ukraine was a part of Russia’s historic lands has been perpetrated by Putin since before the invasion but was recently stated during his Victory Day speech on May 9th. “Defending the motherland has always been sacred,” he said, "Today you are fighting for our people in Donbas, for the security of Russia, our homeland." During that speech, Putin went on to claim that Ukraine and NATO were preparing to conduct an attack against the Donbas region. "They were preparing a punishing operation in Donbas to intrude on our historic lands. In Kyiv they were saying they might get nuclear weapons and NATO started exploring the lands close to us, and that became an obvious threat to us and our borders." These same cultural ties are shared with Belarus. The rhetoric used to invade Ukraine could be used to establish the Union State – reaching farther than economic and military ties, but rather ancient historical and cultural ties that Putin was willing to invade Ukraine for.
Conclusion:
It is possible that in the scenario where Belarus overtly attacks Ukraine, the reactions from the international community coupled with the civil unrest could possibly result in Belarus and Russia formally establishing the Union State – the international community will most likely call to mirror sanctions on Belarus as they did to Russia when they initially invaded Ukraine. Also, Putin and Lukashenko would most likely call the establishment of the Union State a step towards unifying the ancient lands of Rus, further vocalizing their self-proclaimed duty to “defend” historic lands. Additionally, while the possibility of Belarus attacking Poland or Lithuania is unlikely, Belarus would likely use any military action in Ukraine as political messaging towards the aforementioned countries or NATO as a whole to reaffirm their alliance to Russia and/or their anti-NATO stance. The effort to attack western Ukraine would likely serve two primary purposes:
To redirect Ukrainian personnel and equipment from southern Ukraine, allowing Russia to accomplish their military objectives and
Potentially blocking any Polish / NATO ground forces from entering Ukraine. (3)
Across the Force
Written work on the profession of arms. Lessons learned, conversations on doctrine, and mission analysis from all ranks.
Lighter and More Lethal - Timothy Johnson
Less is more. This seemingly contradictory statement is true in many circumstances where an excess of one aspect of something subtracts from the effectiveness of the whole. The Marine Corps has realized this and has begun seriously considering what it needs to stay relevant in potential conflicts with a near peer adversary. In many cases, this has meant the Marine Corps giving up capabilities that it has historically maintained. Force Design 2030 lays out the reasoning behind this and details much of what the Marine Corps has decided to give up to lighten itself and create room for future capacities. What the document fails to offer is a plan to do the same thing for an individual Marine. The Marine Corps made the tough decision to give up equipment and create a more lightweight, expeditionary and austere force on a platform and systems level, but that has not yet done the same for the Lance Corporals and Private First Class. The Marine Corps is not the nation’s heavy infantry; the Marine Corps is the nation's force in readiness; it is the middleweight force– expeditionary, lightweight and lethal. However, the gear Marines carry does not reflect that description; they are weighed down by their excessive load. In order to make the Marine Corps as a whole more maneuverable, mobile, and lethal, the Marine Corps needs to deeply consider what it needs as opposed to what it wants the individual Marine to carry, as it has begun to do with many of its platforms.
General Berger, through his publication of Force Design 2030, has set the Marine Corps on course to face the growing threats around the globe. “Great power competition” is the buzzword of the day for the Marine Corps. Coming out of the Middle East, the Marine Corps is taking a deep look at the coming fight–especially in the South China Sea–and discerning what it needs to do to be ready for it. In the words of General Berger, we are preparing to make the “sweeping changes needed to meet the principal challenges facing the institution.” Those sweeping changes are needed if the Marine Corps is going to be prepared to perform “Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and the related Marine Corps and Navy concepts of Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO).” Distributed, contested and expeditionary implies a force that has a smaller signature, is more austere and lighter than exists currently. From a platform perspective, the Marine Corps has already begun to change dramatically to meet the coming demands of such operations.
Shedding the weight of tanks, most cannon artillery, some heavy lift helicopters and other large and logistically constraining platforms has made the Marine Corps lighter, more expeditionary, austere, and lethal. Lighter means faster, and speed is a weapon, it “impacts the enemy, especially mentally, causing fear, indecision, and helplessness.” Less tanks and AAVs also frees space for more troops, fuel, food and gear that are necessary for the coming fight. “Less is more” in the sense that lighter systems afford more mobility, a lower signature, and less logistical restraints. Becoming more austere, going without things that the Marine Corps has become accustomed to having, makes the force more lethal. However, there are many things that we still have and may not need. The commandant has stated that he is “not confident that we have identified the additional structure required to provide the tactical maneuver and logistical sustainment needed to execute DMO, LOCE and EABO in contested littoral environments against our pacing threat.” In the 2021 Force Design 2030 Annual update, General Berger has diagnosed direct investments in unmanned surface vessels, modernized training systems, expeditionary logistics and light amphibious warships among many other areas to meet the demands of the coming fight. What is not listed among those things is an exploration and investment into what the individual Marine carries, and the necessity of that equipment in the coming fight.
Historically, there are many circumstances where Marines have had to make tough decisions to leave gear behind in order to increase their mobility. In The Last Stand of Fox Company, the Marine Corps found itself in North Korea, an austere environment, fighting against a capable enemy. In order to prevent themselves from being surrounded, the Marines near Yudam-ni had to move quickly and relieve Fox Company, on Fox Hill to secure the pass out of their current predicament. Before these ridge runners, the men sent on this mission, set out to rescue the men on Fox hill, they had to decide what to bring. It was suggested that the men:
“discard everything in their C-rations except the canned fruit, crackers, and chocolate. The entire battalion, [Davis] said, was to jettison all superfluous equipment and lug only essential weapons, extra ammunition, and sleeping bags… Crews for the heavy and light machine guns were doubled, and each rifleman was handed an 81-mm mortar shell to lug in his mummy bag. “
The ridge runners had to decide what was absolutely necessary to accomplish the mission; they shedded excess weight to make themselves more mobile. Like the ridge runner, the Marine Corps also needs to answer these essential questions: First, what does the individual Marine need to stay survivable, maneuverable and lethal in the coming fight? Secondly, what essential gear can be lightened, distributed or recreated to decrease the load of the individual Marine?
The Marine Corps should rethink what an individual needs to carry to meet the goals of Force Design 2030. The load of an individual in combat has almost doubled, from 60 pounds 200 years ago, to an average of 117lbs in the Marine Corps in 2016, ranging from 90 to 159lbs. This enormous increase in weight has consequences. The fatigue caused by carrying excessive loads lead to lower cognitive performance, longer response times and decreased physical performance. Injuries significantly increase as a result of an excessive load as well, resulting in loss of talent and combat strength when individuals need to be evacuated for musculoskeletal injuries as a result of heavy loads. What, then, can the Marine Corps get rid of to lighten the individual’s load? Body armor is a significant part of the weight that every Marine carries, and there is no question that body armor saves lives. However, “the heavy weight and bulk of body armor decreases soldier performance.” There is a trade off occurring, protections for mobility. Which one would the Marine Corps rather? Large main packs weigh approximately twelve pounds. Is the space provided by such a large pack absolutely necessary, or a contributor to the excessive load on a Marines back? There is no escaping the fact that a significant load must be carried by Marines in many circumstances. However, it is crucial to shed everything that is not absolutely necessary. It has already happened from a platform level: tanks are gone, artillery is significantly reduced, and so are half of all heavy lift helicopter squadrons. The Marine Corps must think and act like the ridge runners in Korea; “all superfluous equipment” must go.
There remains a base line of equipment that the modern Marine requires to survive on the battlefield; those things can be lightened or distributed to decrease an individual's load. Radios are a good example. Communications gear mostly remains bulky, heavy and prone to lapses at best. Having lighter, smaller and more effective radios would be a great boon to an infantry platoon. Using solar panels or mats instead of heavy batteries to recharge those radios or other equipment would both lighten a Marine's load and help lessen the logistical resupply replacing batteries requires. MREs are another hefty item that every Marine must carry. Instead of fully hydrated ready to eat meals, dehydrated meals combined with locally sourced water would be more weight conscious. Spread loading would also benefit the individual. Carrying one E-tool per buddy pair, or one sleeping system during operations cuts down on the overall weight a unit carries. This can also apply to cooking equipment, weapons cleaning gear, and supplemental first aid supplies. We create unnecessary redundancy by having all Marines carry the same gear, this can be avoided. Similarly, Company and platoon commanders should be given more autonomy to decide what gear and supplies are absolutely necessary for an operation and cut out anything unnecessary depending on the mission and operating environment. All of these changes would result in a more agile, lightweight and maneuverable force.
The Marine Corps has already made the bold decision to lighten its platforms and systems in order to become a more lethal fighting force against a near peer, it should continue in that same spirit to lighten the individual Marine’s load. It is moving away from the tanks, artillery, and heavy lift capabilities to build a more agile force that can move and survive against the increasingly lethal striking capabilities of our adversaries. Like the ridge runners in The Last Stand of Fox Company, the difficult decision to leave gear behind needs to take place now for individual Marines. They too need to become more agile, more maneuverable, and more lethal by trading an excess of equipment for mobility. Greater mobility for Privates and Lance Corporals will put the Marine Corps in a better position to meet the goals of Force Design 2030, and make the Corps as a whole a deadlier force. (4)
The March Upcountry: A lesson in leadership from 370 BC - Insurgent Chimichanga
This is a story of war. Like most wars, this one was set in motion due to the machinations of a small, power-hungry elite. Similarly, the truth of this story exists in the fighting holes and on the battle lines. It is a story that comes to us from the distant past, from a time that resembles our own in every way that matters. Technology has advanced, but people remain the same.
This is the story of a man. Xenophon the Athenian, who was thrust into a leadership position against his will and who shouldered the burden, so that all under his command might see the shores of home once again.
The year is 401 BC. The Peloponnesian war between Athens and Sparta is over. Across Greece, the city-states are rebuilding and re-arming. The nearly 30 year conflict wrought untold destruction to the disparate Greek peoples and produced a class of professional soldier that had never before existed in human history. These warriors found themselves without a cause and without battles to fight. Like so many today, they had survived the war only to struggle with surviving the peace.
Enter Cyrus the Younger, brother to the Persian king Artaxerxes II and heir to the throne. By all accounts, Cyrus was an amiable and just leader, unlike his brother who ruled through fear. Like countless others before him and countless others who would come after, Cyrus coveted the seat of power, convinced of his own ability to be a better king than his brother. Cyrus saw opportunity in the listless mass of soldiers who were wreaking havoc across the Greek countryside and he gathered 10,000 of the best and most experienced fighters to him. He then pointed them, like a dagger, straight at Babylon and the heart of the Persian Empire. Cyrus knew that his comparatively small force of professional soldiers would be more than a match against the hordes of Persian conscripts that would surely be placed in his way.
It was a gamble that ultimately didn’t work out. Cyrus was killed at the battle of Cunaxa along with hundreds of his men. And although the Greeks were victors on the field of battle that day, it was a pyrrhic victory that found them on the losing side of the campaign. The survivors faced an even tougher prospect; They could lay down their arms and come under the not-so tender mercies of the Persian king, or turn around and fight their way back to the shores of the Aegean.
In typical Greek fashion, the final decision was left to a vote. Most men knew that they faced torture, slavery and eventual execution in the custody of the Persians. They elected to take their chances and march home, across more than 1,700 miles of hostile terrain. Harassed the whole way, they fought what we would call a sustained retrograde action through the plains, mountains and valleys of Anatolia. Shortly after Cyrus was killed, an envoy from the Persian king arrived, claiming truce and offering terms that were favorable to the Greeks. They would be allowed to remain under arms, the Persians said, and would be escorted home without further delay.
This turned out to be a ruse, designed by the Persian general Tissaphernes, that resulted in the capture and murder of every Greek flag officer, leaving the 10,000 rudderless and without leadership. Once again, the soldiers resorted to democracy and elected a new leader from amongst their ranks. Xenophon was chosen, among several others, to lead the mercenary army home. What followed was an epic struggle that came to define the man and cement the 10,000 in the annals of history.
A passage from Xenophon’s seminal work The Anabasis sums up his command philosophy and serves as a reminder to all that leadership starts with the individual.
It was a frigid night at elevation and snow was falling in great drifts across the narrow mountain pass where the 10,000 were encamped. They were trapped. The Persian army was arrayed on a plain behind them and a fortress stood before them, blocking the pass and their pathway home. Xenophon, like his men, was under-equipped for the cold weather. Morale was low and the men were despondent. Across the formation, everyone seemed resigned to their fate. Sure that the expedition was doomed to failure. Wrapped in his cloak, Xenophon found a spot on the ground and tried to sleep. Afterward, he recorded the following passage;
“Why am I lying here? The night advances and with daybreak, the enemy will be upon us. If we are to fall into the hands of the king what is left for us but to face the most horrible of sights, to suffer the most fearful pains and then to die. Insulted–an inglorious death. To defend ourselves, not a hand stirs. No one is preparing, no one cares. But here we lie, as though it were time to rest and take our ease. I too! What am I waiting for? A general to undertake the work? Am I waiting till I am older myself and of fuller age? Older I shall never be, if today I betray myself to my enemies.”
Xenophon rallied himself and his men, performed a bold flanking maneuver around the hostile fortress and attacked from two sides. He achieved total surprise and the battle was won. The men continued their journey, safe in the knowledge that they had elected the right man to lead them.
This singular passage, among all the works of Xenophon and arguably all contemporary military literature, should resonate with today’s combat leaders. Who, but you? If you are unwilling to pull the long watch, if you are unwilling to defer your own comfort for the survivability of your troops, If you can’t rally yourself for the betterment of your team / squad / platoon, then you fall short of the standard set almost 2,500 years ago.
The 10,000 fought across the Western reach of the Persian Empire and eventually made it back home. Many died, but many more survived, thanks to the efforts of leaders like Xenophon and the combined sacrifice of the entire cohort. Xenophon was a student of Socrates. He co-authored the Spartan constitution and was ultimately exiled from Athens due to his militaristic beliefs. He endeared himself to his men, found a home amongst the greatest Western philosophers and was an inspiration to Alexander the Great when it came time for the young Macedonian to embark on his own campaign.
Around the same time Xenophon was leading his men home, spiritual thinkers in India composed one of the most important religious texts in world history. The Bhagavad Gita is the record of a great battle waged between related clans over the issue of succession to the throne. It details the dialogue between Arjuna, a prince of one clan and Krishna, the highest deity in the Hindu pantheon. Krishna posits the following to Arjuna as they survey the field of battle the night before fighting is set to commence;
“For a warrior, nothing is higher than a war against evil. The warrior confronted with such a war should be pleased, Arjuna, for it comes as an open gate to heaven. But if you do not participate in this battle against evil, you will incur sin, violating your dharma and your honor.”
My contention is this: the war is in your mind. Like Xenophon, lying in the snow on that mountain pass, the choice is yours to make. Do you choose the hard right, or the easy wrong? Your Soldiers, Marines and Airmen are astute individuals who will know which choice you make, even if you yourself don’t. Choose the hard right. Be a leader who inspires your troops to even greater feats. Be the first over the rampart, the first through the breach. Lead with actions not words. Lives depend on you.
The moment a set of chevrons or a bar is pinned on your chest, you become the lowest common denominator in the grand equation of your life. You owe it to your troops to be the best and most clear-headed leader you can be. Choose the hard right. For yourself as much as for them. Because in the end, when everyone moves on to live out the rest of their lives, all that remains are the memories of those things you did, or failed to do.
5 Kilometer Decisions Space - Jeremy Kofsky
There is an aporetic tale within the Marine Corps of the reason behind having a three mile run for the Physical Fitness Test; it was the average distance of a resupply mission during the Vietnam War and mid-level leaders recommended they needed to know how well their Marines would perform during that combat test of endurance. While this is likely a reason in search of an answer it does demonstrate the way unwritten standards learned in combat can have far reaching effects upon standardized doctrine and operating procedures. Similarly, a reading of the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Basing Operations (EABO), the EABO Handbook, the Commandant’s Force Design 2030, Stand-In Forces Concept, and Initial Planning Guidance, the Marine Corps lays out the tasks to be accomplished but fails to provide the internal structure at the operational level, where Staff Noncommissioned Officers (SNCO) face the Tactical realities provided by Operational Commander’s Intent further derived by Strategic Guidance laid out in doctrine. In both the EABO future and distributed operations present, SNCOs must be able to be effective operators, not strategically and not in the proverbial last 300 yards, they must be proficient Distributed Leaders in the same three mile radius that became the standard in the Marine Corps decades ago.
While many of the current lessons being experimented on by the Marine Corps’ Littoral Units have set up the infantry in a positive manner to accomplish EABO goals, it has left a critical vulnerability in the way support Marines integrate their operations, be it communications, fires usage, transportation/maintenance, intelligence, Signature Management, and/or Information Operations. To this end, SNCO Distributed Leaders, of all MOSs, need to know the capabilities and limitations of each of these various functions. This may come off as a ‘no duh’ moment and these areas are covered at various Professional Military Education courses but these courses lack the in-depth and hands-on knowledge that will be critical in the proposed future conflict zone where one Soldier, Sailor, or Marine may need to have multiple skill sets given the lack of mass formations while still needing to accomplish the myriad of warfighting functional areas.
The SNCO Corps should endeavor to gain this knowledge for themselves and how to be effective dispatchers of convoys, responsive intelligence consumers/customers, PACE planning communicators, and Signature Management managers. If we lack these skills in the managerial sense, it will be nearly impossible to give our enlisted charges the actual hands-on skills necessary to succeed in their tasks, since we do not know what the tasks should be in the first place. Creating a mosaic of SNCOs who understand the complexities, and perhaps more importantly, know the right questions to ask of the various specialized supporting skill sets will in turn make them more effective in their own role. A transportation SNCO who understands explosive device indicators and what atmospherics their convoys should be looking for symbiotically helps themselves and the intelligence section. This same SNCO knowing when and where he can move his convoy due to communication (PACE’d) and maneuver (SIGMAN) windows increase the survivability of their unit (Force Protection) therefore getting the needed supplies to where they need to be (Logistics).
This pattern of thought can be endlessly replicated throughout each of the various warfighting organizations within the Distributed and EABO realm. We are merely limited by our imagination. The ability of the SNCO to creatively integrate the collective TEAM in support of an operation makes the overall unit more effective, cohesive, and lethal in their ability to deliver desired effects onto the adversary and/or targeted audience. This in turn creates the true definition of synergy wherein all parts of the organization can work in concert as they understand each other’s strengths and weaknesses and ways to enhance the former and eliminate the latter through shared strength.
The battlefields of the future will force more decisions of critical life or limb impact further down the trough. Where in Iraq and Afghanistan times, the SNCO had to make critical decisions about Rules of Engagement, maneuver, and coordinating fires within an urban environment, in the current experimenting future, they may have to decide whether to even go into the city, when to even be able to communicate for fires, and whether taking a small target out is worth making their signature bigger and therefore creating a targeting opportunity exponentially more dangerous for their maneuver elements. The core tasks of infantry, intelligence, logistics, communications, and other critical support elements of the Task Force will remain the same; those 300 yards will always be the same 300 yards they have been since time immemorial. We must focus on how to integrate those to create the whole being larger than the sum of its parts.
To effectively manage the conglomeration of 300 yard specialists in our formations, we must read, train to, and understand their procedures, manuals and doctrine, the same way we must expect them to read and understand our own unique way of doing business. We are a brother and sisterhood of professional colleagues, unique in our approaches to problem solving and mission accomplishment, but oftentimes we let our internal cognitive dissonance and not wanting to be ‘the boot’ again shy us away from learning new skills outside our comfort zone. Those in our charge are smart and perceptive, if they see we don’t push the limits, why should they? If we are not creating new linkages between ours and others jobs, why should they endeavor outside of their proverbial cave? We represent the right way to do things; the military entrusted us to do those things and make changes based on our experiences. We are doing a disservice to those before us who made similar corrections within their organization. Our goal should always be to endeavor to effectively manage the talent we have and ensure we have the three miles before and after their objective sorted through proper use of integration and synergy whilst they fight the last 300 yards by locating, closing with, and destroying the enemy.
Struggles at JRTC - The Box Wizard
Being an OC/T at the US Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) offers a unique perspective to observe Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) conduct operations. JRTC conducts 8-10 rotations yearly, each lasting two weeks. This allows astute observers to identify potential trends and to see what most likely are universal points of struggle. This list is not all inclusive and is based on my personal opinions and observations. There are many more shortfalls that units typically have, but these are seen every rotation and working to fix them can pay high dividends for any unit.
Security- Units are failing on a routine basis to conduct basic security measures. This has been across the board regardless of branch or MOS; Combat Arms are not immune from this issue either. Failure to conduct security results in the enemy’s ability to seize the initiative and quickly capitalize on the confusion that sets in amongst friendly forces. I have seen a team of OPFOR quickly destroy platoon and even company sized elements due to a lack of security. Command Posts and sustainment forces are especially susceptible to enemy actions when they do not establish security at their positions.
It needs to become habit among all Soldiers that security is first in the priorities of work in all situations. Non-combat arms personnel must begin to practice this essential warfighting skill to ensure survival. When in doubt, pull security.
Synchronization- BCTs have difficulty synchronizing all War Fighting Functions to act in a manner that allows them to be brought to bear in multiple locations against the enemy. This typically stems from ineffective war gaming at the Brigade level to identify friction points that will occur during operations. Another typical reason is the lack of a synchronization matrix to help their Battalions visualize the execution of operations.
We have seen that when units can synchronize maneuver, fires, intel, and sustainment even to a minor degree, their results are much more successful. This requires detailed planning, production and dissemination of warfighting products, and effective wargaming by staff at both Brigade and Battalion level. SOPs can help to drive all these processes and make them easier to accomplish when presented with the additional stressors combat operations produce.
Dismounted Movement- At JRTC, the roads are death. This lesson hits particularly hard with Motorized Cavalry Troops. They believe that based on their composition, they are inherently road bound. This allows their movements to be easily predicted by enemy forces and they quickly become attrited, putting the Brigade at a distinct disadvantage without reconnaissance forces. Many Infantry formations suffer from a lack of physical conditioning for moving dismounted over severely restricted terrain. Suffering numerous heat casualties that sap combat power and attention away from the mission.
The best remedy is to practice dismounted movement in severely restricted terrain as much as possible. This builds comfort and physical conditioning. Motorized Cavalry Troops must begin dismounting. They need to plan and execute basic movement techniques between mounted and dismounted forces in a mutually supporting relationship.
Employment of TUAS- Companies/Batteries/Troops are not utilizing TUAS enough. During a rotation, Geronimo typically has 2-3x as many flight hours as RTU. This number does not include BCT level assets, such as the Shadow. At a minimum, maneuver elements have the Raven at their disposal, with some fielded by the Black Hornet copter as well. We see in Ukraine right now the sheer number of TUAS on the battlefield and the usefulness of these systems. But Army units are not using what they have. The most common reasons are they are afraid of losing them, they do not have certified operators, or they will outrun their usefulness. All of these add up to units that just will not use them in general and suffer tactically for it.
We must start developing the TTPs and SOPs now on how we utilize these systems to gain the tactical advantage. These systems are not new, with the Raven being in the inventory for 18 years, but we still do not utilize them often enough. Commanders at the Battalion and Brigade must get comfortable with losing these systems in training. They also need to make it a priority to train personnel and get their lower echelon commanders to use them.
Rehearsals- So much time is wasted at JRTC, that could have benefited the unit had they just conducted rehearsals. Rehearsals are an easy way to build synchronization within a formation, but they are not conducted. It inherently comes down to laziness. With this, you can easily identify a lack of practice in higher level rehearsals, specifically the Combined Arms Rehearsal (CAR). The CAR is paramount in creating shared understanding amongst adjacent units and to identify and find solutions to friction that will occur during operations. Some CARs are painful to watch and do not meet their intended purpose. If anything, they can cause more confusion than understanding among subordinate units.
The great part about rehearsals is that they can be as simple or complicated as you want them to be. Teams can conduct battle drills rehearsals to form muscle memory. Platoons and Companies can conduct map rehearsals with leaders to synchronize their actions. Fires should be conducting technical rehearsals to ensure timely delivery when needed or planned. OCs can identify very early units that will be successful in rotation by the amount of rehearsals they conduct during RSOI and the rotation itself.
Over Reliance on Digital Comms Platforms- We as an army have gotten to the point that we have begun putting so much effort and reliance into new comms systems, that our skills in older platforms have atrophied. C2 systems that rely on upper TI do have their uses, my firm belief is that they are imperative for cross coordination at the Brigade and above level. Upper TI is a burden at the Battalion level. The equipment is large and hard to conceal and the EM signature is a huge security risk. This drive to become connected comes at the cost of more reliable communications systems such as FM, JBCP, and especially HF.
Units must master the legacy systems. While FM and JBCP can have large EM signatures as well, there are many ways to mitigate this. Learning comms fieldcraft improves security and EM concealment. With this, the Army needs to relearn the importance of HF and begin teaching it at the institutional level. Currently, the only Army school that really teaches HF is the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC). Meanwhile, the Marine Corps has numerous schools dedicated to teaching the art and practice of HF comms. The Army has to put a greater emphasis on comms in general at lower echelons to ensure survival on the battlefield.
Regeneration- There are many parts of the regeneration process at a CTC that would not be used during combat operations, but the systems that a unit has in place to deal with the loss and replacement of personnel and equipment are universal. Your Brigade’s rotation is a litmus test to see how well it can regenerate combat power in any situation. It is shown within the first 48 hours after contact is made, how well the Brigade’s systems work.
Units can reach out to help them understand the process, but they rarely do. It seems like an afterthought until they begin to take casualties and do not understand why they do not have replacements arriving. Leaders at the Brigade and Battalion level do not understand the process in general and responsibilities are identified or understood. Regeneration is a key process for Sustainment to understand in order to allow the Brigade to continue its mission.
Opinion
Op Eds and general thought pieces meant to spark conversation and introspection.
The Warrior Philosopher - Tuns Tavern
I recently posted about the need for a cultural shift among the enlisted ranks, from a knuckle dragger mindset to one focused on becoming warrior philosophers. This mindset permeates the officer ranks, as does a dedication to professionalism and physical fitness. Having worked extensively with officers of the other services, I have often said that Marine Corps officers are different. They are often more candid with their troops, open to honest feedback, and dedicated to refining their leadership skills. While there are fine officers in every branch, my bias will always be with the ones who wear the Eagle, Globe, and Achor.
Intelligence, physical prowess, tactical acumen, and job proficiency are traits we desire in our commissioned leaders, but they do not monopolize them. We expect these traits in Officers, but too often, we allow our fellow senior enlisted leaders to fall short of these traits or let ourselves fall short of them. I am guilty of slipping, dropping my pack when burnt out, and failing to uphold the higher standard I am calling for today. However, as SNCOs and NCOs, we must foster these traits within our ranks. We owe ourselves to become educated, physically fit, proficient, and tactically sound. More importantly, we owe it to the Marines we lead.
HQMC or the Officer Corps cannot direct this shift; it must percolate through our ranks of its own volition. It starts with each of us choosing to study doctrine, choosing to host book discussions with our junior Marines, choosing to stay fit, and realizing we are the masters of our professions.
HQMC cannot direct us to make these choices. However, HQMC can plant the seeds of change in a minor way with the potential for significant impact. The SMMC should fully control the enlisted reading list and publish it as its own. This small gesture signals a transfer of intellectual ownership from the Officer Corps to the Enlisted Corps.
Gunny
@tuns.tavern
Gunny's Reading List
This list intends to be an addition to the CMMC reading list. The Only duplicates are Once and Eagle, moving from SNCOs to NCOs, and Kill Chain. Gunny's Reading List is living; titles can and will be added/removed as necessary. Quarterly recommendations are provided to Lethal Minds Journal, with the exhaustive list retained on @tuns.tavern. Audiobooks are accessed through the DoD MWR Library for free.
All Ranks: This section provides excellent books with lessons for ALL ranks.
Q2 Recommendations:
The Coddling of the American Mind - Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan Haidt
First Principles - Thomas E. Ricks
Junior Marines: New to a life of service and in the infancy of their transition to adulthood, this list focuses on struggle, sacrifice, life lessons, and general knowledge. We often take for granted the tedious lives junior Marines lead, menial tasks, fire watch, and the lack of escape senior leaders are provided in their home life can make us forget our junior warriors' tough lives.
Q2 Recommendations:
Unbroken: A World War II Story of Survival, Resilience, and Redemption - Laura Hillenbrand
Economics in One Lesson - Henry Hazlitt
12 Rules for Life - Jordan Peterson (Audiobook highly suggested)
NCOs: Entering a life of leadership, the NCO list consists mainly of leadership titles while continuing the general knowledge trend. NCOs also have lighter political science and geopolitics titles as they transition to the staff work of SNCOs.
Q2 Recommendations:
Leaders Eat Last - Simon Sinek
Once an Eagle - Anton Myrer
*PODCAST* The Cold War What We Saw - Bill Whittle
SNCOs: Serving as advisors to their officer counterparts, the SNCO list contains titles geared toward strategy, critical thinking, leadership, and geopolitics.
Q2 Recommendations:
The Return of Great Power Rivalry - Matthew Kroenig
Kill Chain - Christian Brose
Better Angels of Our Nature - Steven Pinker
Please provide any recommendations to @tuns.tavern on Instagram. Enjoy!
Gunny
@tuns.tavern
More in Heaven and Earth than in Thy Philosophies:
Fiction for Every Marine’s Reading List - Bryson Curtin
The famously indecisive Prince Hamlet, perhaps the greatest of Shakespeare’s creations, once remarked to his friend Horatio that, “There are more things in Heaven and Earth than are in thy philosophies.” The philosophies referred to by the manic Prince of Denmark are not the works of Plato or Descartes, but rather the sort of informative, nonfiction works seen on the Commandant’s Reading List and in unit libraries across the Corps. Shelves and lists are filled by histories, theoretical works, doctrinal publications, analyses of current affairs, and other such essentials. Rightly so, I might add; for any Marine who would be expected to fight for the interests of this country deserves the resources to learn the reasons why. However, I notice on the list not what is, but what isn’t. Specifically, I notice a distinct lack of fiction on the list, especially non-military fiction. I am not against the selections on the reading list, nor am I advocating for the return of pedantic classics such as “Gods and Generals” or “Gates of Fire”, who have been the subjects of many unfortunate small unit PMEs. America’s Spartans do not need to read another rehashed tale of Thermopylae. However, they do need some fiction in their palates. I do not for a moment think the average Lance Corporal should be pouring over Wuthering Heights (although Bronte is an excellent choice) on his or her off duty hours. Rather, certain selections can be used to bolster the education and development of our young Marines. Marines today face a lack of spiritual awareness that plagues all of our society and can become exacerbated by the culture shock of the transformation from civilian to Marine. The average Marine is roughly 18 to 24, and are members of a generation known for polarization, nihilism, and the classic disease afflicting all age groups: “If it happened before I was born, it’s wrong.” Good fiction can give the Marine a new life to inhabit, a character to project themselves into, and inform their own development as warriors and as people. In response to this dearth of fiction, I’d like to provide three perhaps often overlooked suggestions of my own section that would benefit all Marines.
First on our list is Chuck Palhinuk’s controversial novel Fight Club, made into the culturally significant film starring Brad Pitt and Edward Norton. The relatively short (less than 200 pages) journey of self-discovery by our narrator, never directly named but believed to be “Jack”, as he dives headfirst into a violent world of no-holds-barred underground fights. The novel is sometimes taken to have an extremist viewpoint, an accusation levied as Jack embraces a tough world of violence and a path of self-destruction not acceptable by modern standards. However, I’d argue that extremity is necessary to the novel’s artistic standards, as Jack explores his own desire to test himself, his limit, and the world around him. Rather than extremism for extremism’s sake, the novel adopts an extreme arc to strip away both the reader’s cultural views and Jack’s. Paint cannot be thinned without applying corrosive and harmful thinner, and coincidentally, a civilian cannot be transformed into a Marine without the fires of training. Marines should be reading and discussing Fight Club not for its politics or its violence, but rather for what it says about people in the extreme, about what it means to change oneself at a core level. Comfort does not always breed growth, and the young Americans who come to the Marine Corps seeking change, to belong, to matter, will find the journey of Jack resonates with them. Throughout the novel, he acquires more bruises, injuries, and scars than he thought possible, a source of pride, remarking “In a way, I was proud of the bruises.” Marines find this source of pride too; of obstacles overcome, pain endured, and battles won. While many complain, there is a certain unacknowledged pride in being the unit who, given the toughest jobs in the worst conditions, still produces victory. Hardship shows us who we are, and to a generation of young people drowning in screens and meaningless affirmations, Tyler Durden, Jack’s antagonistic guide into the underworld of his unexamined character, poses the only question worth asking: “How much can you know about yourself if you’ve never been in a fight?
Second comes Dostoyevsky’s classic Crime and Punishment. A tale of guilt, consequences, and the fallout of a man who violates both personal and social moral compasses, Dostoyevsky’ s novel explores the effects of Man in the extreme. Raskolnikov, the handsome, idealistic student with a promising future, slays his petty, miserly pawnbroker neighbor Alonya Ivanova on the grounds that, due to her wickedness and his own obligations as a moral man of action with a will to power, he is justified in her brutal killing. However, as such things tend to do, his simple planned attack spirals out of control, leading to more misery and horror than he anticipated, including for himself, as he is wracked by his guilt and the dirty reality of a previously only intellectual exercise. Undisputedly the most difficult and deepest of these recommended works, Crime and Punishment is valuable to Marines for its examination of the effects of violence and uncommon actions on human beings. Raskolnikov exhibits many of the modern sentiments displayed by an outwardly polarized and extreme generation. If the events of 2020 and 2021 have shown us anything, they have shown us the worrying effects of an ever more extreme society, one which continually views opposing political blocs as not only wrong, but evil and dangerous. When something is evil and dangerous, previously immoral actions begin to look not only moral but desirable as the moral paradigm shifts. The military services are not immune to such actions. As society becomes polarized, so too does the Marine Corps, who draws its recruits from the selfsame social fabric. Crime and Punishment assists Marine leaders in speaking with their Marines about the tough subjects of extremism and polarization, as Raskolnikov serves as a character study for a man who takes his ideals too far and finds himself too far gone. While Marines may not commit such acts for political or idealistic reasons, men and women who find themselves in morally gray situations may need to consider their effects prior to their beginning. As Fredrich Nietzsche once said, “If you stare too long into the abyss, the abyss stares back into you.”
Now comes our final work, Aldous Huxley’s dystopian Brave New World. Written in the early 1900s in England, Huxley’s novel explores a world in which technology replaces religion and philosophy, and man becomes totally separated from nature, struggle, and art. Huxley envisions a future world divided into strict classes based on the circumstances of an artificial birth (natural birth being considered horrifically disgusting) and overflowing with a happiness and complicity-inducing drug called Soma. The strict classes are enforced by the predisposed cruelty of science, which deliberately harms some fetuses while boosting the health and brainpower of others. Some, the “Alphas”, are bred to be the ultra-intelligent leaders and thinkers, while the abused Deltas and Epsilons are considered “semi-morons” only good for the most undesirable positions. Art, religion, and poetry are almost all completely banned, replaced by a new but equally fanatical faith in “progress”. Some Marines who were assigned this classic to read in high school will assuredly know about the strong theme of the dangers posed by our ever-increasing faith in technology. While a warning about our seemingly blind enthusiasm for the “next big thing” is worthy of being discussed, another angle is more valuable to Marines. The main plot of Brave New World focuses on Bernard Marx, a member of the Alpha class, who seeks more meaning in his life, and seeks out the way that man lived before the society of Brave New World. In doing so, he finds a “savage”, a person still living how man lived before the new society, and brings him into it, losing sight of his mission to find something greater than himself that adds meaning to his life and instead parading the “savage” to the upper classes for his own gain. Marx, now plied with drugs, free sex, and all base desires that one might come up with, now feels no desire to seek anything greater than what he can touch or swallow. Modern people, including modern Marines, owe it to themselves to study the foreboding warning Huxley commits to paper in Brave New World. Marines are increasingly attached to the instant gratification of modern convenience. Food can be delivered at all hours of the night, cheap plastic goods are delivered in two days or less, and the ever-present allure of online pornography is at the fingertips of everyone with a smart phone. What is there left to work for, or to want? Yet still Marines grow depressed, they leave military service feeling unfulfilled; in the most tragic and horrid of cases they take their own lives. The cynical assertion that Marines only care about chow and liberty clearly doesn’t hold up. What are they seeking, then? What gives them, to borrow from Nietzsche, “the why to bear almost any how”? Only they can know for sure, and Brave New World can perhaps help them find an answer.
Overwhelmingly, the professional reading of the Marine Corps deserves a shakeup, something to break the standard additions of the latest current events themed book or “leadership think piece” from the latest business guru. Fiction has taken a backseat in an attempt to make Marines smarter by appealing to their sensibilities, as many have just left high school with no desire to pick up a book ever again if it can be avoided. Consequently, reading lists and programs are very technically and issue focused. No one would oppose a Marine reading the latest in-depth study of modern China or the myriad of issues in the Indo-Pacific region. Rather, my solution is to add a bit of art to their shelves, to address all the burning questions that keep them up at night. What is right and what is wrong? Who am I, and what do I believe? What do I really want out of a Marine Corps career and my life in general? These are questions that no 300 page history of the Chinese Communist Party will ever help answer, no matter how useful of a read it is. While fiction may not give them a direct answer, it allows them to experience the lives and emotions of others, which can guide them to their own, keeping with General John A. Lejeune’s maxim to “return them to society better than they came”.
Smoke in the Wadi: A Case Study on Artillery in Large-Scale Combat Operations - J.H. Edmonds
As the military forces of the United States and its NATO allies shift from over two decades of counterinsurgency to a renewed focus on countering conventional threats in Asia and Europe, modernization of strategies and systems must be built upon a strong foundation of lessons learned from history. One of the chief lessons to embody in our force structure and operational art is the requirement for massing surface fires against conventional forces in offensive operations to enable maneuver units to close with and destroy our adversaries in unfair fights. Over the past twenty years, artillery units have found themselves constrained to singular fixed positions on forward operating bases and combat outposts, bound by areas of operation saturated with restrictive fire support coordination measures that limited the employment of fires, and leashed by risk averse commanders who carried the avoidance of collateral damage to an extreme that neutered lethality. Organic artillery must be empowered to provide lethal and non-lethal fires against a wide range of targets without the risk aversion, restrictions, and positioning limitations of the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. History offers a moderately recent example of the success of artillery massed against a conventional threat - the execution of the American fire support plan for the Battle of the Wadi al-Batin during the Persian Gulf War in 1991.
After the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Army in 1990, United States and Coalition Forces were deployed to Saudi Arabia as part of Operation Desert Shield, to safeguard Saudi Arabia and its oilfields from the threat of invasion. In 1991, the mission changed to the liberation of Kuwait - Operation Desert Storm. US Central Command and US Army Central/Third Army planned to use the US Army VII Corps as part of a massive left hook through southern Iraq to envelop the Iraqi Army in Kuwait while the US Marine Corps 1st Marine Division and 2nd Marine Division assaulted southern Kuwait.
To maintain the element of surprise, the US Army’s 1st Cavalry Division was ordered to conduct a feint up the Wadi al-Batin, a massive dry riverbed and historic invasion route into Iraq, as part of the theater deception plan. The 1st Cavalry Division had to convince the Iraqi Army that they were the main invasion, to draw attention away from the main VII Corps attack. The Division Artillery (DIVARTY) of the 1st Cavalry Division and the Corps Artillery of VII Corps were critical to the success of the theater deception operation in the Wadi al-Batin. 1st Cavalry Division’s feint consisted of four distinct operations:
Preliminary operations (13FEB1991): 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment and 1st CAV’s Long Range Surveillance Detachment (LRSD) conducted reconnaissance and screening north of Tapline Road, only a few kilometers from the Iraqi border. Alpha Battery, 21st Field Artillery Regiment conducted the war’s first MLRS raid, destroying enemy artillery positions.
Operation Berm Buster (14-15FEB1991): 8th Engineer Battalion breached the berm separating Saudi Arabia and Iraq, while being covered by 1-7CAV and indirect fires by 3rd Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery Regiment. Task Force 1-32 Armor then moved to secure the breach. Suppress enemy units during Operation Berm Buster (Combined Arms Breach). Neutralize enemy maneuver forces, artillery units, and anti-aircraft positions north of the berm to support TF 1-32 Armor as it secured the breach.
Operation Red Storm (15-16FEB1991): 1st CAV Division Artillery and 42nd Field Artillery Brigade (VII Corps Artillery) conducted fire missions against 28 planned targets - enemy maneuver units, artillery positions, and anti-aircraft positions. This was followed by an attack conducted by AH-64 Apaches from the 11th Aviation Brigade (VII Corps).
Operation Knight Strike (20FEB1991): After Task Force 2-8 CAV and Task Force 2-5 CAV from 1st Brigade, 1st CAV DIV conducted offensive operations north of the berm, Task Force 1-5 CAV conducted a reconnaissance in force into the Wadi Al-Batin. The fire support tasks for this operation included those below:
Illuminate suspected enemy positions and formations for TF 2-8 CAV.
Destroy high payoff targets - enemy artillery and command posts.
Screen the withdrawal of reconnaissance units during Operation Knight Strike.
Destroy enemy armored vehicles and anti-aircraft positions while TF 1-5 CAV attacked Iraqi fire trenches (oil field trenches set aflame by Iraqi troops).
The US Army artillery units primarily executed planned targets during the breach and artillery raid, and then executed targets of opportunity during follow-on operations. With the significant assistance of the American fire support plan, the Iraqi Army took the bait of 1st CAV DIV’s feint and committed the 12th Armored Division, five infantry divisions, and a corps artillery group. Large elements of the Iraqi forces were destroyed, but more importantly, US Army VII Corps was able to envelop the Iraqi Republican Guard.
Deconfliction and Fire Support Coordination Measures: Synchronization of surface fires with aviation assets and maneuver units was essential to maximizing effects of fires on enemy forces and to minimizing the potential for fratricide on US or coalition forces. To integrate each planned target with the complex maneuver plan of the theater deception operation, fire support planners employed the following tools:
Time separation was used between Field Artillery and Attack Aviation during the 13 February 1991 MLRS raid and Operation Red Storm, meaning that artillery fires ceased at a predesignated time before AH-64 Apaches from 1st CAV and VII Corps ingressed to the target area.
Lateral separation through unit boundaries between maneuver units was used to prevent fratricide and to provide zones of responsibility for calling for fire.
Restricted Firing Lines on lines of longitudes were used to prevent fratricide between adjacent units (VII Corps to the west, 1st Marine Division and 2nd Marine Division to the east). This meant that coordination between the headquarters of adjacent units was required for any fires or effects that could potentially cross those lines.
Captain Andy Hoskins described the experience of his battery, Charlie Battery 3-82FA during the deliberately planned deconfliction of fires for Operation Red Storm in his book, Gulf War Diary: “Just prior to 0100 hours, 16 February 1991, the artillery units were to fire a 3-minute prep on selected targets, followed by Apache attack helicopters crossing the berm to engage targets of opportunity. At the same time, USAF assets were attacking deep targets.” Captain Hoskins and his battery were responsible for firing 40 rounds of high explosive rocket assisted projectiles in three minutes before the attack aviation assets checked on station to begin their attack runs. Three minutes after executing their fire mission, they heard “Check fire!” on their radios, “followed almost immediately by the sound of Apaches flying overhead into Iraq to engage their assigned targets.”
New Technology in the Fight: The advent of improved weapons systems, munitions, and targeting equipment across US field artillery units and fire support teams was a deciding factor in the American advantage during 1st CAV’s deception operation. American fire support assets could reach farther, exact greater accuracy upon their targets, and process fire missions faster than their Iraqi counterparts. Listed below are some of the key systems that gave the American fire support plan a lethal edge:
The M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) was used in combat for the first time during Operation Desert Storm. Its extended range and improved conventional munitions gave field artillery units and maneuver commanders a farther, more lethal reach in the Battle of Wadi Al-Batin.
The M712 Copperhead (Cannon-Launched Guided Projectile) was a munition fired from the M109A2 Paladins in 1st CAV DIVARTY. This projectile was guided by laser designators to an accuracy of 10 meters. This gave 1st CAV DIV a decisive advantage in Operation Berm Buster, when DIVARTY used Copperheads to target precise locations of enemy observation posts.
Laser designating equipment mounted on OH-58 Kiowas and M981 FIST Vehicles provided rapid targeting capabilities to Fire Support Officers and Maneuver Commanders and decreased the mission processing time for fire missions sent to DIVARTY.
Forward Observers and Target Acquisition: US Army artillery missions were being observed by British SAS units past the forward line of troops (FLOT), Cavalry Scouts in 1-7CAV, OH-58 Kiowas with laser designators, US Air Force Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP), and Task Force Fire Support Elements. Many targets were visually acquired by observers, but most were identified by Army aviation assets and joint aviation assets. US fire support planners were effective at developing a scheme of fires that supported 1st CAV in its operations in the Wadi.
Iraqi Army artillery missions were being observed by observation posts in towers along the border berm and by artillery observers co-located with armored units and infantry units. Most targets were acquired visually. Iraqi fire support planners were ineffective at massing fire on US forces during the breach and responding with accurate counter-fire.
Artillery - A Decisive Factor in the US Victory: Artillery decisively affected the outcome of the Battle of Wadi Al-Batin. The accurate and timely effects on a wide range of targets matched the 1st Cavalry Division Commander’s intent for executing a convincing feint against Iraqi Army units in the wadi as part of the deception plan. There were no incidents of fratricide or collateral damage from artillery, because of the successful deconfliction and employment of well-placed fire support coordination measures.
Task Force Fire Support Elements and other observers were successful in target acquisition and calling for fire on planned targets and targets of opportunity. Counter-fire radar units were successful in pinpointing locations of Iraqi Army artillery units and relaying them to firing batteries. The cannon crews, rocket crews, and fire direction centers of 1st CAV DIVARTY and VII Corps Artillery were able to outrange Iraqi Army artillery and bring accurate, first round fire for effect on the enemy before rapidly displacing for survivability.
Greatly aided by the artillery support from DIVARTY and VII Corps Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division was able to engage and destroy elements of the Iraqi Army 12th Armored Division, five infantry divisions, and a corps artillery group. More importantly, these units and Iraqi Army leadership became convinced the main coalition attack would come from the Wadi Al-Batin, so VII Corps was able to flank and envelop the Iraqi Army and drive them out of Kuwait, leading to a cease-fire and end of hostilities. Artillery support was critical to success in every operation in the Battle of Wadi Al-Batin:
Preliminary Operations: A/21FAR’s MLRS raid destroyed enemy artillery positions that would have suppressed US forces during the breach.
Operation Berm Buster (Combined Arms Breach): DIVARTY and VII Corps Artillery supported maneuver units securing the breach.
Operation Red Storm (MLRS and Aviation Raid): DIVARTY and VII Corps Artillery conducted a raid that destroyed at least 28 high payoff targets.
Operation Knight Strike (Reconnaissance in Force into the Wadi): DIVARTY destroyed enemy armor and anti-aircraft formations in support of TF 1-5 CAV.
The US Army learned how to effectively mass fires from cannon artillery and rocket artillery in concert with attack aviation and in support of highly mobile maneuver forces. The advent of MLRS, Copperhead munitions, and laser designating equipment gave US artillery units a decisive technological advantage over Iraqi Army artillery units. US Army Field Artillery units were able to shape the deep fight with long range fires while still providing decisive action in the close fight with responsive fire support to maneuver units. The Army would use this knowledge and experience twelve years later during the “Thunder Run” to Baghdad in 2003, when in the first twenty-one days of combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom, maneuver units and fire support assets defeated the bulk of the Iraqi Army in depth and brought the conventional phase of the war to a rapid close.
Lessons Learned:
A well-constructed, well-executed fire support plan should focus on the destruction of high payoff targets with the assets most capable of maximizing the effects on those targets.
Effective fire support should balance supporting the close fight and shaping the deep fight. Fire Supporters must always plan in advance of current operations and be able to anticipate future fire support tasks.
Fire Support Teams need to spend more time learning about the capabilities and employment of friendly rocket artillery. MLRS and HIMARS are not assets BCTs are used to training with, but they would most likely support Division Artillery in large-scale combat operations.
Fire Support Teams need to spend as much time learning about the capabilities of enemy artillery as they do learning how to recognize those weapon systems. Knowing the range and effects of enemy artillery can help Fire Support Teams advise Maneuver Commanders on how to create “standoff” and on what precautions to take against certain enemy munitions.
Fire Support Teams must be able to anticipate a deep, varied set of threats and understand how to plan effective fires against maneuver forces, artillery units, anti-aircraft positions, and command posts across changing terrain and fluctuating proximity to friendly forces.
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The Evergrande Default - Cory Bravo
Foreword-
On July 10th, plainclothes police violently broke up the protest outside the Zhengzhou branch of the Bank of China. The protest is a direct result of the ongoing collapse of the real estate market, which began in October 2021 when Evergrande Group defaulted on its interest payment. The default led to speculation that the same contagion – real estate companies having difficulty in raising new funding to repay bond payments – as Evergrande. The speculation was correct since three additional real estate companies – Shimao Property Holdings, Kaisa Group, and Sunac China – all defaulted on bond payments like Evergrande. The defaults led to some small-scale, peaceful protests to occur outside the headquarters of the companies. However, most commentators did not think the crisis would spread to the banking sector let alone spark major protests against banks or other financial institutions. Further, most commentators did not think the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would violently crack down any major protests since CCP would rather defuse the situation nonviolently. The breaking up of the protest is indicative of not only the CCP’s but also Xi Jinping’s (习近平) view the protests could potentially cause significant social instability throughout China. Furthermore, both the CCP and Xi would want to prevent the protests from gaining momentum so they do not evolve into anti-CCP or pro-democracy protests. However, it should be noted the order for police to violently break up the protest likely originated at either the city or provincial party apparatuses or officials rather from their national counterparts. While both the central government and Xi would have unofficially approved of the handling of protest, they also knew the protest was against the local party officials and party apparatuses rather than the central government. This difference is notably because of how most of the protesters called for Li Keqiang 李克强 to intercede in the crisis. Another notable difference is the notion most Chinese people believe the central government will help them during crises involving the local and provincial governments.
Original Article (Written in late October 2021)
The ongoing problem China Evergrande Group has in managing its approximately 300 billion USD in liabilities has dominated many news outlets in the last month. While many writers examined the reasons the Chinese government will or will not bail out the property company, the effects a collapse would have on Chinese society have undergone cursory scrutiny at best. The lack of any examination how a collapse would effect Chinese society places multinational corporations who have business interests in China at risk.
While the Chinese government has implemented some short-term measures such as asking banks to release some cash into the property market, a myriad of analysts continue to speculate on what type of bailout would be implemented. Further, analysts disagree on what exactly a potential bailout would consist of, the extent such a bailout would cover investors’ liabilities, and who would benefit. While any examination of the type and potential beneficiaries of any potential bailout is important – especially given the company is set to formally default on October 23rd – no serious analysis has been given to any negative effects a collapse of Evergrande would have on Chinese society. Analysts such as AllianceBerstein’s Jenny Zeng stated the “social risks associated with Evergrande itself are actually reasonably manageable.” However, what Zeng and other analysts miss concerning a potential collapse are the massive amount of money the Chinese middle class would likely lose. For example, is estimated approximately 1.6 million homebuyers and hundreds of small businesses would lose all their money in the event of a potential collapse.
A collapse of Evergrande would be extremely bad for both the Chinese economy but also the Chinese government, specifically for Xi Jinping. The main economic implication of a collapse would the probability of financial contagion spreading to other property companies. For example, Modern Land and Fantasia Holdings Group – based out of Beijing and Shenzhen respectively – had the same issues as Evergrande regarding bond repayment in the last two weeks. Additionally, the escalating fear of a potential collapse prompted investors to divest from the property market to other sectors, causing other property developers to have trouble in raising new funds or refinancing. These companies would in turn, face the same problems as Evergrande, Modern Land, and Fantasia Holdings Group, potentially default and collapse. The collapse would likely prompt the loss of a significant percentage of the savings of the Chinese middle class.
Any potential collapse of Evergrande would cause social turmoil that the Chinese government – specifically Xi – knows the government cannot afford more social discontent than the current crisis shows. The collapse likely could trigger protests – but unlike the protests that occurred at Evergrande offices across China in September – will likely be bigger and more violent. This would leave the Chinese government with two options, the first option would be to let the investors and others who lost their investments protests and try to maintain order. An example of the first scenario would be the Chinese security forces response to anti-Japanese protests in cities throughout China in 2012. The second scenario would require the Chinese government to crack down on the protests and forcibly disperse them. However, the problem with either scenario would be probability the protests will evolve into anti-government protests, with the Chinese government unlikely to rapidly regain control of the situation.
How multinational businesses would be negatively affected would range from logistical issues to the overall decrease in purchasing power of the Chinese middle class, both of which would have a profound effect on their business interests. Any protests by investors who lost their savings would cause significant supply chain issues by either blocking major roadways to causing massive price increases in the movement of items to factories or to ports. The protests would also cause corporations to scale back or shut down production at their factories; causing significant disruptions to their supply chains both in China and to other parts of the world. The disruptions would also have significant direct and indirect ramifications to markets where the corporations have a presence. The overall decrease in purchasing power would also negatively affect the multinational corporations profit margins by causing Chinese people to not spend money on their products and to find cheaper alternatives. Additionally, the decrease would also lead to the corporations to reduce their presence in the Chinese market by a significant percentage. The reduction would force the corporations to increase costs related to marketing and manufacturing products in China to regain the same market presence in the future.
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“Always Faithful”: A Review - Eric Sheppler
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, many young men and women answered the call to serve their country. They left the safety and security of their homes to travel halfway around the world with no certainty about what their future might hold. A defining moment for many, who in the wake of these events, decided to roll the dice and participate in what would become our generation’s war, our opportunity for meaning and purpose. They understood that the world had fundamentally changed and, although they did not yet know themselves or where they were going, their involvement in what would become America’s longest conflict would be life-defining. For twenty years, American servicemen and women sacrificed their lives, their bodies, and their mental health to a war in a country on the other side of the world that has a knack for enmeshing and draining world powers. A country that would, in time, deplete another.
Though the collective consciousness is making an ardent attempt to move forward from two decades of American military involvement in Afghanistan, in the minds of the men and women who gave a part of themselves to that conflagration, its memory is still an open wound.
The lives that were ended there, the colossal expenditure in money and blood, the conclusion that
can at best be called dissatisfactory; compounded by the way in which the final U.S. withdrawal was carried out. For our parent’s era, it was the sight of desperate refugees grasping at the skids of helicopters as they were lifted off an Embassy roof. For us, after twenty years of effort, a strikingly similar endgame: desperate men willing to cling to the aluminum skin of an aircraft with vain hope until the certain terminal fall; thousands of allied Afghans abandoned to a dismal fate at the hands of a reconstituted Taliban regime.
Each of these issues and their corresponding emotions were laid bare in “Always Faithful: A Story of the War in Afghanistan, the Fall of Kabul, and the Unshakable Bond Between a Marine and an Interpreter,” Thomas Scheuman and Zainullah Zaki's story of unyielding faith and jaw grinding determination encompassing the entirety of America’s longest conflict. Told from the point of view of two men with very different backgrounds who nonetheless were thrust together in the maelstrom of combat in the forlorn hope of bringing a better future to a country that has known little else in its living memory than death and sadness.
Scheuman’s description of the life arc that led to his chosen path as a Marine infantry officer is all grit and determination. An inspiring story of a man who fully admits to achieving his goals due to innate stubbornness combined with old fashioned hard work and desire. This trait would serve him greatly as he was entrusted with shouldering the responsibilities of a platoon leader within a storied unit in what would become one of the Marine Corps’ most grueling battles.
Zaki was born into an environment that is completely alien to those of us raised in the cradle of American comfort. A childhood under the Taliban. Poverty, oppression, and limited prospects for a happier life. The U.S. invasion offered an escape from all that as Afghanistan was being brought kicking and screaming into the 21st Century. Zaki’s personal realization that no future could be had under Taliban rule led him to make a dice roll of his own. Deciding to assist the Americans in combat; deciding to fight shoulder to shoulder with foreigners against his own countrymen to secure a better future for his people; doing so while attached to a Marine Infantry Battalion at the precipice of what would become one of the more infamous campaigns of the war.
Darkhorse 3/5. Sangin. To most civilians or those who aren’t in the Marine Corps’ family, those words may not carry significant weight. However, to those in the community, anyone with that line carved into their biography gets a quiet nod of respect. An acknowledgment that the individual, regardless of rank or position, had skin in the game. Was firsthand witness to the real price of America’s war in Afghanistan. The ultimate price. A campaign that forced the participants to endure hardships and suffer losses that were largely unheard of during the War on Terror. Combat conditions such as these forge bonds among combatants that can last a lifetime. The brotherhood between Zaki and Scheuman is one that can surpass even that of blood. The loyalty that they have for one another, a loyalty earned in hardship, would lead to one of the few inspiring stories to come out of America's disastrous withdrawal from the Afghan theater.
Veterans of the war will appreciate their work. For voracious consumers of GWOT media, it will be a welcome respite from SOF heavy action-packed autobiographies, and General officer memoirs. No glorifying self-promotion or eyebrow-raising blame avoidance are to be found in its pages. A gritty story of ordinary infantrymen in combat, and their lasting solidarity. As someone who invested a part of his own life in that distant theater, their story gave me a glimmer of hope in what was done there. That what we participated in, mattered. That the war, even with all its loss and waste, may not have been completely in vain. That people, as individuals, can understand and remember words like loyalty, sacrifice, dedication, and obligation, even when governments cannot.
Eric Sheppler is a former U.S. Marine and veteran of OIF and OEF. He is from Southern California. He participated in multiple combat deployments to Iraq an Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014. Since that time, he has been employed as a security provider for civilian U.S. Government entities in the Middle East, and as an instructor/trainer for the U.S. Military.
He is currently an undergrad History major at George Mason University and resides in Northern Virginia. He is on Instagram as @shepp_61 and Twitter as @EricSheppler.
The Written Word
Poetry and Fiction written by servicemen and veterans
The Bunker Next Door - Cora Reichert
Who wins in this story,
because the hill-takers and
hole-diggers and
mud-bravers and
cave-burners with gasmasks and
flamethrower backpacks
didn’t even cash their last paycheck-
but flickering footage of skinny, round-headed GIs
was taken
by journalists with coonhounds
at home in Mississippi,
and we call this history.
Sun-white stone walls along
expressways that we now use for
convoys, guardhouses
not for sentries, but for
ghosts that bum your cigarette,
castles built for shoguns and
secondhand castles for displaced children, bunkers
smoothed over
by velvet spreads of turf.
How many jawbones are under the sidewalk
leading to my dim linoleum office?
How many teeth is my wheeled chair worth, and is it
worth more than a chair without wheels? They paid
for everything.
If I ask for a better chair,
am I retroactively charging them more?
Teeth they never even had.
Ribs they never even broke.
Some reach back, retrieve a finger bone.
It’s biblical:
I should take my boots off
but I would never take my boots off.
And there is glass from Saturday.
They would’ve understood,
the boys inside that hill 10 paces past the east side
door, with their boots too big
around their ankle bones.
The boys who died over
this shitty parking lot with one entrance
this trash pit with its sweet reek of
sunburned bottles
this liquor store’s grime-greased windows and the
slap of plastic baskets in the stack
this parking space where Japanese grandmothers
pump gas mechanically in
stiff magenta hats
this holy landfill, steam-rain-palmtree,
floating mountain range
this drifting slice of long and silence beach
Hitting Depth - K. D. Dexter
My favorite days are for squats. Nothing really makes me feel quite as sore, or quite so strong, as a good leg day. I wear my special shirt that says “Are You Afraid to Hit Depth?”, and I carefully assemble a playlist of absolute bangers while I warm up, so when it’s time to finally get to it, I’m ready. I load the bar, I brace, and in one smooth, controlled movement I drop until my hips fall below my knees. Anyone can get here I think to myself, but not all of us are prepared to get up.
When you are lifting weights, form, not weight, is what matters more. It will never matter how much you can lift if your form is wrong, because you are doing your muscles and joints a disservice. You will almost certainly hurt yourself if you continue in bad form, and you’ll never get the full benefits of the exercise. On a squat, the most common mistake I see is lack of depth. Full depth on a squat is usually considered breaking parallel. As long as your back is stable, the lower you go, the better. When you hit depth on a squat, as opposed to quarter or half squatting, you gain better development of the muscles. If you don’t stretch and strain your muscles, they do not get stronger, and if you’re not getting stronger, there’s not much point in doing the exercise. When you squat to depth you can generate more power out of the hole. Manageable weights at full depth strengthens your lower back and spine better than heavier loads at depths above parallel. It builds flexibility and even allows the tissue around your knees and hips to develop fully, giving you more stable joints. So while shorter squats can be useful for accessory movements or necessary due to injury, full range of motion rules all.
But it’s not just in the squat rack where full depth serves us best. I was reminded recently, that when we are feeling overwhelming emotions, we have a natural tendency to engage in dissociative behavior. Sometimes we do it to get through the day, sometimes we do it just to survive, but at some point, it becomes necessary to feel “the thing”, or we will never move past it.
It feels good to escape when we are suffering, but this is the quarter squat. It won’t ever stretch you; it won’t strain you, the little tears that need to form to help your muscles grow will never come. You can dissociate any number of ways but it all comes down to escape and avoidance, whatever the behavior is. Sometimes we never learned how to confront the things we’re going through, and sometimes it seems like too much, but the bottom is that confrontation, it is where we do the most growth.
I’ll spare you the additional essay on self-care, as long as you remember that there are tools and people to help you manage at depth. Whether it comes in the form of a coach, a therapist, or just a good friend, you can always get advice on form. When you first start out in the gym the weight goes up fast and you can sneak by with bad technique because you haven’t quite figured out how strong you really are. As you begin to advance past those first few months, however, the places where you have been lax will start to show. Just as you shouldn’t wait until you hit heavy squats to reach depth, you shouldn’t wait until you are going through something traumatic before you learn how to fully process your emotional experiences.
The same problems you’ll notice if you never break parallel, you’ll also notice if you never hit depth in the mental and emotional arena. Parts of you will overcompensate, parts of you will atrophy, you will be unbalanced, and when you are forced to the bottom of the hole because the weight of the load has finally done it for you, getting back up will feel like an insurmountable task. Nobody looks at Rock Bottom and thinks of it fondly. It is a place of great pain, where we feel stretched beyond our ability to bear. But rock bottom is also full depth, it is the place from which you may generate great power as you rise. You can stretch the muscles, and increase your tolerance.
So I would remind you that form is King. Don’t cheat on your descent. When you are overwhelmed, when you are tempted to quarter squat because the load feels too heavy and you would do anything to shrug it off, take it to the hole. Keep your chest up and your core tight, and push.
Talking to Myself Neville Johnson
A nightly ritual of ice cubes gently falling into an empty glass.
Cognac flows over the ice cubes,
like a beautiful artistic dance, moving gracefully by herself.
The crackling and squeaky sound of the ice cubes breaks and snaps the dead silence.
Swirling the ice cubes around in my glass is like a theatrical portrayal of my past,
A nightly tale that I tell myself.
I Struggle to Believe - Neville Johnson
I dream of a place I used to call home
Familiar faces and familiar voices
I dream of a peaceful moment
While we prepare for war
No struggle to speak of the days that were
With these Familiar faces and familiar voices
In my dream, I’m witness to my survival
Which I struggle to believe
Health and Fitness
Fitness and PT Guidance for improving diet, physical performance, health, and leading troops in physical training.
How Far Do You Want to Run: A Basic Marathon Plan – RunHardRunFastRunOften
I would be remiss to begin without stating that there is absolutely (in my mind) no tactical reason to run a marathon. It is highly unlikely that any of us will be called upon to act as a modern day Pheidippides and serve as the long-distance messenger of victory. There are however a multitude of valid reasons why one might choose to train for and run a marathon: to further development of cardiovascular fitness, to try a new challenge or break out of a fitness rut, to build camaraderie amongst a team (who train and race together), or to tick an accomplishment off your “bucket list”. Sometimes over the course of one’s military service (if assigned to MCB Quantico for example) they are faced with the option of “run the Marine Corps Marathon” or “work the Marine Corps Marathon”. Whatever your reason, training for and completing a marathon/half-marathon/10k is a worthwhile challenge.
This 13 week training plan is structured in 3 blocks: VO2 Max, Lactate Threshold, and Endurance, with an abbreviated 1 week taper period. The target race is the Marine Corps Marathon/10k on 30 October 2022.
It is recommended that those starting the marathon plan have a solid base (minimum of 3x 45min-1hr of continuous running per week) to ensure that their body is prepared for the rigors of high mileage. This is not to say that one cannot go from 0-26.2 in 13 weeks, but it is likely that those with less experience running will find greater enjoyment in training for and participating in a half-marathon or 10k as a stepping stone to the marathon distance. Conversely, a half-marathon is also a good opportunity to improve shorter distance speed, with fewer miles than a marathon. (The intensity of the half-marathon/10k plan will often be higher than the marathon plan, but the miles shorter). For those unable to commit to the rigors of an endurance training cycle, I have also included a Combat Fitness Test (CFT) training plan to increase medium distance (800m) speed.
Legend:
Recovery Run (RR) - Also known as “Easy Runs”. These workouts are used to accustom the body to running for longer periods of time, keep the muscles “loose”, and aid in the recovery process after harder efforts.
Intensity - 4-5 Rate of Perceived Effort (RPE); a comfortable pace where one’s breathing is slightly labored, but they are able to easily speak in complete sentences.
Time - 30min - 1hr
Endurance Run (ER) - The standard “Long Run”. Used to gradually build the strength required to complete the required race distance. For these runs, “time on feet” is as important as distance covered. If the training plan gives a proscribed distance AND time, complete whichever comes first. ER are a great opportunity to test things out for race day (i.e. nutrition, hydration, gear).
Intensity - 5-6 RPE; between comfortable and moderate. At a 6, you have to think about it before speaking in a complete sentence.
Time - 2-6hrs
Steady State Run (SSR) - Used to develop aerobic fitness at an intensity just below one’s Lactate Threshold (the level at which blood lactate begins to accumulate in the blood stream because the rate of lactate production increases faster than the rate of removal, causing a “burn” in the muscle).
Intensity - 7 RPE; breathing is labored. Sentences spoken are very short.
Time - 20-60min (of intensity), not including warmup, cooldown, and recovery periods; 5-8:1 work to recovery ratio
Tempo Run (TR) - Important for developing speed by improving an athletes ability to process and utilize lactate.
Intensity - 8-9 RPE; Hard, breathing is deep and labored.
Time - 8-45min (of intensity), not including warmup, cooldown, and recovery periods; 2-3:1 work to rest ratio
Running Intervals (RI) - Maximum effort used to develop top-end speed.
Intensity - 10 RPE; out of breath, can only hold for a short period of time.
Time - 12 - 24min (of intensity), not including warmup, cooldown, and recovery periods; 1-1 work to rest ratio
Warmup/Cooldown - RR do not really require a warmup/cooldown; run at a 4-5 RPE the entire time. For ER, ease into the run, slowly building up your RPE to a 5-6, and back off at the end. For SSR, TR, RI, a warmup cooldown is not proscribed in this program. A 15-20min (2-3mi) warmup and a 10-15min cooldown is recommended. Listen to your body and give it what it needs. Some days you may need a longer warmup or cooldown. Other days, you may feel good and need less.
Race Pace (RP) - The pace you will need to hold IOT accomplish your marathon time goal.
Intensity - 6-7RPE; moderate, you don’t want to speak in a complete sentence, but can.
Time - However long it takes to finish the race
Faster Than Oprah (FTO) - A common marathon goal; Oprah Winfrey ran the 1994 Marine Corps Marathon, finishing in 4:29:15 (10:18 min/mi RP).
Hmmmmmm (HMM) - A marathon goal fast enough to make the questioner go, “hmmm” when you respond to the question, “what was your finish time”. In this program HMM is based around a 3:30 marathon time (8:01min/mi RP).
Full Send (FS) - The pace where you either achieve greatness, or go up in a ball of fire. Recommended for experienced runners, in this program FS is based around a 3:00 marathon time (6:52 min/mi RP).
BLOCK 1: VO2 Max
Next month’s plan will appear in Volume IV.
Transition and Career
Career and civilian transition guidance, geared towards helping servicemembers plan their careers and help transitioning servicemembers succeed in civilian life
From Green to Blue: Veterans in Law Enforcement - Hector Fajardo
Introduction: America has one of the largest law enforcement forces in the world. According to the FBI, in 2019 there were 697,195 police officers employed by 13,247 agencies. Nationwide, the rate of sworn officers was 2.4 cops per 1,000 residents and the rate of full-time law enforcement employees (civilian and sworn) was 3.5. During that same year, law enforcement officers responded to 16,425 murders, 139,815 sexual assaults, 267,988 robberies, and over 5 million thefts. From these statistics, we can conclude two points: Police officers are and will always be needed, and the demand for competent officers to handle those calls is and will always be high. American military veterans are among the best our nation has to offer, and their talents and skills are exactly what our law enforcement communities need.
The Job: Law enforcement is not a black or white occupation. Policing in America can vary greatly from state to state, county to county, and even city to city. This arrangement is singular to the United States, as there isn’t a lone set of rules and/ or regulations that all police officers must abide by. The type of enforcement that officers can do is highly dependent on the local politics of the jurisdiction they work for, and the guidelines set by local and regional prosecutors’ offices. The latter, in turn, are guided by judicial decisions. For example, we see how similar crimes are punishable in different states. In Alabama, a First-Degree Robbery can carry sentencing of life or 10 to 99 years in prison. If the offense was conducted with a firearm, the sentencing goes from 20 to 99 years in prison. Yet, in California, a First-Degree Robbery carries a maximum of 6 years in prison, and if a firearm was used, a maximum of 16 years (Findlaw.com, 2022). This contrast in sentencing is important to highlight because it affects the type of enforcement officers can do with their available resources. If the time and effort to investigate and charge a robbery offender can be better utilized on another crime, the robbery will, unfortunately, take a back seat.
The Ferguson Effect: On August 9, 2014, Officer Darren Wilson, while working patrol in Ferguson, Missouri, encountered a then 18-year-old Michael Brown. After a struggle ensued between Wilson and Brown, the latter died of gunshot wounds from the officer’s handgun. This incident sparked a fast-paced series of rumors and media storms across the United States, which exploded into one of the most violent times for law enforcement and the communities at the mercy of vandals and rioters. What took place in the policing community after those days is what scholars and law enforcement experts call the “Ferguson Effect.” This effect is best described as a concerted hesitation or outright refusal to act by law enforcement officers across the country, who either found the backlash against cops unfair or did not want to be the next ones whose lives would be plastered across news reports (Longman, 2016).
Tragedies like the one in Ferguson, MI, and the many others that have followed since, which have either painted cops as murderous racists or even as cowards and incompetent (i.e, Parkland, Fl or Uvalde, TX), created a damaging image for police officers and the profession itself. When generations grow up being told that policing is either a tyrannically racist job or one that lacks honor, the types of candidates willing to enter that profession change. The recruitment of police officers is a serious problem affecting most agencies across the United States. The pool of candidates interested in the job and willing to follow the long hiring process is much less than what it was before the Ferguson Incident. Mass retirements and quitting of officers have also left a significant dent in the number of peace officers nationwide.
How Can Veterans Help: Just like in the US Military, policing in America is a job that demands the utmost professionalism, ethical conduct, and at times, the highest levels of courage. If Americans do not think that policing is an honorable job or at least one that is worth doing, two things will happen: Either the number of qualified candidates is reduced and agencies will find themselves in critical need, or the standards for hiring officers to fill the ranks will decrease. If the latter is the choice, officer safety and that of those who they have sworn to protect are at peril.
Military veterans of all branches and specialties have already gone through rigorous basic training, and have, for the most part, lived in an environment that demanded discipline, respect, and courage under stress. These are the exact values that we need in our American police force. We need police officers who can help the communities they serve with outreach and engagement, while also having the courage necessary to face a murderous school or church shooter. In addition, many police agencies across the nation seek veterans to join their ranks. Some offer bonuses to hire and relocate officers and many others provide extra benefits, like Veteran Points for promotions or hirings.
Conclusion: If you are a veteran, or a current military service member, and are thinking about possibly joining the ranks of the police force, let me give you my opinion as someone who has been there. After my service in the US Marines, I joined the police force in my community. During my tenure, I've had the honor of working alongside many other veterans who have also found the transition from the "green to the blue” immensely rewarding and fulfilling. Even now, as a Reserves Coast Guard Officer, many of the warriors to which I have the honor to serve, have also become police officers and taken tremendous pride in it.
We all know, as veterans, that the friendships, experiences, and life lessons learned during our time behind a rifle are unique and everlasting. Yet, I can confidently say that if you take upon the career of law enforcement with the exact sentiment of pride and honor to which you took the oath to defend the nation's flag, you will have a rewarding career. Not a career free of obstacles, for there will be many, but surely one where you will find a family comparable to the one you have in the military.
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This ends Volume 3, Edition 1, of the Lethal Minds Journal (01AUGUST2022)
The window is now open for Lethal Minds’ second edition, releasing September 1st.
All art and picture submissions are due as PDFs or JPEG files to our email by 20 August.
All written submissions are due as Word documents to our email by midnight on 20 August.
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Special thanks to the volunteers and team that made this journal possible:
Erin
R.W Parker
Steven
All articles published in this journal are the personal opinions and positions of the authors themselves. The Lethal Minds Journal and Lethal Minds team are not responsible for the content and opinions expressed by our contributors.
By submitting work to the Lethal Minds Journal, all contributors recognize and authorize the Lethal Minds team to publish and feature their work in the Lethal Minds Journal. All contributors relinquish their right to profit from their submission to the Lethal Minds Journal.
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1. Artillery Duel: Who Will Win the Russian-Ukrainian War for the Donbas? | The National Interest
2. An analysis of "shoot-and-scoot" tactics | Naval Postgraduate School
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1. https://novayagazeta.ru/news/2019/03/13/149955-proekt-naemniki-chvk-vagnera-ohranyali-na-madagask are-svyazannyh-s-prigozhinym-polittehnologov
2. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/foreign-mercenaries-new-scramble-africa-and-sahel
3. 14°29'22.19"S, 40°42'28.08"E. Nacala Airport. October, 2019
4. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/imageserver/image/%2Fmethode%2Ftimes%2Fprod%2Fweb%2Fbin%2Fa5f1 6bfe-e45b-11e9-bc3e-661ff0438ed9.jpg?crop=866%2C487%2C0%2C45&resize=1500
5. https://www.military.africa/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/EFYXrHBWsAAH-4P-1024x768.jpeg
6. https://www.military.africa/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/EFYXrHJWwAI7VIr-768x1024.jpeg
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8. https://archive.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3136399
9. https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/the-wagner-group-files/
