Bulletin From The Borderlands

01 December 2023

Note from Lethal Minds:

Bulletin From The Borderlands is a joint project between Lethal Minds and some of the most talented OSINT analysts and independent journalists working today. Our goal is to provide you with a clear, accurate, and informative view of the world, free from censorship or bias. The Bulletin will bring you the facts, our analysis, and our evidence. We hope you find our work helps you better understand the complicated and increasingly volatile world in which we live.

Be informed, be prepared, be lethal.

The Bulletin Team:

Analyze Educate : Brodie Kirkpatrick (Analyze & Educate) is a Marine Corps infantry veteran. He is a graduate San Jose State University with a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science. He runs Analyze & Educate, a podcast and associated social media pages discussing geopolitics, armed conflicts, news, and history. In his capacity with Lethal Minds he is the team lead for the Bulletin From the Borderlands, Americas Desk chief, and an editor.

Meridian News : Meridian News is a project dedicated to sharing and aggregating open source intelligence, stories from individuals experiencing history, and amplifying underreported global news.

Sino Talk : Sino Talk is China watcher with extensive experience living and studying in China. In another life, he was a Marine intelligence analyst. 

The Expeditionary Intelligence Group : The Expeditionary Intelligence Group Instagram page is a project delivering flash news utilizing open-source intelligence combined with human asset contributions and geographic intelligence to provide the general public with objective bias-free global news that tells the whole story based on the facts and on-the-ground insights they feel are missing from a lot of mainstream news reporting.

S2 Forward : A serving US Marine and Intelligence analyst, S2 Forward is focused primarily on the Mid East and Central Asia.

Callisto Report: The Calisto Report is an OSINT project dedicated to delivering timely open source analysis and conflict reporting, and chronicling global events

The Defense Bulletin: Defense Bulletin is run by John M Larrier. As a civilian, I’ve closely followed strategic developments for close to a decade, but “launched” the Bulletin during the pullout in Afghanistan due to the extreme nature of the misinformation I saw my peers as well as others reading into. The lacuna that the general populace has about these now very prevalent subjects is the stated goal for Defense Bulletin

ALCON S2: A veteran of the New Zealand military intelligence community, if it walks, talks, or crawls in Asia, ALCON S2 knows about it. Cole is the preeminent source of OSINT for the Oceania and South East Asia region.

Jillian Butler: A lifelong writer and San Diego native. She received her bachelor’s degree in English and History at the University of Ulster in Northern Ireland. Upon moving back to San Diego, she received her master’s in International Relations at the University of San Diego where she centered her research around jihadi terror. She is also a contributing writer for Pop Smoke Media, American Grit, The Modern Insurgent, and Lethal Minds Journal’s Bulletin from the Borderlands. In her free time, she can be found surfing, training jiu jitsu, or improving her craft of cooking the perfect ribeye.

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In This Issue:

The Americas : Covered in this issue by Brodie Kirkpatrick (Analyze & Educate). 

Amid fears of war in South America, Venezuelans are set to vote on the annexation of two-thirds of neighboring Guyana. This issue has drawn comparisons to the Russian annexation of Crimea almost ten years ago. In Mexico, the head of security for the Sinaloa Cartel faction led by the sons of El Chapo has been arrested. The circumstances of his arrest have been in question as he has likely caused more trouble for the cartel than he is worth.

Europe : Covered in this issue by Meridian News and Callisto Reports

In late November, the Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren announced that the Netherlands wants to join Europe’s Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation known as OCCAR. known by its French acronym (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement / Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation).

Finland has decided to fully close its borders with Russia for two weeks, citing security concerns and fears that Russia is using migrants as a tool to destabilize the country, following Finland's recent entry into NATO. This move is seen as a precautionary measure to safeguard Finnish national security, reflecting a significant shift in Finland's foreign policy and escalating tensions with Russia. The Finnish government, was alarmed by a larger-than-normal flow of asylum seekers – calling it "hybrid-attack" – has their concerns substantiated by the EU's accusations against Belarus in 2021 for similar tactics. Simultaneously, Russia is proposing legislation requiring foreigners to sign a "loyalty agreement," prohibiting criticism of government policy, traditional values, and Soviet military history. This aligns with Russia's broader efforts to control information and opinions, and indicates a tightening of state control domestically, as well as over international opinion within its own borders where possible. The legislation is awaiting review by the State Duma, highlighting Russia's attempts to further limit free speech.

East Asia and Oceania: Covered in this issue by Sino Talk

The Taiwanese Army’s 203rd Brigade will conduct a live-fire exercise at Xishu Beach near the city of Tainan on December 28th. Taiwan began production of the Sky Sword II Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) system after successfully passing evaluations and testing in July. The KMT and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) failed to form a joint presidential ticket due to disagreements over polling. The ruling Japanese bloc agreed to ask the government to amend regulations to allow for the export of Japanese weaponry and equipment. South Korea contemplated restoring guard posts along the DMZ after North Korea began to restore their guard posts and bringing recoilless rifles to arm them. China began testing the electromagnetic catapults on the Fujian-class/Type 003 aircraft carrier, the country’s first indigenous flattop carrier. 

The Philippine Senate is set to pass a law that would declare and identify the various maritime zones under the jurisdiction of the country. Vietnam and Japan agreed to increase their maritime security cooperation as part of upgrading their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The deal between China and Thailand to switch from a Yuan-class submarine to Chinese built frigate is in jeopardy due to the Defense Ministry failing to get the Royal Thai Navy and Parliament’s support. Myanmar’s junta acknowledged that it lost several military bases in northern Shan State due to the ongoing rebel offensive. Australia accused China of injuring several navy divers due to operating a destroyer’s hull-mounted sonar near its frigate during an operation to remove a fishing net from its propellers. The Indian Navy commissioned three of its Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) shallow water vessels in the city of Cochin located in eastern India. 

Central Asia and the Mid East: Covered in this issue by Eric Sheppler

The Israel-Gaza conflict has been paused as a foreign-brokered ceasefire is ongoing. Though this has temporarily halted hostilities in the Gaza AO, military action in the Red Sea continues as the Houthi movement continues to threaten foreign shipping and regional infrastructure while the Pentagon has confirmed the 74th attack on U.S. troops and assets in the region since Oct 17th.

Even with the fighting in Gaza halted for the time being, the potential for a resumption is high as an active-shooter incident in Jerusalem on Nov 30th, perpetrated by Hamas gunmen, has left 4 people dead and multiple others wounded.

Africa: Covered in this issue by the Expeditionary Intelligence Group, Unbiased Conflicts, and Jillian Butler

The Big Points:

The Highlight: North Korean Ballistic Missile Developments  

North Korea seeks to advance its ballistic missile and space program utilizing Russian technology and insight. 

See Also:

• India expands its ASW capabilities, the rift between Thailand and China grows deeper, Taiwan’s two major parties fail to form a joint ticket, the Phillipines seeks to declare disputed maritime zones as theirs, China’s aggressive actions against Australian divers, and the Askai Chin region moves back into the spotlight. 

• El Nini, a key player in the Sinaloa Cartel, has been arrested by Mexican Authorities. The disputed Essequibo region causes tensions to rise between Guyana and Venezuela. 

• In Africa, Sudan puts in a request for the withdrawal of UN security forces, 

• New “loyalty” legislation in Russia. Finland closes the Russian-Finnish border crossings. The Netherlands seeks to join the OCCAR framework. 

Strategic Forecast: John M. Larrier - Defense Bulletin 

Strategic Forecast Highlight: Implications for regional security in the Askai Chin region. North Korea enhances its ballistic missile and space capabilities.

Largely overlooked, the strategic dynamic in and around the Askai Chin region has been a great indicator for future Chinese actions against Indian forces in the region and their reliance on dual-use technology. 

Based on the recent suspected launch test in Aksai Chin and China's ongoing infrastructure development in the region, China will likely continue efforts to strengthen its control over Aksai Chin. The launch site is likely connected to the National Space Science Center (NSSC) or China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT), underscores China’s potential expansion of their dual-use capabilities for both space exploration and military purposes. China's rationale for building this site aligns with a broader infrastructure expansion strategy, enacted since 2020’s violent clashes with Indian forces along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that resulted in dozens of casualties on both sides. Future Chinese actions in the region are likely reliant on the completion of the G695 Highway, connecting key regions. As mentioned in the write-up, China will seek to construct villages, cities, and transportation networks to establish a comprehensive presence. Despite the potential military vulnerability of the site, China's persistence in infrastructure development suggests a strategic commitment to bolstering its force posture in the contested region. Increased involvement from India’s allies and partners and diplomatic efforts will be crucial to understanding and responding to China's increased focus on the Aksai Chin region, as it  carries implications for regional stability and the ongoing border dispute with India.

Comment:

RAND Corporation’s “The Backbone of U.S. Joint Operations: Army Roles in the Indo-Pacific” offers further insight into potential Chinese actions in the Askai Chin region. 

The successful launch of North Korea's Malligyong-1 satellite, after two previous failures, is evidence of the deepening collaboration between North Korea and Russia since the pariah state began sending ammunition and material to Russia for use in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. The bilateral agreement to enhance their defense relationship, particularly in satellite development, points to Russian technical assistance in overcoming challenges associated with North Korea's Chŏllima-1 rocket system and the Malligyong-1 satellite. Russia likely provided crucial technology transfers, technical analysis, and advanced components to refine both the rocket and satellite systems. North Korea's hesitance to publicly release imagery from the Malligyong-1 indicates limitations in its capabilities, despite Russian assistance, but may also indicate their reticence to admit Russian involvement in their production and development. The collaborative efforts, however, signify advancements in North Korea's Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)  program, which will pose a significant threat to South Korea, the United States, and other allies and partners in the region. Expect to see increased cooperation between Russia and North Korea, potentially extending beyond satellite technology to other defense capabilities, which will in turn foster a strategic alliance that challenges the current regional security dynamic. 

Global Forecast:

The Netherlands' decision to seek membership in OCCAR (Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation) holds significant implications for the development of independent European security initiatives. As the Netherlands aims to join other member states in collaborative defense equipment/production programs, this move aligns with a broader European effort to enhance efficiency and reduce costs in armaments and acquisitions. We’ve seen other initiatives similar to this. A good example is the expansion of the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP). The timing is notable, given the ongoing war in Ukraine, and the Netherlands' historical cooperation with OCCAR as a non-member reflects a strategic commitment to European defense objectives. By participating in OCCAR projects, the Netherlands can facilitate increased interoperability with their European allies and partners, thus strengthening its role in the acquisition of new weapons systems. This decision underscores the collective European effort to respond to the dynamic security environment and will likely signal increased commitment to deeper collaboration in defense technologies. Additionally, the closure of Finnish borders to Russia following its NATO entry and Russia's proposed "loyalty agreement" legislation further highlights the complex geopolitical dynamics and increased tensions between Russia and NATO/western powers since Finland’s ascension to NATO and the commencement of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Russian “greyzone” actions against Finland and non-aligned nations can be expected to increase in the coming weeks and months. 

The IDF's use of unconventional weaponry, such as the domestically produced X-95 Tavor and Negev NG-5, reflects their focus on urban warfare and rapid, repeated movements in and out of armored vehicles. The write up highlights how the IDF’s choices in small arms align with their proven tactic of the suppression and destruction of lightly armed unconventional forces in urban terrain while simultaneously prioritizing force preservation. The Qatari-brokered ceasefire, at the time the issue was written, had the potential for continued extension as long as Hamas remained willing to trade hostages for time. International support from Qatar, Egypt, the United States, the UK, France, China, and Russia seemed to enhance the prospects for a negotiated end to hostilities. Instead, after Hams claimed they could not fulfill their obligations on account of being unable to locate more hostages and repeated violations of the ceasefire by Hamas/claimed violations by Israel, the ceasefire has now expired, resulting in a resumption of IDF operations in Gaza. The Houthi movement's involvement has put their military capabilities, supplied largely by Iran, on display. These capabilities, which include cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and heli-borne ship seizures, add a complex and unpredictable dimension to the regional dynamics, forcing both regional and non-regional actors to reassess their approach to the Houthi movement. The Houthi actions, particularly their demonstrated military competence, while limited, may have significant and unpredictable repercussions in the region.

As Sudan becomes the third African country, after the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali, to request the end to UN security missions, the UN Security Council's upcoming vote on December 1, 2023, to end the UNITAMS mission signals a potential setback for regional stability and international peace efforts. The termination could exacerbate an already dire humanitarian situation, leaving vulnerable groups of people without essential aid and protection. The withdrawal of the UN mission may embolden warring factions, leading to an escalation of violence and human rights abuses. The withdrawal of UN security forces could also create a power vacuum, with no one to check the aforementioned potentialities. 

In Mexico, the arrest of El Nini, the Chief of Security for the Sinaloa Cartel's Los Chapitos faction, on charges of Fentanyl distribution and other narcotics has significant implications for the future dynamic within the cartel and the broader Mexican drug trade. El Nini's arrest, combined with internal dissent and suspicions about his loyalties, suggests a power struggle and potential restructuring within the Los Chapitos organization. The current theories surrounding his arrest, including a deal made during Ovidio Guzman's extradition, a strategic move to divert attention, and a response to the recent decision to cease Fentanyl distribution, highlight the myriad of challenges facing the cartel. The future of Los Chapitos rests on their selection of a successor, which highlights the delicate balance of familial ties and strategic considerations. The intricate dynamics within the cartel's hierarchy, paired with the need for a leader who understands the complex security challenges and commands loyalty, will shape the organization's resilience and success in the Mexican drug trade. As mentioned in the write up on his arrest, the likelihood of a combination of theories, emphasizes the internal discontent with El Nini and the cartel's strategic move to address both his controversial status and mitigate increased attention from Mexican and U.S. authorities. If Nini was indeed handed over, Los Chapitos likely had a prepared successor, indicating a strategic and adaptive response to increased U.S. interest in the fentanyl trade in Mexico.

As Venezuela’s vote on the Essequibo annexation looms in spite of the ICJ (International Court of Justice), we can expect tensions to rise between Venezuela and Guyana. Unsubstantiated reports persist surrounding potential Brazilian involvement in a potential conflict. As Brazil has many issues to deal with domestically, it is unlikely they have the wherewithal to address domestic issues and get involved in a state on state conflict. 

The Americas

Brodie Kirkpatrick

Venezuela Votes on Annexation 

On December 3rd, Venezuelans will vote in a referendum to decide whether or not their country should annex Essequibo, an area of Guyana that makes up 66% of its landmass. The dispute between the two nations regarding Essequibo has led to heightened tensions and fears of a new war in South America. 

Venezuela Rhetoric & Signaling

The dispute regarding the oil rich region of Essequibo has been previously covered by the Bulletin. Readers can refer back to the November 1st issue to get an overview of the issue, which dates back hundreds of years. When Hugo Chavez was in power in Venezuela, he rarely brought up the issue on the advice of Cuban leader Fidel Castro. In 2015, with Nicolas Maduro now in power, oil was discovered in Guyana’s territory. Guyana now has the most oil reserves per capita than any other country. This has given Venezuela a major incentive to once again assert its historical claim over Essequibo. 

The military has been promoting pro-annexation events and language ahead of the referendum. On November 25th, General Domingo Hernández Lárez declared that Venezuela would defend its claim to Essequibo “with blood and fire” in a post on Twitter/X. Lárez is the commander of the Strategic Command of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (CEOFANB), so his threats should be taken seriously. In late November, Major General José Antonio Murga Baptista led a march of soldiers and civilians supporting annexation. A recent video posted to Twitter/X also shows Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez painting “The Essequibo Is Our’s” on the side of an armored personnel carrier. Additionally, a post from the Venezuelan Army’s official Twitter/X account asserted the country’s claim to Essequibo and its willingness to defend that claim with force.   

Some developments have also taken place near the border of Venezuela and Guyana. Coast Guard stations near the border have been undergoing modernization. Recently, Admiral Neil Villamizar Sánchez visited the coast guard station “Punta Barima”, which is 40 miles from the border and is currently being upgraded. Hundreds of Venezuelan troops have also been deployed to the border region in order to “combat illegal mining”.    

Referendum

Venezuelan votes will be asked five questions regarding the annexation of Essequibo. According to Phil Gunson, senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, Essequibo is the only issue that unites the Venezuelan people. President Nicolas Maduro is using the issue to bring the country together ahead of next year’s presidential election. It is expected that Venezuelans will overwhelmingly vote in favor of annexation. 

ICJ Ruling

In an attempt to block the Venezuelan referendum, Guyana took the matter to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Guyana asked the court to halt the vote on December 3rd. The ICJ is the high court of the United Nations. While the court’s rulings are legal binding in theory, there are serious doubts as to the UN’s ability to enforce them. 

Today, two days before the referendum, the ICJ issued its ruling regarding Guyana v. Venezuela. The court order did not specifically reference the referendum, but it did rule that Venezuela should “refrain from taking any action which would modify that situation that currently prevails” regarding Essequibo. This ruling is temporary and the court plans to review the case again at a later date to provide a permanent order. Court president Joan E. Donoghue justified the urgent issuance of the temporary order by saying that “Venezuela’s expressed readiness to take action with regard to the territory in dispute in these proceedings at any moment following the referendum".

Adding to questions of the enforceability of the court’s ruling, Venezuela does not recognize the ICJ’s jurisdiction over this issue. The nation is still expected to hold its referendum in two days, despite the court order. Vice President Delcy Rodriguez said as much to the court¹.        

The Capture of “El Nini” and the Future of Los Chapitos

Analyst: Non-State Anomalies

Introduction:

On November 22, 2023, Nestor Isidro Perez Salas A.K.A “El Nini” was arrested by Mexican Security forces at a residential location in Culiacan, Sinaloa. El Nini is alleged to be the current chief of security for the Sinaloa Cartel faction the Los Chapitos. Additionally, Nini is wanted by US authorities for the distribution of Fentanyl and other narcotics. The Los Chapitos, are a prominent faction within the Sinaloa Cartel, and are characterized by their familial ties to one of Mexico's most notorious drug lords, Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán. Comprised primarily of the sons and close relatives of El Chapo, this faction operates as a significant force within the larger criminal organization. While initially maintaining a lower profile, the Los Chapitos have gradually ascended to positions of influence and leadership, shaping the cartel's strategic direction. Known for their adaptability and ruthlessness, the group has played a crucial role in the cartel's expansion and resilience amid shifting dynamics in the Mexican drug trade. Upon his arrest, Mexican authorities have placed Nini in a maximum-security prison in Sinaloa with a plan to move him to Mexico City where he may face extradition to the United States. 

El Nini:

In his capacity as Chief of Security for the Los Chapitos organization in Sinaloa, Mexico, El Nini assumes a critical role in safeguarding the interests and personnel of the cartel. Functioning as a strategic linchpin, El Nini oversees a cadre of adept security professionals responsible for protecting key figures, securing trafficking routes, and fortifying the organization's operational integrity. His responsibilities encompass orchestrating intelligence initiatives, implementing counter-surveillance protocols, and managing a sophisticated security infrastructure to mitigate potential risks from rival cartels, law enforcement entities, or other potential threats. 

El Nini's influence as the Chief of Security for the Los Chapitos organization extends beyond conventional protective duties, as he plays a pivotal role in the intricate web of fentanyl distribution. Leveraging his strategic position, El Nini orchestrates the secure transportation and delivery of fentanyl, a potent synthetic opioid, along the cartel's trafficking routes. His meticulous oversight ensures the uninterrupted flow of this high-demand substance while minimizing risks associated with law enforcement interdiction or inter-cartel conflicts. El Nini's role involves coordinating with various factions within the organization to optimize logistics, employing counter-surveillance measures, and establishing secure channels for communication. 

Despite El Nini's indispensable role as Chief of Security for the Los Chapitos organization, his controversial loyalties have cast a shadow over his standing within the leadership. Rumors and suspicions abound regarding his alliances with rival factions or external entities, leading to an erosion of trust among the upper echelons of the cartel. This lack of confidence is exacerbated by El Nini's calculated and enigmatic demeanor, leaving leaders questioning his true motivations and allegiances. The dissent within the leadership stems from concerns that El Nini's actions, while ostensibly serving the cartel's interests, may be influenced by personal gain or undisclosed affiliations. This internal discord, fueled by the clandestine nature of his dealings, has contributed to an atmosphere of unease and discontent, making El Nini a figure not well-liked by the very individuals he is tasked to protect and serve within the Los Chapitos organization.

Current Theories Surrounding the Arrest:

1. Ovidio Guzman: With the recent arrest of one of Los Chapitos leaders, Ovidio Guzman, information of Nini’s whereabouts may have been a part of a deal made with US authorities once Guzman was extradited to the US in exchange for leeway on charges brought forward against him in pending trials.

2. Too much attention on the Chapitos organization: due to his controversial status within the organization multiple sources of evidence point that upper management of the cartel likely voted to pin their recent actions on Nini and give him to the government in hopes that they will start to turn their attention elsewhere. 

3. Recent decision to stop Fentanyl distribution: As recent as a month ago, the Sinaloa Cartel announced that they would be ending the distribution of Fentanyl, and anyone caught in the act would face the death penalty likely in an attempt to lower attention from the US put toward cartel activities. This recent resolution has led many to speculate that Nini did not cease his distribution of Fentanyl and that the cartel voted to give him up in an attempt to calm US attention. 

The Future of Los Chapitos:

In the aftermath of El Nini's capture, the Los Chapitos organization faces a crucial juncture in selecting a suitable successor to maintain the delicate balance of their security apparatus. The intricate dynamics within the familial hierarchy could play a pivotal role in determining the individual poised to step into El Nini's formidable shoes. While the organization has historically relied on family ties for leadership roles, the replacement would need to exhibit not only a profound understanding of security strategies but also possess the charisma and leadership qualities necessary to command the loyalty of the diverse security personnel under their purview.

A prospective successor may emerge from the ranks of trusted relatives or associates who have demonstrated competence in security matters and proven their mettle in navigating the intricacies of the cartel's operations. The Los Chapitos would likely prioritize an individual with a keen awareness of the evolving threats posed by rival cartels and law enforcement agencies, ensuring a seamless transition that safeguards the organization's interests. The selection process would be a delicate balancing act, requiring a candidate who not only embodies the ruthlessness and adaptability characteristic of the Los Chapitos but also commands the respect and allegiance essential for maintaining cohesion within the cartel's security infrastructure. This succession, influenced by a complex interplay of familial ties and strategic considerations, would undoubtedly shape the trajectory of the organization's future resilience and success in the challenging landscape of the Mexican drug trade.

Analyst Comment:

While there are a multitude of theories surrounding Nini’s capture, it’s likely a combination of all three of the aforementioned theories. With rumors and information found in telegram groups and other cartel media channels, it is apparent that El Nini, while holding a pivotal role, was not well-liked within the organization. Moreover, with the organization recently deciding to halt the production and distribution of Fentanyl, it would be logical for the organization to remove it from the root source if El Nini was truly orchestrating a majority of the Fentanyl distribution for the Chapitos. Beyond these two factors, there is also the fact that the Chapitos of been gaining more and more attention from both Mexican and US authorities ever since the first attempted arrest of Ovidio Guzman that led to a surrender of the Mexican authorities to the cartel.

All of these compounding factors and external pressures make it highly probable that upper management of the Los Chapitos organization voted to pin recent action on Nini in an attempt to kill two birds with one stone. First, remove a controversial figure within the organization and two, possibly lower the amount of attention the organization is getting from Mexican and US authorities because Nini is a prominent enough figure. Lastly, if this is the case, and Nini was “given” to the government, then the Chapitos likely already have a suitable replacement ready to take Nini’s place.

Looking Forward

Though Venezuelans are expected to overwhelmingly support the annexation of Essequibo, it isn’t clear what actions Nicolas Maduro plans to take regarding the issue. His military does outmatch Guyana’s Defense Forces and a conflict between the two would likely not last long. Guyana is desperately trying to deter an invasion from its neighbor. This includes the country seeking military cooperation with Brazil and the United States. Looking at Mexico,  El Nini’s arrest is unlikely to hinder the operations of  Los Chapitos or the Sinaloa Cartel overall. His arrest may even be a positive for the faction considering the attention he brought on them. At this time, his extradition to the United States has been put on hold by a Mexican federal judge.