Bulletin From The Borderlands Special Report

Sino Talk - Why The PLA Can't Seem To Keep It's NCOs

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Jun 07, 2023

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Losing The Best

Why The PLA Can’t Maintain A Competent NCO Corps

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel reforms aim to remedy the inability of the organization to keep college graduates in the organization. The reason why the PLA implemented the reforms was due to its failure to retain highly educated individuals in the organization. This inability adversely impacted PLA’s readiness levels because it cannot operate equipment to its fullest potential or meet manning requirements for naval vessels. Furthermore, it hurts the PLA by negatively impacting the organization’s ability to add progressively more sophisticated equipment in a timely manner. The PLA’s retention issues will have a profoundly negative impact on its ability to modernize due to its inability to keep college educated individuals in its ranks.

Reasons the PLA has Issues Retaining College Graduates

The PLA’s difficulty in retaining college graduates varies from the regular issues that every military faces to issues unique to militaries that rely on conscription. These issues range from an individuals’ inability to adapt to military culture to college educated individuals having no incentive to reenlist beyond their initial enlistment. College students who entered the PLA as directly recruited or targeted training NCOs face significant difficulties in trying to adapt to the organization’s culture. Several participants stated that NCOs from both the People’s Liberation Army Navy and People’s Liberation Army Air Force had significant difficulties in adapting to military life. One reason why these NCOs have difficulties in adapting stems from their direct commission with little if any military experience as a soldier in the junior ranks. Another reason is how the college graduates turned NCOs are often not respected by both their superior and junior enlisted members of the unit. The lack of respect from either group means these NCOs are incentivized to not reenlist when they complete their initial enlistments. The same difficulties in adapting to military life can also be found in college graduates who are mobilized to complete their two-year enlistments.

College educated personnel also leave the PLA after only one enlistment due to not liking the unit they were stationed at. The reasons include due to the unit’s harsh conditions and general dissatisfaction with their unit or with the PLA. For example, most of the college educated personnel stationed at a radar brigade in Xinjiang’s Taklamakan Desert chose to demobilize after their two-year enlistment. The group cited the harsh environmental conditions they lived while stationed with the unit as one of the reasons they chose to leave the PLA. Another reason is how these individuals feel unhappy or dissatisfied while serving as part of their unit. The group stationed at the radar brigade also cited feeling unhappy or dissatisfied as another reason they did not want to reenlist. A 2021 survey of college educated members of a unit also indicates a majority of will chose to demobilize rather than staying with the PLA. While both surveys did not provide any details about why either group felt this way, a combination of factors such as the harsh environmental factors and being treated the same as their less-educated counterparts significantly influenced their decision not to reenlist.

Another retention issue is how college educated individuals do not reenlist because they feel like their expertise or education are not being used properly. The issue is a result of the PLA placing them in billets or positions based on the organization’s needs instead of positions where their education, expertise, or knowledge could be used. For example, a 2022 survey by a Central Theater Command brigade shows enlisted graduates leave after their two-year commitment because they believe the PLA is not using their education or expertise properly. Furthermore, these individuals felt as if the PLA or their units was not utilizing them to their fullest extent. The issue still occurs even after the PLA created a program called precision recruitment 精准征兵 to recruit soldiers with the proper education and expertise. The PLA also used big data and social media analysis to locate potential recruits who have the required education and background. However, the issue of the PLA placing college educated soldiers in billets or positions where their education and expertise cannot be fully used continues even after the implementation of these programs.

College graduates often do not want to reenlist because they could take advantage of the various veteran programs and incentives found at local, provincial, and federal level. Local governments at the municipal or county level offer various financial and job incentives to PLA veterans. The incentives include forums designed to inform veterans about the various programs, consultation centers devoted to assisting and providing loans to veterans for small business or entrepreneurial loans. For example, in May 2023, the city of Wuzhou held a forum where veterans had the opportunity to learn about the various programs available for veterans to start and maintain their businesses. News reports indicate the forums are a part of a wider Ministry of Veteran’s Affairs program to increase veterans’ awareness of the programs. Provincial officials will also sign agreements with local branches of Chinese banks and other institutions to create new loan programs or consultation centers for veterans. Guangxi signed a strategic cooperation agreement with 11 local financial institutions to set up consultation centers throughout the city. The centers will be located throughout the city, county, and village levels and are tasked with providing financial advice and services to local veterans. Another financial incentive is the various military support loans 拥军贷 Chinese banks and other institutions offered to veterans to start or sustain their businesses.

The preferential hiring practices include extra assistance for government and non-government employment and incentives to hire veterans. Veterans will receive a veteran’s preferential treatment card 退役军人优待证 after they demobilize and apply at their hometown’s local Veterans Service Station. These cards could be used when applying to jobs to verify they are able to receive hiring incentives such as preferential treatment during the hiring process. However, the same hiring incentives are also used to entice college educated individuals to enlist into the PLA since they will receive them once they demobilize. These benefits also incentivize these same individuals to demobilize after their mandatory enlistment. For example, a 2020 survey revealed that several college educated PLA soldiers did not reenlist because Shanghai and 35 provinces provide incentives – including preferential hiring treatment – veterans. The benefits also include the ability for veterans to receive their old job positions after leaving the military. Hunan province introduced a measure in 2020 stating college graduates hired or employed by government agencies, organizations, or businesses before they enlisted can return to their job after demobilization. These benefits mean the veterans will have better alternatives – from their perspective – than reenlisting in the PLA.

Ways PLA are Trying to Increase Retention Among College Graduates

The PLA understands there are several issues that dissuade highly educated individuals from reenlisting. However, the organization has in recent years undertaken some initiatives to fix the issues and to increase the retention of these individuals throughout the PLA. One initiative is to increase the level of access PLA personnel have to various benefits – monetary, legal, or leave – available to them. For example, in April 2023, a local branch of a state-owned bank sent both equipment and staff at the request of a regiment training in the Xinjiang Military Region. The unit made the request because of several NCOs and other personnel requiring banking assistance since no banks were located near their training ground. The lack of banking services caused issues among the soldiers such as failing to complete home mortgage payments or replacing their military security card 军人保障卡. The local branch and the regiment created a mobile bank流动银行 by mounting the equipment inside a vehicle so personnel can access banking services and resolve any issues they may have. The mobile bank increased morale and motivation among the unit members who used its services.

The PLA also created legal aid centers 法律援助中心 to provide PLA personnel and their families with resources that would help them solve their legal problems. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF) Northern Theater Command created the center after finding that the inability for PLA personnel to successfully navigate legal issues they faced led to low morale and motivation in March 2023. The center was established to connect personnel with various legal resources such as consultations and lawyers. The command also created the center to increase legal knowledge among PLA officers and soldiers and to protect their rights and interests. The center held various seminars that discussed various laws and how to abide by them, increased PLA personnel’s awareness of their rights, and how to protect them. However, one of the biggest benefits of the center was how it enabled officers and NCOs to solve legal issues such as debt and employee disputes. Another PLAAF legal center in the Southern Theater Command assisted dependent spouses in solving several employee disputes after they moved with their spouses to new bases. The various issues caused a large amount of stress on both the PLA members and their dependent spouses which led to decreased morale. However, the personnel’s morale substantially increased after receiving assistance from the centers with their disputes and issues.

The creation of databases at the brigade level enabled the units to quickly process applications for NCOs and officers’ families to receive various benefits such as on-base housing. The hope is by reducing the bureaucratic hurdles associated with applying for benefits, the PLA hopes to increase morale for college graduates to reenlist in the PLA. One example is how a brigade of the 78^th Group Army set up an application database that assisted NCOs and officers to apply for family benefits such as on-base housing and school enrollment. The database increase the speed and efficiency of the application process by combining all applications into ‘packages’ that contain all information from them. Previously, personnel applying for benefits had to fill out and give information to various departments multiple times due to them losing paperwork and facing long processing times. Additionally, it also prevented their families and children from moving and living with them at the bases where they are stationed or their children from attending school. Another benefit of the ‘packages’ is that it enabled the processors to increase focus on applications containing issues. The databases also assisted the spouses of NCOs and officers in finding jobs after they relocated to new bases. A PLAAF brigade used similar databases to coordinate with the base’s Veterans Affair’s Bureau and other entities to set up job fairs for their dependents. The inability for dependents of military members to find new jobs near bases caused significant in trying to get NCOs and officers to reenlist or to relocate to the new bases.

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Another way the PLA is trying to increase retention among college graduates is by revamping and making it easier for personnel to take leave. The Central Military Commission (CMC) issued revised Interim Regulations on Military Vacation Work军人休假工作暂行规定 in October 2022 and took effect in January 2023. The regulations adjust and optimizes military vacation benefits by redesigning the leave system, revamping pay policies, and improving protections related to taking military leave. The new policy contrasts with the previous policy where PLA officers and enlisted personnel were limited to only visiting their family once a year for a set number of days. The new regulations are already seeing some use within PLA units to allow PLA soldiers to take leave due to family emergencies or other personal issues. In March 2023, a conscript from a brigade in the Central Military Theater needed to take emergency leave because his father was terminally ill. However, the conscript did not know if he was eligible to take until his instructor informed him of the new regulation and the process to ask for emergency leave. The conscript ultimately was able to take emergency leave to visit his father before he died because the company rapidly completed the approval process. A PFC 上等兵 in different company of the same brigade also had to take leave to go his appointments. While the PFC was reluctant to ask for leave to go to his appointments, his squad leader reminded him to fill out the leave form and he no longer felt reluctant to ask. The new leave regulations not only allowed both conscripts to take military leave without any negative consequences but increased their morale and view of their unit.

Increasing marriage prospects for NCOs and officers is also another way the PLA is trying to increase retention of college graduates in the organization. Historically, bachelor PLA NCOs and officers were introduced to potential spouses through friends or family from their hometown. However, this matchmaking method has proven ineffective in responding to the increasing numbers of military members because they had only a limited amount of time (45 days) they could use to meet and get acquainted with potential suitors. Additionally, NCOs can only marry if they are meet one of the following criteria: he/she is an intermediate-level NCO; male NCOs above 28 years old and female NCOs above 26 years old; children of martyrs; orphans or NCOs with disabilities due to combat, public cause, or illness. The PLA sought to increase marriage prospects of its NCOs and officers through organizing and holding matchmaking events. These various matchmaking events are used to match prospective suitors with personnel who meet the criteria for marriage. Matchmaking efforts by the PLA are usually led by the CMC’s Political Work Department and worked with state media to organize large ‘blind dates’ 相亲 for eligible military personnel.

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These ‘blind dates’ consist of a significant number of selected young females who are also looking for husbands who would register online and participate in the events. These events are held by both the local military and government departments charged with handling civilian affairs. The ‘blind-dates’ are usually accompanied by group weddings of military personnel and civilians – both NCOs and officers – who were previously introduced to each other. The date participants are often invited to watch the audience of the gala-style weddings. However, the ‘matchmaking’ programs are usually carried out by each of the five PLA branches. These programs range from dedicated programs such as the PLAAF Military Matchmaking Gathering 军旅姻缘会to similar matchmaking events held by individual PLAA and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) units. While there are conditions that NCOs must meet before marrying, evidence exists that some units disregard the intermediate NCO rule and allow junior-level NCOs (Corporals 下士 or Sergeants中士) to get married. For example, a brigade from the 80^th Group Army held a Love in the Military Camp Happy Double Embrace 情定军营幸福双拥 in March 2023.

The matchmaking event included both female civilians meeting and talking with NCOs – wearing both civilian and military uniforms – in different settings such as meeting in the one of the brigade’s honor rooms 连荣誉室 and banquet hall. Several photos taken of the event appeared to show junior NCOs (Corporals and Sergeants) taking part in the event. Furthermore, evidence of junior-level NCOs marrying their spouses also appeared in Chinese media. Several junior NCOs were married during a collective wedding ceremony held by a brigade of the 83^rd Group Army in May 2023. The evidence of Corporals and Sergeants participating in both matchmaking and collective marriage ceremonies points to the PLA using marriage to increase retention among junior NCOs. The NCOs likely do not meet any of the marriage criteria such as meeting the age requirement since they do not meet the intermediate NCO requirement.

Conclusion

The PLA’s inability to retain people who have the necessary educational background is an issue that the organization is trying to rectify to enhance its ability to effectively modernize. The various programs have had some immediate impact on improving the lives of and enabling the PLA personnel greater access to various benefits. However, it is still too soon to determine what effect, if any, these programs will have on improving the retention rates among college educated PLA personnel or if they will incentivize them to reenlist. The initiatives will likely be unable to cover the losses created when PLA soldiers leave the military since the programs will not be enough to retain highly educated individuals. The most significant reason is due to overall lack of control regarding whether that group of soldiers will leave the military after their mobilization. The inability for the PLA to retain those individuals means the PLA will continue to face substantial hurdles in its ability to modernize.

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A guest post by

Sino Talk

China watcher with extensive experience in analyzing topics related to China and the Indo-Pacific region.