Flashpoint Taiwan

A Lethal Minds War Game

Note from Lethal Minds:

This is the first of several articles feeding into our upcoming war game and crisis simulation Flashpoint Taiwan. The purpose of this simulation is to simulate a diplomatic crisis in the Taiwan Strait which triggers an invasion of Taiwan by the PLA. This simulation will feature both military practitioners and foreign affairs students and professionals.

As part of this article series, one of our writers Quantico Warfighting Society will be hosting Zoom classes to provide additional context and learning opportunities. The link to these calls will be available on our social media account.

Participants will be assigned to factions in the simulation at random, although preference to leadership positions will be given to those who interact with these articles and with the Zoom classes we will be hosting.

At the end of this article will be a thought exercise. We encourage you to write a brief response to that question and send it in to our email at lethalmindsjournal@gmail.com

Be informed, be prepared, be Lethal.

Dedicated to those who serve, those who have served, and those who paid the final price for their country.

The Sino Taiwanese Conflict Part One: Historical Overview

Sino Talk

Within the last two or so years, a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan emerged as one of the most popular topics in both news media and defense/security circles. Many individuals claimed that China will invade Taiwan in 2025 at the earliest while other argue for 2027 as the year Xi will order the invasion. The evidence most frequently referenced includes Xi ordering the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. Others rely on a U.S. Air Force general’s ‘gut instinct’ and similar commanders’ analysis. However, many do not understand or take into consideration both the history and the reasons why China would decide to invade Taiwan. Below is a short but concise overview of both the history of the history of China and Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War and the rationale behind why China would invade Taiwan. 

History

The modern history between China and Taiwan began in 1949, in the final stages of the Chinese Civil War when the government of the Republic of China (ROC) fled to Taiwan. Sporadic clashes continued between the ROC and the Chinese forces in both China’s interior and several islands off the coast of the newly formed People’s Republic of China (PRC). For example, the PLA successfully landed and captured the island of Hainan off the southern coast of China in spring of 1950. However, the defining confrontations between Taiwan and the PRC were the multiple Taiwan Strait Crises that occurred before and after the United States recognized the PRC in 1979. 

First Taiwan Crisis

The First Taiwan Crisis began in September 1954 due to several factors, the most important was China’s testing the Eisenhower Administration’s committing to defending Taiwan. The second factor was the United States publicly debating on the possibility of it signing a Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC. The United States’ creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization – an organization established as a united front against the threat posed by the PRC and other communists – was the third factor. Beginning in September 1954, PLA units shelled Kinmen Island but expanded the bombardment to include both Matsu and Tachen islands in November. The PLA captured the Yijianshan Islands from the ROC in January 1955 as fighting continued between both sides. The United States responded by signing the defense treaty with the ROC but did not commit the United States to defending the coastal islands. However, the treaty did promise American support if the ROC became engaged in a wider conflict with the PRC. Congress passed the Formosa Resolution in January 1955 to provide President Eisenhower and his successors total authority to defend both Taiwan and the ROC occupied islands. 

As the situation in the Taiwan Strait continued to deteriorate in the early months of 1955, the Eisenhower administration debated how to effectively respond. The administration weighted the sending a portion of 7^th Fleet into the strait but hesitated because it did not want to restart the Chinese Civil War and cause significant instability in the region. Other options included convincing ROC President Chiang Kai-shek to surrender the islands to the United States using nuclear weapons against the PRC. However, the United States made announcements expressing its commitment to defend Taiwan against any Chinese attack but did not specify the territory it would explicitly defend. The administration and Chiang privately agreed that he would withdraw ROC forces from Dachen islands for the American promise to defend Kinmen and Matsu. However, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai said the PRC wanted to negotiate with the United States during a speech at the 1955 Bandung Conference. Zhou’s comments about negotiating with the United States stemmed from the Soviet Union pressuring the PRC to ease tensions with the United States. The PRC also decided to step down is because the United States use of nuclear brinksmanship during the crisis. 

Second Taiwan Crisis

The Second Taiwan Crisis can be viewed as a continuation of the First Taiwan Crisis and China’s second test to determine to which degree the United States would defend ROC’s territory. The PRC also wanted to blockade and force the ROC into a withdrawal from the islands as a prelude to a potential invasion of Taiwan. Another of the PRC’s goals was to force the United States into lifting the embargo and sanctions on international trade to decrease its overreliance on the Soviet Union for trade. PLA units began bombardment of Kinmen and Matsu in August 1958, shelling both islands with 100 shells but intensified the shelling at Kinmen, firing up to 60,000 shells a day at the island. The Soviet Union publicly announced its support for the PRC and reaffirmed its commitment to aid the country in “liberating Taiwan” three days into the crisis. In addition to the shelling, the PLA and ROC clashed in the vicinity of Dongding Island when the PLA attempted an amphibious landing. However, the ROC military defeated the units and prevented the islands from being captured. 

The United States responded to the shelling and attempted amphibious landings by conducting a massive buildup of military units both in and around Taiwan. The Air Forces moved several fighter-interceptor, fighter-bomber, and tactical air control units to Taiwan and Clark Air Force base in the Philippines. Elements of the Marine Corps’ First Air Wing were sent from Iwakuni Marine Air Station to the island as addition reinforcement. The Navy also deployed several naval vessels, including six aircraft carriers, to the Taiwan Strait as part of the United States’ response. President Eisenhower said that there will be “no new Munich” when discussing the crisis during a televised speech to the American public. Several of these vessels and carrier-based aircraft also convoyed supplies to within three miles of the Kinmen to keep supply lines open. As the PRC saw the United States not backing down or convincing Chiang to evacuate the islands, in late September, shelling decreased significantly to about 6,000 a day. In PLA then stopped for ten days in early October that allowed the ROC to rapidly resupply and build stockpiles on the islands. However, the PLA shelled Kinmen with about 40,000 rounds on November 3^rd likely as a response to the ROC’s successful stockpiling of supplies on Kinmen. The PLA also shelled the island to influence the voters in the leadup to the 1960 elections. From the end of the crisis in 1958, the PLA sporadically shelled ROC-held islands until 1979. 

Third Taiwan Crisis

The Third Taiwan Crisis differed significantly from the previous crises because it involved Taiwan proper instead of Kinmen or other ROC-held islands. Another difference is the amount of time – approximately 38 years – that occurred between the second and third crises. The crisis began in May 1995 when U.S. President Bill Clinton granted ROC President Lee Teng-hui a visa to visit the United States to attend a reunion at his alma mater, Cornell University. However, the PRC reacted negatively to Lee being granted a visa because they perceived it as the United States moving away from the One-China Policy. The PRC feared that this and other actions by the United States may encourage Taiwan to declare formal independence after its 1996 presidential elections. They also pointed to the ongoing democratization of Taiwan under a native-born Taiwanese president as an indicator the island will declare independence. 

The PRC responded to Lee receiving a visa by recalling its ambassador to the United States, cancelling a defense minister meeting, and suspended cross-strait dialogue with the United States. The PLA also launched six ballistic missiles that landed at least 100 miles from Taiwan’s coast in July and live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait in August 1995. The PRC hoped the exercises and the suspension of diplomatic contact with the United States will convince both Taiwan and the United States from moving away from the One-China Policy. However, the United States responded by criticizing its actions while also trying to restore diplomatic relations with the PRC. The ROC’s response included conducting its own missile launches and live-fire exercises designed to defend against a possible invasion. In late October, the PRC received guarantees that the United States will limit high-level meetings with Taiwan. However, the PLA conducted wanted to influence the upcoming legislative elections. The PLA conducted a major naval live-fire exercise in October and a forced beach landing exercise on Dongshan Island in the months before the election. 

The PLA launched several ballistic missiles over Taiwan and conducted a major amphibious exercise in Fujian province immediately before the island’s presidential election in March 1996. The missile launches and exercises were aimed to intimidate the ROC’s electorate from voting for candidates who wanted to move away from the One-China Policy. The series of launches and exercises were also aimed at intimidating the electorate from voting for Lee in presidential election. The United States responded by sending one Carrier Strike Group (CSG) that sailed through the Taiwan Strait in direct response to the PRC’s actions to during both elections. However, the PLA’s actions had an opposite effect on the electorate with Lee winning the election with 55 percent. 

Last Ten Years

In the last ten years, the relationship between China and Taiwan changed from a relatively peaceful relationship to one that is increasing antagonistic. KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou won the presidency in the 2008 presidential elections, taking away the presidency from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Coupled with the KMT’s landslide win in legislative elections in December 2007, it solidified the party’s control over both the executive and legislative branches of the ROC. Ma’s and the KMT’s new policy were based on gradual economic, symbolic, and political rapprochement with the PRC during his first term. The rapprochement was based on four objectives: 

1. To lower political and military tension in the Taiwan Strait;

2. Strengthen economic ties with the PRC that would lead to a common economic market;

3. Counter Taiwanese separatism;

4. Drew up favorable conditions for a possible future unification.

However, during his second term, Ma and the KMT received a significant amount of criticism about how some of their policies are eroding the island’s sovereignty. Many Taiwanese and the DPP criticized Ma’s economic policy linking the ROC and the PRC economies under a one-China market that would make it easier for the PRC to annex the island. A similar argument was used to voice their disapproval over a series of trade agreements that they argued would hollow out the island’s industries. However, both Ma and the KMT received the most criticism when announced he would meet with Xi in Singapore in November 2015. While the meeting would be the first to occur since the end of the Chinese Civil War, the announcement also shocked most of the Taiwanese population. The presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP used the meeting along with the Ma’s policies to win both 2015 legislative and 2016 presidential elections. 

In contrast to the good relations that existed between Ma’s administration and the PRC, the relationship between Tsai’s administration and the PRC was antagonistic. The root of the antagonism lays in how both President Tsai and the DPP never endorsed the understanding outlined in the 1992 Consensus. Tsai openly refused to accept the document and used other ways to find other interpretations that would be acceptable to both the PRC and the ROC. Another point of contention is the PRC’s viewpoint that the DPP, Tsai and Vice President William Lai are advocates for Taiwanese independence. The PRC cut off all official contacts with the Tsai administration but still maintained contact with the KMT and Taiwanese businessmen such as Terry Gou. Tsai sought to increase the ROC’s participation in several international organizations such as the World Health Organization and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. However, the PRC was successful in limiting the ROC’s membership and participation in these organizations. The PRC also began to steal the ROC’s remaining diplomatic allies with the most significant countries being Panama and the Solomon Islands since the 2016 elections. 

Last Year: The Fourth Taiwan Crisis

The Fourth Taiwan Crisis began in August 2022 after former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island to meet with President Tsai and other members of the ROC government. Other factors that also led to the crisis include the erosion in Sino-American relations that began during the Trump administration. Another factor is how the PRC viewed Pelosi’s meeting with Tsai and other ROC officials as the latest sign that the United States is legitimatizing the ROC as an independent country. The PLA responded by conducted a series of exercises along the coast of Fujian province and around the island. These exercises included live-fire exercises of ballistic missiles that were larger and closer to the island than were seen during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. The PRC also announced the creation of six military exercises zones in waters around the island that were near major ROC ports such as Taipei and Kaohsiung. The PLA launched several volleys of Dong Feng-11 (DF-11), DF-15, and DF-16 ballistic missiles into the waters around Taiwan. The PLA also deployed the Liaoning and the Shandong CSGs to Taiwan to participate in naval exercises around the island. The PRC also conducted a disinformation campaign to disseminate large amounts of fake and true information designed to make the Taiwanese population doubt the Taiwanese authorities. The PRC also conducted several cyberattacks that compromised several ROC government websites during the military exercises. Furthermore, the PRC also published its first white paper about Taiwan after the visit. 

The United States deployed a significant number of military units to the immediate region surrounding the ROC in the lead up to Pelosi’s trip. These included one CSG and two LHAs in Japan while another CSG and LHA was off the coast of Hawaii. The U.S. military also deployed a rotational force of F-35s to South Korea in July and a rotational force of B-2 bombers were stationed in Australia. The Biden administration was divided over the trip because the U.S. military opposed it while the trip received bipartisan support. However, the administration voiced its opposition to the exercises and requested that the PRC stop them to prevent the escalation of tensions. The PRC also conducted similar exercises near the island after President Tsai transited the United States and met with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in April 2023. However, the PLA did not conduct any ballistic missile exercises because it decided to take a more measured approach than the one in August 2022. The PRC also did not want to jeopardize the KMT’s chances of winning the 2024 presidential election. The PRC also responded diplomatically by issuing various statements condemning the visit and meeting and demanding the United States to limit its interaction with Taiwanese officials. 

Sides

People’s Republic of China

The countries that consistently took the PRC’s side during the crises included the former Soviet Union/Russia and North Korea. Specifically, these two countries consistently made statements in support of the PRC’s actions and supported the country in its confrontation with the United States and the ROC. The most recent example are the statements both countries made supporting the PRC in its confrontation over Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan. Myanmar also issued statements showing its support to the PRC during the Fourth Taiwan Crisis. Ten other countries also issued statements that closely aligned with the PRC but did not mention the United States. Some of these countries include Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, and Kazakhstan that issued statements that used phrases the PRC also used to describe Taiwan and the ongoing situation. 

Republic of China 

The country that assisted the ROC during all the crises was the United States through providing extensive military, diplomatic, and economic support to the island. However, several countries voiced their support to the ROC both during and after the PRC conducted exercises around Taiwan in August 2022. These nations include Australia and Japan, who expressed their support to the island during the crisis. Other countries issued statements that aligned with the United States but maintained their neutrality, such as India, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam.Furthermore, other countries such as the United Kingdom, Lithuania, and the Czach Republic issued statements of support after Pelosi’s visit. 

Why Would the PRC Invade Taiwan

The question of what circumstances would lead the PRC to invade the island of Taiwan is important because of how the question of Taiwan is one of China’s core interests. The most important reason why the PRC would invade the ROC is due to the island formally declaring independence or making any concrete moves towards it. This is  why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does not like the DPP, Tsai, or Lai, because they believe they are advocates for Taiwan to formally declare independence. The CCP also believes that Lai will try to declare independence or move the ROC towards it if he is elected president. This aspect explains why the CCP is attempting to influence the 2024 presidential elections so the KMT would win them. 

The ROC developing a credible nuclear deterrent would also prompt the PRC to invade the island. In the mid-1960s, the ROC established the Chung-Shan Science Institute to conduct research into various fields, such as nuclear energy and missile areas. However, the institute was also responsible for the ROC’s secret nuclear weapons program – called the Hsin Chu program – that began to purchase and modify equipment to develop nuclear weapons. The institute brought a heavy-water reactor, a heavy-water production plant, and a plutonium separation plant during the late 1960s. However, the CIA determined the ROC operated a small nuclear program that also had a nuclear weapon option and could create a nuclear bomb within five years. ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo pledged that the ROC would not build reprocessing facilities or engage in reprocessing of material into fissionable material for a bomb. However, the ROC continued secret reprocessing and irradiation research until the late 1980s. The United States forced the island to dismantle some buildings to reduce the possibility of the ROC creating a nuclear device. The reason why the PRC would not want the ROC to develop a successful nuclear program is because it would complicate any amphibious assault the PLA would conduct. It would also reduce the PRC’s ability to use coercive measures against the ROC since it would threaten the PRC with its nuclear weapons. 

The United States formally stationing military units on the island would also prompt an invasion by the PRC. The United States Taiwan Defense Command was established after both the United States and the ROC signed the mutual defense treaty in 1954. This command was responsible for all U.S. military personnel deployed or stationed along with all U.S. operations in Taiwan. However, the United States pledged to withdraw all personnel and close all military sites in Taiwan in the Shanghai Communique developed as the United States reopened relations with the PRC. The PRC wanted the United States to remove its military presence from the island because Mao and other CCP leaders viewed the presence as the only impediment to an invasion. It would also cause the United States to deploy units from other military bases in the region, buying the PLA time to conduct the beach landings and create a beachhead¹. 

Thought Exercise

What factors would trigger both China and Taiwan to cause China to invade Taiwan?  

Below is a list of databases and papers for additional information: 

https://www.csis.org/programs/international-security-program/isp-archives/asia-division/cross-strait-security-0. 

https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/topics/taiwan-strait-crises 

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2006/RM4900.pdf 

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/taiwan-straits-standoff/second-taiwan-strait-crisis-1958/BC03AAB5CDFE980F62B4733425272913 

https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/TaiwansFormerNuclearWeaponsProgram_POD_color_withCover.pdf

All articles published in this newsletter are the personal opinions and positions of the authors themselves. All content, and the Lethal Minds and Lethal Minds Journal brand is the copyright of Lethal Minds©

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