Lethal Minds Volume 4

Volume 4, Edition 1 01SEPTEMBER2022

LETHAL MINDS JOURNAL

Lethal Minds Volume 4

Volume 4, Edition 1 01SEPTEMBER2022

Volume IV brings with it a new section of the journal. Based on sheer volume of submissions, we are breaking Written Word in two. The new section will be called Poetry and Art, and will feature poetry, short prose, and artwork created by our military and veteran communities.

We are making a second change to the Journal, and that is to limit each section to three pieces per month per submission type. This is to ensure that our editing team is forced to choose the best of the monthly submissions, not simply ALL the submissions we get (which we’d like to do). So, for example, we will feature only three poems, a maximum of three art collections, and three military affairs pieces per Volume.

Lethal Minds continues to grow, and that growth is only possible through your continued support. Your content is what makes the journal happen every month. If you have an idea you want to put into words, reach out. Our editing team stands ready to help you get your ideas onto paper. We are always looking for ways to improve the content we put out, and your input and critique is very important to us.

Be informed, be prepared, be lethal.

Graham (CPT US Army)

Editor of Lethal Minds Journal

The World Today

• Tactical Ideological Competition between Great Powers: In Development?

• The Philosophical and Political Foundation of the People’s Liberation Army

• Natural Disaster Brief: California Mega Flood

Across The Force

• Whispers of Lafonia

• AAR On Leadership

Opinion

• A Helmand Spring

• Why Are We Acting Like We Did Not Know This Would Happen

• Codename Conoco

The Written Word

• A Fort Campbell Dogman Encounter

• Twilight Tour

Poetry and Art

• Perpetual Predestination

• A Beast Of Burdens

• Kin Town Anthem

• Get That Gun Up

Health and Fitness

• How Far Do You Want to Run? A Basic Marathon Training Plan - Month/Block 2 -Lactate Threshold Focus

• Climate Optimization for the Tactical Athlete

Transition and Career

• Transition Truths

Dedicated to those who serve, those who have served, and those who paid the final price for their country.

The World Today

In depth analysis and journalism to educate the warfighter on the most important issues around the world today.

Tactical Ideological Competition between Great Powers: In Development? - Scott Snow

The past few years have been a bonanza for international relations students and cable news’ legion of armchair-generals. Precipitated by a belligerent Russia and ascendant China, the United States must, for the first time since the fall of the Berlin Wall, share the global stage with what those erudite televangelists deem ‘peer or near-peer competitors.’ Terrorism, the specter which has predominated U.S. National Defense for the better part of two decades, has been relegated to a second class threat. Nowadays, the Great Powers of the East and West earnestly wargame global crises and clashes between their conventional militaries.

Militaristic competition between the U.S. and Russia has fallen into a familiar rhythm established in the previous Cold War. Where possible, the two countries engage in proxy wars; aiding and abetting third parties to wage war against the other. In the six months since the Russian Army struck out to seize Kiev, congressional authorizations of military and nonmilitary American aid to Ukraine are approaching $50 billion. In Afghanistan, the Russian intelligence group GRU works closely with the Taliban, and the CIA suspects it may even have placed bounties on American soldiers. In addition to supporting the other’s enemy, the two powers engage in an arms race and constantly posture, with the hope that the mutually assured destruction inherent in direct conflict will prevent global conflagration. In this vein, recent U.S. sanctions preventing Russian imports of computer chips have hamstrung the Russian war effort, and Putin placing his nuclear capabilities on high alert serves as a grim reminder of the consequences of modern aggression unrestrained by considerations of human cost. 

The twin guardrails of competition via proxies and an arms race-generated mutually assured destruction are also plain to see in the U.S.-China relationship. Taiwan’s ‘porcupine’ strategy of national defense entails an annual purchase of billions worth of U.S. military equipment and technology. Similarly, Chinese companies, such as Huawei, regularly defy international sanctions to deliver equipment and technology to the rogue states of North Korea and Iran. And there can be no better example of Cold War posturing and probing than the Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit to Taiwan and the People’s Liberation Army’s ensuing exercise/rehearsal in the Taiwan Strait. 

Despite their similar modes, the two competitions described above are fundamentally different. Specifically, there exists today a competition of ideologies between the U.S. and China. Russia, on the other hand, poses no more than a strategic threat. The Russian state has traded economic prosperity and individual liberties for whatever military prowess it claims, and its recent actions express little more than a nostalgic yearning for a long-ago vanquished empire. In short, the Russian kleptocracy is ideologically bankrupt. Russia’s neighbors, aside from those places such as Belarus where the shadow of the Kremlin blots out progress and freedom, are at little risk of choosing to imitate the Russian style of government. Indeed, the rather remote prospect of Russian dominion has sent the potential imperial holdings of Finland and Sweden tumbling in the opposite direction into the arms of NATO. The Russian game is presently bounded by concerns of its military’s capabilities and intentions, not the viability or virtues of the society which has generated that military.

U.S.-China competition exceeds such delimitations. Instead of just chafing against a U.S.-led world order as Russia has, the Chinese Communist Party has intentions to supplant the current way of things and institute a Sino-centric hierarchy of states. Similar to the Russian empire of yesteryear, the CCP’s desired end state has its roots in history. In this case, that history consists of several thousand years of successive imperial dynasties, the majority of which enjoyed regional hegemony and an array of supplicant vassal states. Having married their imperial legacy to a teleological yet flexible form of governance, the CCP’s ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,’ as it is known, represents a serious rival to the neoliberal, capitalist, and democratic virtues which the U.S., with its expiring monopoly on great power, has been exporting more-or-less successfully to the world since the end of the Second World War.

Faced with a peer which is rapidly approaching power-parity, the United States, and to an extent the West as a whole, is marshaling its military might, economic heft, alliances, cultural influence, and whatever other levers of power it can in order to contend with a resurgent China. On the level of grand strategy, these machinations are far above the pay grade of the military’s rank and file. American servicemen and women have, and will continue to, honorably execute to the best of their ability the orders passed down which reflect strategic imperatives translated into tactical missions. Certainly, a military capable of deterring or defeating any threat is a necessary component of the U.S.’ ability to thwart its ideological adversaries, and each member of the armed services contributes to this effort by professionally performing the duties of their position. However, for service members steeped in decentralized command and control, who feel overwhelmed at the thought of the vast contest in which they are now engaged, the current picture feels incomplete.

Command and control is simply the system by which Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, Airmen, or Coasties make decisions and use resources to accomplish a mission. In its decentralized form, ‘command’ flows from higher to lower authority while ‘control,’ or feedback, flows from lower to higher authority. Servicemembers receive a command, set about the mission, encounter and solve problems along the way, complete the mission, and report back with refinements. The intangibility of ideological competition breaks the command and control loop. There are few, if any, identifiable objectives individual units can pursue in the ideological realm. Mission success is often undefinable, and how on earth would feedback be pushed up a chain of command with regard to ideologies? Again, by executing their jobs, servicemembers are competing in the ideological arena; but it is possible to be left feeling ineffective or disconnected from the greater mission because the greater mission, that of the U.S.-China ideological competition, is overwhelming and doesn’t fit into the way the military does business.

How, then, can service members at the ‘tactical’ (medium and small unit) level affect ideological competition? This question is complicated given that, due to the U.S.’ democratic values and diversity of thought, whatever ‘ideology’ it puts forward will inherently be different for each American and changing over time. Compounding this difficulty is the fact that our country’s newest generation of servicemembers are coming of age at a nadir of national low self-esteem, uncertainty, and disunity. There are a multitude of manners through which Great Power competition is waged, but there are next to none at the tactical level which explicitly deal with ideological competition.

Briefly, a counterargument to concerns over a lack of tactical means of competing ideologically must be addressed. Some would argue that ideological battles can’t be meted out at the tactical level, or that these battles would have little to no effect on the greater ideological competition. They would argue that the entire American army could have been filled with communists, and the Soviet Union would still have collapsed under the weight of its internal contradictions. However, the American experiences in Vietnam and Afghanistan suggest that when American servicemembers lose faith in, or struggle to understand, the reasons they are waging war, the extreme difficulty of a mission as complex as winning hearts and minds can become staggering. A clear understanding of why and a feeling that one can make an impact in the ideological arena may be invaluable, particularly for young American men and women who see their country harangued daily by their own countrymen after joining the armed services.

In other countries, inductees to the military march under the banners of their great leaders and are beaten into ideological homogeneity. In the United States these are impossibilities. A prescriptive form of ideology is completely inconsistent with our values. Each of our servicemembers, by virtue of being thinking and free individuals, are already equipped with as much American ideology as they could ever need. Instead, tactical ideological competition would take the form of deliberate efforts to engender, protect, and promote the American-led world order on a human-to-human level. Perhaps, during the Cobra Gold Exercise, each service member could be tasked with befriending five Thai servicemembers. Of course, these connections happen naturally, and are a purpose of the exercise, but by explicitly turning international goodwill into an understandable task, ideological competition is pared down from an unfathomable abstract into a series of conversations. ‘Befriend’ is just one potential ideological task that could become an auxiliary to conventional training. This article is a call for the development of more ideological tasks that can be completed at the tactical level. 

For the first time in over thirty years, the United States exists in a multipolar world and is confronted with a serious ideological competitor. Ideological competition between Great Powers is conventionally fought in the realm of generals and diplomats, presidents and prime ministers. However, in this moment of national disquiet at home, there exists an opportunity to give servicemembers up and down the chain of command a chance to tangibly protect the U.S. nebulous ideology abroad beyond fulfilling their military duties. The U.S. would be well served by the development of concrete tasks which bring ideological competition between Great Powers to the tactical level¹.

The Philosophical and Political Foundation of the People’s Liberation Army - Hunter Keeley

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

-Sun Tzu

The individual soldier’s understanding of the philosophical and political foundation of the army he may face one day is critical for the United States military in preparing to deter potential future adversaries especially in the INDO-PACOM area of responsibility. China continues to assert itself on the world stage as a revisionist and competing power, economically establishing rival international institutions to undermine friendly international institutions to the United States. 

By enacting live fire exercises surrounding Taiwan in response to political visits to the island, China is beginning to assert itself more violently. China is shifting a focus from diplomatically and economically revising the world to potentially militarily revising the international order. This year marks the 95th anniversary of the foundation of the People’s Liberation Army and while much has changed in the world since then, the following primer on understanding the Peoples Liberation Army will illustrate that the organizations founding principles still guide the organization today. Principles that historically focus on Taiwan and the United States. 

1927-1949

The Peoples Liberation Army was founded on the 1st of August, 1927. Mao Ze Dong, the eventual commander of the PLA, joined shortly. After being surrounded by the Kuo Min Tang in the mountains of Jiangxi in 1934 the PLA executed the “Long March” to Shaanxi province, during which time Mao Ze Dong seized control of the Army. This “Long March” is to the foundational myth of the PLA as Valley Forge is to the US Army. Mao Ze Dong’s seizure of power is a critical moment in the history of the PLA as Mao Ze Dong’s writings on warfare formed the foundation of PLA military doctrine. From 1927-1949 to be Communist was to be a member of the PLA. As such, the eight policies within the Manifesto for the Army were listed the same as the Communist Party policies.

“(1) Unite….Chinese and other patriots; form a united front; overthrow the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government; and establish a democratic coalition government.”

  (2) Arrest, try, and punish the civil war criminals headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

  (3) Abolish the Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship…guarantee freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly and of association for the people.

  (4) Abolish the rotten institutions…clear out all corrupt officials and establish clean government.

  (5) ……Develop the industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie, improve the livelihood of workers and employees, and give relief, to victims of calamities and to poverty-stricken people.

  (6)…Put into effect the system of land to the tillers.

  (7) Recognize the right to equality and autonomy of the minority nationalities within the borders of China.

  (8) Repudiate the traitorous foreign policy of the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government, abrogate all the treasonable treaties, and repudiate all the foreign debts contracted by Chiang Kai-shek during the civil war period. Demand that the U.S. government withdraw its troops stationed in China, which are a menace to China’s independence, and oppose any foreign country’s helping Chiang Kai-shek to carry on civil war or trying to revive the forces of Japanese aggression. Conclude treaties of trade and friendship with foreign countries on the basis of equality and reciprocity.” (Mao, 6-7, emphasis added)

It is important to notice the political nature of the policies and the orientation of the policies surround two key purposes: destruction of the Chiang Kai-shek government—Taiwan is the spiritual if not literal successor of that government with one prominent political party still bearing the name of the Kuomintang—establish the Communist policies of government domestically and enforce US withdrawal from China and restrict any aid from the US to Chiang Kai-shek (Taiwan) and Japan. Mao went on in the same format to state: “our army will hunt them [Chiang Kai-shek and his hardened accomplices] down, even to the four corners of the earth.” (Mao, 8).

Make no mistake. While the United States has prepared its forces to destroy enemies of the constitution both foreign and domestic, China has been preparing by name for conflict with enemies of the communist party—Taiwan and if needed the US since its inception. 

1950-1988

Mao known to say as early as 1929 that “The Chinese Red Army [PLA] is an armed body for discharging the political tasks of the revolution,” (Peoples Liberation Army of China).  In 1949 following the cessation of active combat between Communist forces and the Nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-Shek, the PLA was prepared to discharge these political tasks. The period of 1950-1989 illustrates how far ranging those tasks can be. While the PLA did engage in the Korean war—known to them as the War of American Aggression. Significant for marking a nation committing military action against a United Nations mission (China entered the conflict after the UN security council resolution to intervene). These years set the precedence for the PLA to be a tool of the party in rejecting international systems and norms. 

In the 1960’s the PLA reaffirmed their adherence to this foundational principle during the Cultural Revolution, ten years of turmoil and continuous political and economic upheaval. Fu Chung, Deputy Director of the Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army stated: “There has been no war in history which has not had a political character,” (Foreign Policy, 1960). Chinese doctrine had yet to separate politics and military action, evident by the office of a Political Department within the PLA. Further on in his speech Chung stated of the military doctrine preached by Mao Ze Dong: “in the People’s Liberation war the chief aim should be to annihilate the effectives of the enemy and not to hold or seize cities or places—[that] in order to annihilate the enemy.” (Foreign Policy, 1960, emphasis added)

This emphasis on annihilation of enemy and not seizure of land or territory shows a break from traditionally understood Western military doctrine that isolates specific tangible objectives to force surrender of the enemy, whereas Mao’s theory isolated the elimination of the enemy to gain the tangible objectives. Chung stated that these efforts marked a “a turning-point at which the century-old imperialist rule in China changed from expansion to extinction.” (Foreign Policy, 1960). At the beginning of the 1960’s it was clear that the PLA’s purpose was to end political opposition to the Party’s ideology in armed conflict. Victory for China is marked by the end of an opposing ideology, not the seizure of certain cities, territory, or signed peace with the opponent; victory is the end of the opponent’s ideology being exercised. The political nature of the PLA was reiterated by Zhou En-Lai to Tseng Su-yu in response to a crisis of military leadership in the Wuhan Military Region in 1968 stating: “The Army must be united at all times. It must obey orders whether understood or not. Defiance of orders is intolerable, and to disrupt the Army’s stability is a breach of discipline and lack of loyalty to Mao.” (Political Affairs, 1960).  This is not a military tied to values of morality, honor, or tradition. This is a military tied to political power, propagation of that power, and the end of opposing ideology. 

In the organizations own words: “Arriving somewhat late upon the scene of the of the cultural revolution, the Army succeeded, swiftly and determinedly, in taking the apparatus of state power into its own hands. In these complex trends, the Army was assigned new tasks, and it would be safe to say that the cultural revolution saw the Army emerge in China’s political development as the most powerful political force. Having been given its new and explicitly political tasks, supplementing its former exclusively military functions, the Chinese People’s Army now represents a military cum political instrument.” (People’s Liberation Army of China). 

1989-Present Day

What happens when a military is aligned so meticulously with a political ideology? The Tiananmen Square massacre of June 4th, 1989. An armored assault on Beijing’s city center that resulted in the deaths of a still unknown amount of Chinese protestors. Protesters had occupied the square protesting for more democratic institutions in the communist state for months. The famous Tank Man photo depicts a lone Chinese man halt a column. 

Image: Jeff Widener/AP Images

A quote from a Chinese veteran regarding this photo illustrates the PLA’s perspective down to the lowest soldier on its role as a force for internal security for the party. The veteran said: 

“this photo actually demonstrated the discipline of the Chinese Soldiers. ‘It would have been easy for the tank commander to run over the demonstrator, but he didn’t and by his restraint he let that one man stop the entire column.” (Blasko, 194). 

Never mind the fact that no one knows what happened to the demonstrator in question. Nearly 40 years after its founding the PLA felt it had fulfilled its role to sustain the Party rule and unite China. Force was acceptable to defend its ideology mass carnage of its own people. The fallout from the Tiananmen square incident internationally and domestically influenced the PLA greatly. “Chinese Political and military leaders do not want internal conditions in any part of the country to deteriorate to the point that another massive violent suppression of dissent or demonstrations by the PLA is necessary.” This leadership alteration in policy along with the mechanization and joint-operation training of the PLA have drawn the PLA away from its internal security operations (Blasko, 192).  This places greater emphasis on the two initial foundational principles of: overthrowing the Chiang Kai-Shek Government, and stopping the US from aiding Taiwan and Japan. The courage of a lone man against the mass of the modern militarized regime may not have been enough to stop a massacre but it was enough to push a shift in PLA policy.

Modernization efforts by the military under Xi Jin Ping reflect this shift in priorities. While two military regions maintain dual internal and external mission focuses the remainder seem to be organized for external security measures. Shen Yang Military Region in Northeastern China utilizes PLA presence to help deter disgruntled workers from taking steps beyond peaceful protests and demonstrations but serves a dual purpose of influencing developments on the Korean Peninsula and Russian activities in Asia. Shortly before Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan PLA tanks had appeared on the streets of Shen Yang enforcing this domestic peace. Lan Zhou military region PLA units include a unique civil-military organization, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, which integrates agriculture and industrial production with their security functions since the 1950’s. These two regions focus on internal security missions while having a secondary external threat deterrence capability.

 The remaining military regions main missions are external and the secondary are internal. The Nanjing Military Region and Guangzhou Military region orient towards a Taiwan deployment. These regions contain mechanized and armored equipment suitable to an amphibious assault of Taiwan or missions into Southeast Asia (Blasko, 71-73). As the history of the PLA continues to be written the directive mentioned by Mao to “hunt them [enemies of the people] down, even to the four corners of the earth” (Mao, 8) becomes a more central part of their mission.

What does this mean for the American Soldier?

A reflection on the history of the PLA illustrates a political history more than a military history. The Chinese emphasis on Taiwan has less to do with the territory of the island or the economy of Taiwan and more to do with the continued practice of a form of government and politics separate to that of the communist party. This emphasis exists separate to changes in the current Communist Party structure, economic policy, or other policies in Taiwan. China seeks to take Taiwan to fulfill fundamental founding objectives and purposes of the organization. 

The existence of Taiwan’s political institutions and ideology reflect a permanent reminder to Chinese leadership that they have not overthrown Chiang Kai-Shek, they have not pursued ‘War Criminals’, and that they have failed to oppose a foreign nation—the United States—from supporting Taiwan’s continued resistance. 

Make no mistake the 1982 Shanghai Communique and other agreements between the United States and China brushed US and Chinese political disagreements under the rug for the mutual benefit of economic growth. However, from a pure military perspective Taiwan and the United States have always been the focus of the Chinese PLA. A failure to secure victory on these objectives would shake the institution to the core.  

The United States soldier needs to know that the Chinese military has existed for 95 years to pursue the enemy of his state to the four corners of the world, to overthrow his government, to oppose any foreign nations from aiding him. In the words of Fu Chung: “rule in China changed from expansion to extinction.” (Foreign Policy, 1960). A possible conflict in Taiwan is not about the expansion of Communist China it is about the extinction of a Democratic China². 

Natural Disaster Brief: California Mega Flood - Gray Man Briefing

Researchers have warned that a "mega flood" could soon hit the Central Valley of California (Sacramento, Fresno and Bakersfield) as well as Los Angeles. Experts expect it to happen if atmospheric rivers (long, narrow regions of heavy moisture) bring water down on the California lowlands for consecutive weeks. 

UCLA researchers described it as a "very severe flood event across a broad region that has the potential to bring catastrophic impacts to society in the areas affected." 

The study looked at the physical characteristics of a "plausible worst case scenario" featuring extreme storm sequences leading to "megaflood" conditions. The study looked at "climate model data and high-resolution weather modeling" with data from the Community Earth System Model Large Ensemble. Researchers claim climate change "has already doubled the likelihood of an event capable of producing catastrophic flooding." 

While a timeline was not conclusively declared, experts said the "mega flood" is "inevitable." Researchers did provide theorized models depicting a date of 2081 which showed potential rains of 100+ inches. The study's abstract says that "runoff in the future extreme storm scenario is 200% to 400% greater than historical values in the Sierra Nevada because of increased precipitation rates and decreased snow fraction. These findings have direct implications for flood and emergency management, as well as broader implications for hazard mitigation and climate adaptation activities." 

Debrief: The regions anticipated to be affected provide a quarter of the U.S. food supply. Analysts say the immediate cost would be more than $1 trillion dollars, making it 5x times more costly than the rebuild following Hurricane Katrina. A similar flood occurred in the 1860’s killing 4,000+ Californians, destroying 1/3 of all state property, 1/8 of all houses, 1/4 of all cattle, and a 1/4 of the economy which led to state declared bankruptcy. If a similar flood occurred today, the death toll would be 385,000+ people. 

The Governor of California separately noted that by 2040, the state will lose access to 10% of its natural water supply. 

Begin making a 5 year plan to move from the coastal regions and plains of California. Take preparations steps to be ready for storms, drought, and earthquakes if you live in the area.

Across the Force

Written work on the profession of arms. Lessons learned, conversations on doctrine, and mission analysis from all ranks.

Whispers of Lafonia - Jeremy Kofsky

The Falklands War was fought four decades ago but is still a great case study in the conduct of Expeditionary Advanced Basing Operations (EABO). Specifically due to potential similarities in political pressures, distance requiring traverse, and limits of fires and support establishments, the Falklands War offers great analogous concepts for a campaign to retake Taiwan in the theoretical aftermath of a People’s Republic of China (PRC) takeover of the island.  By understanding the Falklands’ sea and land campaigns, the hard won and bitterly cold lessons of the Royal Navy, Paras, and British Commandos may be grafted onto United States potential actions. This can ensure the whispers of the plains of Lafonia never disappear into the ether. 

The core issues of any campaign involving retaking of an island are the distance and logistical tail that must be overcome to put sufficient force in place for achieving desired effects. The British were so stunned by the rapidity of the Argentine takeover that they hurriedly assembled an ad hoc flotilla of military and mostly civilian shipping to transport the thousands of soldiers and their tons of equipment needed in the forthcoming campaign. The British made the assumption they could use the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) of Ascension Island as the switch point, but the political pressure to quickly get to the island forced supplies and unit specific equipment to be still misplaced. 

While the United States has bases in Japan and South Korea, it cannot be assumed the Chinese would let the United States reconvene all their military assets undisturbed. Efficient use of the Merchant Marine and reducing the logistical footprint of units, either through a foraging concept or other means can give less targets and an easier way to get around the Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) systems of the Chinese to induce American forces into Taiwan. The ability to manage the signatures of the fleet of ships or throw out decoy signals would also allow for the tactical surprise the British found by moving around the Argentine screening force and their intelligence sensors to land at San Carlos. 

The ability to coordinate a landing and build up sufficient force, with adequate force protection measures was another whisper someone studying the Falklands could apply to a Taiwan situation. The slow buildup and a lack of a dramatic breakout was hampered, and in some ways caused by, Argentine air interdiction campaigns against British shipping leading to further issues in the land campaign portion of Falkland operations. This was also caused by a lack of British air support and long-range precision fires, therefore allowing unimpeded access to the British mooring station off San Carlos. The lack of a sufficient anti-air construction around the vulnerable aspects of the Flotilla, namely the merchant ships, was due to an overall lack of sufficient understanding of the Argentine pilots’ will to extend their operational reach, which leading to doctrinally sound but realistically flawed use of a layered approach to maritime based anti-air assets. This was severely hampered by the non-existence of airborne radar systems capable of providing long range detection of Argentine aircraft. 

While the Navy and Marine Corps have taken great strides since the informal end of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and especially with the guidance of Force Design 2030 and General Berger’s Commandant’s Planning Guidance to achieve a greater synergy regarding amphibious operations, it must be noted the last major amphibious landings by the United States occurred in 1950 (there were smaller combat amphibious landing in the Vietnam War and a large demonstration landing in Kuwait during the Gulf War). This will invariably lead to issues as training exercises tend to focus on having perfect conditions to meet the standards of the exercise and not the realities of ill-suited shipping, minimal aircraft, a lack of sea or air superiority, and a convoluted command structure with time and political demands upon it from higher headquarters. Understanding, anticipating, and preparing/planning for the worse on at least a substandard approach to amphibious operations would enable the US Navy to forestall the deadly whispers of the majority of casualties (70%) in the Falklands being maritime. 

Once ashore, the British Paras and Commandos lived up to their sterling reputations and were able to create a howl of violence of action across the Lafonia and Mt Kent portions of Eastern Falklands. Their grit, physical conditioning, and overall spirit overcame severe logistical issues predicated by the Argentine interdiction efforts around San Carlos. The sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor and the peaty undergrowth of the Falklands made all but the Nordic planned CV-206 incapable of traversing any equipment the more than fifty miles in the case of the British Commandos in their movement to the Mt Kent mountain ranges overlooking Port Stanley, the ultimate goal of the British operation. 

This severe logistical deficit was overcome by reverting back to WWII strategies of logistical employment. Porter belts were built up to physically move, via soldier power, provision, ammunition, and chow/water to the front-line troops. Combat aid reverted to WWII models of leaving the soldier behind and having a trailing medical station pick them up for transport (this could take up to 12 hours in some cases), and larger munitions had to be used sparingly as there was only so much that could be physically moved for the required attacks. In a Taiwan scenario, the use of traditional and secure logistical modes of transportation and the use of the proverbial ‘Iron Mountain’ could be severely constrained due to either Chinese long and medium range precision fires and the massive signature these traditional methods could give off to allow for the implementation of these fires. 

Creative problem solving is a cornerstone of the true logistical expert and a Taiwan scenario would be no different. The ability to work sustained and protected logistics under non-guaranteed security, either on land, at sea, or in the air is going to take non-traditional approaches to provide the tip of the spear the ability to achieve desired effects on the Chinese. The use of non-traditional porter methodologies, contracting via locals, and cache construction are a few of the possible solutions, in combination, that could alleviate this sure to be persistent struggle to maintain the rapidity of operations while keeping them appropriately provisioned, while at the same time creating a balance between the two diametrically opposed constructs. 

Lastly, the British were equipped for an operation of recapture, not for the ensuing civil disaster of Port Stanley being devoid of food and water for over a month and a half and 10,000 Argentine soldiers to be taken care of. This was complicated as the British soldiers who were the primary land action arm, and thereby the ones who would be largely tasked with the afterwards humanitarian mission, were crack infantry units and lacked any specialization in humanitarian or reintegration of previously hostile forces back to their land/large scale Prisoner of War (POW) operations. There must be a Stabilization and Security plan. This has been an issue throughout armed conflict and will most assuredly be needed in the aftermath of a battle between two superpowers over one island. A plan to reduce the suffering of the Taiwanese people after this operation is concluded is critical to maintaining the principles which the United States uses as justification to be an ally of the Taiwanese state in the first place. This should be the loudest and longest whisper from Lafonia.

AAR on Leadership - Nate Gladdin

I prefer an After Action Report that is timely. Too often the shelf life on immediate feedback expires, leaving us wishing we had answers long before we get them. For this reason I am offering the masses one, based on a formal course I attended last month. Lethal Minds Journal is a literary learning space for those within the Armed Forces, so it seems an appropriate audience. 

I kept a small notebook with me, recording events and interactions with those attending the course. Not for the purpose of writing (this struck me during week two of training), but instead so I could look back on what knowledge I’ve gained long after the course ended. The training was held at Hurlburt Air Force Base in Florida. The course focused on fieldcraft. Firearms, TCCC, land navigation and combative sessions were the primary objectives, however, from my perspective it became a leadership course. This is due in large part to my role as the Team Sergeant who worked in tandem with the senior officer—our Team Leader. As the SNCO I was responsible for the efficiency and cohesion of just under thirty Airmen. I needed to be more than just a student. 

Commander's Intent—implemented—is something I take seriously, so this was at the forefront of my mind. Most of us had never met, a few in the class had not held a weapon since basic military training, and maybe five of the others had ever attended any form of combative training—either military or civilian based. I didn’t know my OIC. You could tell our instructors were lapping it up like cats with a saucer of milk.

Another interesting wrinkle in this was the presence of one of my hardworking subordinates who was also attending the course. A few weeks prior to the start date I told him to seek out new opportunities to improve, as he prepares to move into the SNCO ranks. When the class roster hit my inbox, I noticed we had enough officers in the training that it may be a challenge for him to accomplish this, but nevertheless I mentioned it as a possible starting place.

……….

The instructor cadre were all prior special operations types; Special Forces, Rangers, PJ, Special Reconnaissance, and so on. It was apparent from the first moment in class we were going to receive exceptional guidance. The cadre dispersed the Airmen evenly and by the time the class roster was verified, we had four Fire Teams assembled, first lieutenants and the other attending E-7 at the helm. 

Twenty four hours later one of our junior officers was injured. And just like that, my E-6 became Team Leader for Fire Team One Bravo. 

The shift in his role led to daily debriefs on how each day went for him and his Fire Team, as well as myself and our Team, as a whole. What was meant to be private note taking for me, became leadership discussions and unit analysis each day. The questions he asked made me think much deeper than I may have if the scenario had not played out as it did. Along with his inquiries, I spent a lot of early morning hours reviewing my day prior and attempting to prepare for the day ahead. TTPs, team communication, and mentoring were my morning companions. The evolution, for me, as a follower and leader, was something I could not have imagined prior to attending this training.

I figured the best thing I could do was walk both junior officer and enlisted types through how I approached my roles and responsibilities during the training. I’ve broken it down into three sections; command team dynamics, developing junior officers, and developing the enlisted tier.

……….

Command Team Dynamics.

An important moment in the course happened within an hour of it starting. At the first decision point, the Team Leader needed something accomplished. Instead of giving an order, she turned to me and simply asked, “Team Sergeant, do you want to handle this one?” The tasking was simple, but the moment mattered. “Yes ma’am, I’ll square it away.” 

This allowed for a few things to happen. First, because the tasking did not require officer input, she entrusted me with the result. This gave me an initial indication that she wouldn't micromanage everyone. It also allowed me to begin building rapport with my fellow enlisted. 

Second, this offered her the ability to observe my approach to leadership while attempting to gauge the feedback I received from the others. By the end of the first day in class we had managed to have small conversations during lulls in the training. We’d spoken about our backgrounds, leadership styles, and expectations for each of us in training. All of this acted as the foundation for how we would communicate between each other and our team. 

As we moved through various training sessions where we split into two squads, we made a conscious decision to each attach to a different one. While we were ultimately in charge, the O-3 for each squad took the lead and worked with their respective Fire Team leaders. This allowed me to have time to learn more about each of the enlisted who were with me in my squad. She was able to do the same with those she was working with. When we assembled again throughout the day we were able to compare notes. Late in week one, after I was able to grasp the experience level of each enlisted type, I was able to give out small leadership assignments to test each enlisted member. This happened throughout the entirety of the course. When possible the Major and myself would debrief our members on how they did, trying our best to improve them in slight ways. 

In the morning we would have quick, directive based conversations to make sure we were on the same page; all other moments tended to be quick, informal chats. This latter part allowed me to understand how she operated, so that I could be a pillar for her to lean on if needed. A three week course may not seem like a reason to do this, but it simply comes back to the old adage of, “Train like you fight.”

Looking back, our non-verbal teamwork was probably our strongest asset. I understood my role, as a SNCO, and worked to accomplish my responsibilities each day. When the time came to speak to the group I focused on the details, development, and discipline. When she spoke it was as the final authority and to confirm her intent. She was fair and approachable. Nobody doubted she was in command. 

……….

Developing Junior Officers. I’m of the opinion that the key to any successful military organization depends on the pedigree of the NCO’s. I also believe—in order for any of our branches to succeed at the strategic level—we must focus on grooming our officer core from the moment pin on O-1. Their superiors may ultimately be their educators and career mentors, however, their pillars wear chevrons. If we do not want to see indecisive, risk averse officers then we, as enlisted, need to instill confidence in them. We are in their ear, we offer them resolve, and we act as the second measurement before they cut. If we aren’t accountable to their development in the early stages, then they won’t trust us as they promote. 

During this course, I did my utmost to spend time with the lieutenant of Fire Team Two Alpha, which I would join when we broke into the smaller elements for instruction. Whenever possible I would pass ideas through him for digestion and dissemination. If he asked for a task to be handled I would grab one of the young Airmen and we would accomplish it effectively and efficiently. My sole goal when working with this young officer was to instill as much confidence in him as possible.

At one point, when one of the junior enlisted was struggling with attention to detail I brought our two lieutenants together to offer a solution. My lieutenant would give up an E-5 to the other in exchange for the younger enlisted. I explained how it strengthened one fire team immediately and could develop the other in the future. That was at the beginning of the second training week. At the end of that week I gifted my motivated fire team leader with the book, Shackleton's Way, and explained how the famous ship captain of the Endurance preferred to have those who could negatively influence the others closest to him instead of the responsibility falling to another. I told him I’d used this principle with our shift in personnel earlier in the week.

……….

Developing the Enlisted Tier. Depending on rank and role you may be called upon to set the tone for your organization. My senior officer in this course gave me the honor of this duty. My focus was on action, reaction, and communication. I took a few simple actions which I felt would set us on the right path. First, with one exception, each day it was an E-3 or E-4 who gave us a quick history lesson of their choosing. This gave them the chance to be heard, and also gave our entire class a bit of pride in our branch's past. Second, I made sure each JNCO at some point was put in a position where I could see how they handled themselves when given a task to lead subordinates. It led to quick feedback from myself which gave them something to process and add to their ever-growing knowledge base. Lastly, when one of them would take the helm for a moment as the leader (during land nav & CQB our E-3’s were elevated to team leaders for a portion) they became a “sir” or “ma’am” immediately, with implied respect. 

Those were the action and communication portions I focused on. The reaction piece was attached to discipline. If one person showed up even one second late the entire team showed up at an earlier time the next day. A second delinquency—by an enlisted member—meant they’d have to meet me a few hours early to run. This only occurred once, but with an officer. When the major told me we’d all be showing up even earlier the next day, I felt compelled to stand firm on this occasion and politely said, “Ma’am, I cannot allow my E’s to be punished because of an officer.” She understood and asked what the punishment should be. 

To the officer’s credit, before he knew what I’d recommended, when he arrived he found me and requested the same punishment my enlisted would have endured. The next morning, at 0445 we met and ran in the soft sand on the beach for an hour. At muster he stood in front of our class and cadre and apologized for not setting the example and told them about us running. None of my enlisted knew we were doing this. They assumed because he was commissioned he would be given a pass, so it shocked them a bit. But, it made them realize that if you set a standard, it must be met. 

I will caveat the reaction piece with admitting that once I did give my enlisted an old school ass-chewing. One E-5 and three E-3 types were late. A few others kept missing simple details. The final straw was me finding the straps from the MRE box laying on the floor instead of in the trash. This was actually when I instituted the running punishment. It was the first time I’d raised my voice in a military setting in six years, and I hated it. However, accountability was taken seriously by the entire team afterwards. I was nothing but proud of how they responded, as well as how they honored the Major with their effort.

Opinion

Op Eds and general thought pieces meant to spark conversation and introspection.

A Helmand Spring - The 18A Chronicles

“Says it feels right this time
Turned it 'round and found the right line
"Good day to be alive, sir
Good day to be alive, " he says

Then it comes to be that the soothing light at the end of your tunnel
Was just a freight train coming your way
Then it comes to be that the soothing light at the end of your tunnel
Was just a freight train coming your way”

– “No Leaf Clover” by Metallica

Helmand Province Spring 2016

We drive weapons in tow, heavy weapons in turrets, medium and light weapons in our hands, our armored vehicles labor into the dark morning pre-dawn, Highway 1 westbound, the sun just beginning to break the horizon to our backs, anticipation building with each mile. Intelligence collection has stated enemy forces massing for an attack into Gereshk, but it doesn’t matter. We already know they will show up, our armored column of death will be the spoiler, radio calls snap each vehicle’s crew out of each man’s silent vigil, truck tires turn north into the desert, no doubt the Taliban didn’t expect what is coming. 

Heading north now with the sun fully out, diesel and low levels of adrenaline push us forward to our battle, we crest a low hill adjacent to a small village, the decision to bypass is made, vehicles report men on motorcycles fleeing the area. We have been spotted. We wanted this to happen. We continue north where we lay eyes on the prize, the Helmand green zone, but not to take as countless other forces have tried and failed, we seek to kill those wishing to defend it, leaving them rotting in the sun for their relatives and tribesmen to find whenever we choose to leave them.

We watch as women and children leave the area in droves, exactly what we wanted. It won’t be long now. Those who stay are here for the fight, radios crack back to life, more men spotted on motorcycles moving to confront us from adjacent villages. An Afghan Commando vehicle decides to open up with a salvo of MK-19, the 40mm grenades rip into the ground, bikes, and bodies of the men, 2 escape leaving their comrades to bleed out.

Immediately small arms fire from multiple locations begin to engage us from insurgents concealed well within compounds across the green zone. Rounds zip, crack, and ping of our vehicles, the battle has begun and we will deliver it to them. American .50 calibers, MK-19s, 240s all roar to life suppressing enemy positions, bearded veteran American SF and Afghan Commando soldiers dismount vehicles and begin launching mortars and shoulder fired munitions into enemy controlled compounds, the symphony of death plays along hell bent on destroying life, “troops in contact” is passed by radio to our headquarters, safe hundreds of miles away.

No additional assets are requested, the battle has been brought to the enemy. They have been found wanting and unprepared, their will to defend has been broken. Silence breaks over the area, bodies are left where they fell, the order is given to continue north paralleling the green zone, we now look for the next batch of enemy willing to defend something we don’t want, to seek out and harvest them. We play this game because we know no other, we have no ability to control key terrain, we have no strategy but this. We kill because “success” is tied to quantifiable results, a dead body.

We know it’s not true, but we press on looking for more. We buy time through deaths for a government that can’t actually do anything. It’s a good day for us to be alive, people say it feels right this time, but the end is already dictated. Then it comes to be that the soothing light at the end of your tunnel is just a freight train coming your way, it will all fall.

Why Are We Acting Like We Did Not Know This Would Happen - Winfield Willis

My use of We is deliberate, in the title. We know who We are, and if you do not know with absolute certainty by the end of this piece of prose that I’m speaking to you, you are not we. But anyone can still take something from this, We or not. I am no one. I went to Afghanistan twice as a Marine, but I was not SOF or a Raider. I was a PFC the first time, a Lance the second, but I was little more than a number. My job on the first pump, as a Boot Team Leader, was point man. Only a couple of us had fully trained on the metal detectors, and my job was to wave it around to find the IED’s before they found us. I loved it. I did the same thing the second time, although I was not a team leader then; things had changed and I was with a different unit, but I was still one of the few that knew how to use the stupid thing. None of this matters, other than that I was the guy up front I ended up talking to a lot of locals more than other people did. I knew what was going to happen a decade before August of 2021, because those locals had told me it would. We can all think of a few stories or anecdotes that should have clued us in, for those that thought it would be different, but I distinctly recall two times where a man walked up to me and told me point blank what was going to happen; the following is an account of those two encounters.

The first time was the first pump. I was the guy up front but I have always been considered an “intellectual” or “nerd” if you prefer. I used big words that I would then have to explain to others. I do not mean that I am smarter or more intelligent than anyone, I am a fucking idiot that knows nothing; but I have always possessed an innate curiosity that has made me question everything, as well as a high degree of skepticism that would make even Thomas the Doubter consider loaning me his title for a spell. As such, on this one particular patrol, very soon after we had taken over for a British unit, I was to take notes for my squad leader for an impromptu shura. Little of that meeting has anything to do with what is happening now or in the past year, with the exception of the interruption that occurred in the middle of the Village Leader talking to us. The oldest person I have ever seen in my entire life, which in Afghanistan means he could have been either 40 or 400, walked up to us and started talking. The Leader and everyone else stopped speaking and let him continue. Our translator took a second to start paying attention to him and did not start translating until prompted. He was a smaller kid in his early 20’s that said his name was Rambo, if that explains why he was not on the ball as a translator. He finally did, but he said that the old man was simply telling us the history of the village, and that it was not relevant to the conversation. I corrected him, and said that we decide that not you, and to please tell us what he was saying. The history the old man was telling us was very historical indeed. He was explaining how he remembered when Alexander had come through, (obviously false), as well as other ancient empires but specifically Alexander, as well as the British (1800s) and the Soviets, and even how the Taliban took over after the Soviets left. The curious thing about his speech was that he was explaining it as if he had lived through every part of it, even though that would be impossible, except for the Soviets. Later, I realized that that was simply how he perceived the world, as an impermeant but infinite, perpetual, and eternal entity, and we are simply arrogant, finite fools that can never understand how small and infinitesimal we truly are.

He wrapped up his history lesson, we thanked him for his time, as did the other leaders in the village, and he wandered on, in the same way that he had wandered in. Evidently he had done something similar when the Brits had arrived in the early days after the initial post 9/11 invasion. He did not say this specifically, but I now realize his point was that we were all the same, even the same as the Taliban, and that it did not matter “who was in charge” because the people’s lives would not really change, and so they did not really care. If we were going to give them stuff, cool, if we were going to hurt them, that was less cool, but it did not matter. We were all the same, and there was little point in trying to change anything, because even the changes we made would either fade with time, or just be changed again when someone else took our place.

The second encounter was much more jarring, because the man spoke perfect English, and he had walked straight up to me and asked me for an American cigarette. I gave him one of my Marlboros, the ones we bought from the traveling PX that were “for prison and military use only,” and asked him how the hell he spoke such good English. I had signaled back to the rest of the squad to hold while I figured out what this was, so the next guy in our ranger file waited about 100m back down the road. We were on the edge of a series of buildings, and in front of us was a wide open, but largely green field of something, I forget what and it also does not matter. He explained to me that he was a doctor, an actual MD that had gone to California to get his education, and then had come home soon after 9/11 to help the area where his family was from. He thanked me for the smoke, and then looked me dead in the eyes and asked if we were going to stay. I told him no, that we would switch out like everyone else, and he began shaking his head. “No, you don’t understand, I mean is the US going to keep Marines here forever” This deployment was different from the first, we had already begun transferring our positions to the local Police and ANA units in the area. I told him that I doubted it, the whole point was for us to leave. He sighed, and bowed his head, and told me that if we didn’t stay, it would not matter, because the Taliban will just come back. He explained that now that we had establish a strong military presence, enough that the Taliban had severely limited their attacks and movement through the area, sometimes completely withdrawing, everything would be fine and peaceful, but the second that we left and turned everything over, they would immediately come right back and it would be like we had never been there at all.

This conversation took only a few minutes, but the patrol leader had called up and said we had to get going, so I told the man that I was sorry and that we had to go. I gave him a couple more smokes, and he looked at me with a sadness that has become all too familiar to many people who have been to Afghanistan; I’ve been reading the stories from the guys who were at HKIA, and I suspect that they have a similar idea, but it would be arrogant of me to compare this one encounter to everything that they experienced there. Either way, these two encounters took place in 2010 and 2011 respectively, and ever since I have watched and waited for the day that this Doctor foretold to occur. For the Doctor, and the old man, if he even lived to see it, it happened even sooner than 2021. These areas were taken back by the Taliban even before I finished my 4 years in college right after I got out in 2013. I even broke down crying at a college party, because I got a phone notification about how specifically these areas had fallen, years before the government did. What in the fuck was the point, ESPECIALLY if even my dumbass knew what was going to happen. Did the officers not know? The generals? The Civilian Leadership? Four fucking administrations, swinging from both sides of the aisle, and it still went down the way the Doctor said. As I stated before, I’m a fucking nobody idiot that knows nothing, and even I knew that the Doctor was right. Of course, the obvious answer is not that no one knew, it's that no one cared. That’s an opinion, I cannot prove its veracity, but with the benefit of hindsight I suppose I can call it a fact. Just like our time there, there seems to be little point in me even writing this piece of prose. It will not bring back the guys who died, it won’t give them back their limbs, it won’t heal the unseeable scars that we all carry, and it most certainly does nothing for the 38 million Afghans whose very existence hangs in the balance. The old man said things would be the same, but watching the Taliban try to govern it looks like it could be even worse, even if they had all of the money in the world, or even just the frozen assets.

Perhaps, if I’m lucky, it might help someone in the future act differently, so that the next time the cycle begins anew, we can change the outcome. I doubt it, but the only thing I have left is hope. Hope is the dumbest, stupidest thing we have ever conceived of. It serves little purpose, and can only exist when proof is absent, similar to faith. I have spent every day since I left trying to find meaning in all of this, not just the conflict and my role in it, but Life itself, and I have come up short every day; I feel am surrounded by darkness and hate and sadness, in a chaotic, cold world that cares not a damn for any one of us, because we are truly nothing, little more than cosmic grains of sand, and even that is generous. Still hope remains, seemingly because I am just stupid enough to hold onto it, perhaps in the same way that Camus assumes Sisyphus is happy. I hear people say all the time that they would rather die on their feet than live on their knees, but the old man seemed to understand that that choice is really the only one we have- how do we face the inevitable?

CODENAME CONOCO - Northern Provisions

US troops remain in Syria in a limited capacity, estimated at less than 1,000 total boots on the ground. Some of them have been, and remain, operating out of a small base near the Conoco Field in Deir ez-Zor. Deir ez-Zor has great historical significance. Deir ez-Zor was infamous in the ages of the Ottoman Empire for being the final destination of many ethnic Armenians before they were systematically massacred by what is modern day Turkey. Deir ez-Zor was also under siege by ISIL from 2014 to late 2017. Russian and Syrian troops now occupy one side of the river, while American and Kurdish SDF troops occupy the other. Despite the collapse of ISIL lines and overall degradation has dwindled ISIL forces' capabilities, sporadic attacks and limited strikes continue. In the wake, however, of ISIL’s collapse, came a new threat, such as the one coalition troops faced in Iraq.

During the war against ISIL, Iran-backed Shia militia groups didn’t pay much attention to US troops, threatening gestures, opportunistic shots at aircraft, etc were about the limit. But as ISIL was virtually destroyed in Iraq, Shia militia groups began rocketing American bases. The same has taken place over the years in Syria. On Wednesday, August 24th, rockets landed inside the perimeter of Mission Support Site Conoco and within the proximity of Mission Support Site Green Village. Three US service members were wounded in the attacks. Coalition forces retaliated with Apache helicopters, M777 cannons and an AC-130 gunship, killing seven insurgents on the night of Wednesday and morning of Thursday. The perpetrators behind these attacks are suspected Iranian militia groups operating in Syria. Israel has been conducting strikes inside Syria since the beginning of the war - predominantly targeting Iranian backed militia groups but also occasionally striking Syrian government facilities that have led to the deaths of Syrian soldiers.

With American troops having been in Syria since 2015, many wonder how long they will remain. This is a difficult question to ponder and answer, and in the wake of Afghanistan, many Americans are uncomfortable with another “indefinite” occupation or contingent. Their current missions are primarily assisting the Kurdish SDF in training and advising, but they also serve a secondary role of guarding oil fields. This does not mean American citizens will pay less for their gas back home, this means that various insurgent groups will not have control over said oil fields, essentially denying them a source of income and financial control. Special Operations groups operating in Syria have also conducted limited strikes and raids on Islamic Jihadist groups and during the al-Sina Prison break, US forces assisted Kurdish SDF soldiers in repelling the prison attack and corralling prisoners. 

The current administration sees no changing of plans. American troops will remain in Syria for the unforeseeable future. This will likely be one more aspect of America’s forever war. Though “Forever War” was unofficially coined for the War in Afghanistan, the Forever War can also be likened to the Global War on Terror in its entirety. The wars that end in treaties and reconstruction are over. The Global War on Terror and its various missions will go on, because it is a problem that will never truly be solved. Due to the ongoing civil war in Syria, Islamic jihadist groups will continue to thrive in an environment of chaos and inconsistency. Civil conflicts in this region generally lead to hot beds of terrorist activity. In Syria, the dynamic on the ground is complex, its players vast, and its goals vary between the players. Unfortunately for Americans, I suspect we will continue to see American troops wounded and killed in Syria for days, months, and years to come. 

The Written Word

Fiction and Nonfiction written by servicemen and veterans.

A FORT CAMPBELL DOGMAN ENCOUNTER - Tales From The Grid Square

Legends come to life

Legend is often a fogged concept, as there are threads of truth woven into lore. When you think of legends in the United States, more often than not the legend of “Bigfoot” or “Sasquatch” is closely associated with the forests of North America. Myth or fact, Sasquatch has become a prolific part of North American lore. However, other legends stalk this land, legends that most people would prefer to turn a blind eye to.

“Dogman” is one such legend. But what is Dogman? Dogman is described as a bipedal large, muscular, and intimidating wolf; a literal werewolf. First reported in 1887 in Wexford County, Michigan the “Michigan Dogman” is a legend that has spread to many corners of the United States. Witnesses have reported coming into contact with this monstrous beast across the US: from the Loup Garou of Shawnee legend, to the Rougouro of Louisiana, to the infamous Beast of Bray Road of Wisconsin. Just like they are ripped from a horror movie: the reported Dogman encounters are often violent, aggressive, and terrifying. 

One tale of the Dogman that has been a focus of scrutiny and legend is that of the “Beast of the Land Between The Lakes.” The Land Between Lakes or LBL is a national park that shares acres within Kentucky and Tennessee. The legend begins in the 1800s with accounts of a bipedal wolf-like creature that stalked the forested area. The legends persist into the modern day with the famous “LBL incident” taking the forefront of the legend. Legend has it that a family’s motorhome was the site of carnage and gore, the aftermath of a vicious killing. Reportedly the family had been ripped to shreds in a gruesome fashion, bearing distinct claw marks on their bodies. The blame has been placed on the Dogman, and to this day the “LBL incident” is cemented in the lore. 

In the search for paranormal military stories, Tales From The Grid Square has discovered a potential dark secret in the training area of the 101st Airborne Division. The following accounts take place throughout one night, during a training event in the “Back 40” of Fort Campbell. 1-502 Infantry Battalion was part of a brigade-level field training exercise at and around the Urban Training Center of “Cassidy.” During that night multiple Soldiers were witness to an event and creature, unlike any wildlife they knew. Their statements and following supporting statements from other Soldiers suggest that something is out there stalking the training area of Fort Campbell. 

A Fort Campbell Dogman Encounter

Eyewitness #1 – Scouts Out

“While I wasn’t in 1-502, I was in the CAV SQDN in 2BCT. During the NOV 2017 BCT FTX, we were conducting area recon 1.5km SE from Cassidy.

It was around 0200 when we were awaiting further orders as we reached our LOA. While Sitting in the TC position monitoring comms, a presence began to emanate 2 meters from the front of our truck.

By presence, I mean a black mass. It was darker than the surrounding nighttime environment on a cloudy night with little illumination. It was a black mass in front of us that was undetectable by NVG or thermal. It was only visible to the naked eye. Everyone in the vehicle confirmed they saw something in front of us with their own eyes.

My gunner tried to pick it up on thermals and NVGs but couldn’t. Everyone in the vehicle felt like they were being stared down by this black mass in front of us. We could all feel eyes on us. After about a 30-second standoff, this presence vanished. 

While I didn’t feel frightened or threatened by it, I never felt any Soldier was the baddest thing stomping around the Back 40 after that.”

Eyewitness #2 – The Squad Leader

“I'm stationed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The Training area we have is called the “Back 40.” Thousands of acres of ranges and training sites. My story takes place in the Back 40 near a makeshift town called "Cassidy". It's located in the middle of nowhere surrounded by forest and thick underbrush and at that time it was mid-July so everything was in full bloom. My company was conducting a two-week field problem in this area. After we had secured this town my platoon was tasked with pulling a blocking position about 100 meters into the wood line from this town. 

So, this is like day 12 of the two-week field problem. I'm located on the far-right area of our blocking position with my squad. I'm a squad leader of my infantry platoon and we dig into our position. I'm located 10-15 meters from my Soldiers with my back up against a tree. Darkness sets on the Back 40, the guys are tired, and my team leaders are doing their checks to ensure the guys are awake. 

Hours go by and I didn't keep track of time but if I had to guess it was around midnight. No moon. The only thing you could see to our rear was the town of Cassidy. My alpha team leader is laying with his team on the line and we're pulling a 50/50 security detail, so one man up, the other asleep. My bravo team leader is sleeping next to me. Our platoon Radioman (RTO) was walking back and forth behind us bouncing between my squad and the others all on line in this blocking position. 

So, every 20-30 minutes I hear him walking by and eventually he comes to me and says "Hey sergeant you good on radio batteries?" “I'm good dude” I replied. Being used to hearing him walk by so much, I hear something, and not even thinking about it I ignore it. Then it gets closer and closer and a lot slower in movement. 

I look over my shoulder and say "what the fuck are you doing" and that's when I saw whatever it was in a mid-crouch pose about 20 meters from me making low subtle growling noises like a dog or wolf. I froze and felt the hair on the back of my neck stand and my heart start to race. Whatever this was stood at least five feet tall crouched over sinking lower and lower to the ground. Paralyzed with confusion and fear I watch for another 10-12 seconds. I then reached over and grabbed my e-tool, not taking my eyes off what I'm looking at. Then quickly flip my PSQ-20s (night vision) and as I did this the creature ran in a diagonal line from me fast (and when I say fast, booking it in a low stance). I flip my 20s to thermal and I saw the outline of this thing running. 

Everyone around me heard it crashing through the woods. It ran too fast to be a man and too big to be a deer as it was fully standing up as it crashed through the brush. 

Later that night another squad leader told me he heard loud deep sniffing noises near his position. His Soldiers were saying they smelled what appeared to resemble a wet dog smell. In the hours before dawn, we all heard this loud-guttural noise that would start up immediately after the coyotes. Coyotes are prominent in the area and you always hear them. Except after this howl or loud noise, they all instantly stopped. I had always heard stories and never believed it as well as others in my platoon. After this encounter, we all agreed we were not alone that night and something lurks out there. 

It was canine by the look of it, it was dark and I don't want to speculate and give a false tale but in the face, it was elongated like a snout from what I could see. I grew up playing in the woods, camping, and hunting. I'd never have seen, heard, or felt that way ever.”

Eyewitness #3 – The Team Leader

“I was in 1-502. Our company had just taken Cassidy after about 5 days of STX. Naturally, we get pushed out into the wood line to set up a defensive line for potential follow-on attacks, and naturally, as soon as we break into the wood line it starts pissing rain on us. At this point dudes are spent and annoyed that we got pushed out, the typical “it’s always our PLT” type deal.

We set in the perimeter, to our left is a ditch running perpendicular to Cassidy, parallelling our sector. The SL and myself are co-located with a Gunner and AG. As we lay in the defense and run out of “give-a-fucks” we end up just leaning back on some trees side by side waiting for the “endex” or “change of mission”. While smoking and joking (minus the smoking since at this point our cigarettes are a soggy mush) up walks the PLT RTO to swap some 148 batteries.

We notice him early due to the leaves and twigs and the sound of his 140lbs slowly walking forward so as to not trip or catch a thorny vine. He makes the swap and walks off. About 20-30mins pass and we hear the same weighted footsteps approaching, none of us had our nods down or on. Assuming it was the RTO again we just waited for him to say something. After a moment of awkward silence we go “Yo what’re are you doing?” There’s no response. Then we heard heavy sniffing sounds from behind us. It sounded like a hound dog trying to find something. The sounds seemed to come from a few meters back behind my SL on my right. We sit and listen trying to figure out what it was for just a moment.

Then immediately the sound of leaves cracking towards us from behind and heavy “sniffing” between me and the AG on my left catches our attention. Immediately we both drop nods and flip around to see WTF it was. At that point, we hear the source of the sound barrel into the ditch on our right and speed down it deeper into the wood line. All of us sat there dumbfounded at what just happened and concluded it was too heavy sounding to be a coyote.

Its steps sounded more like sprinting on 2 legs rather than 4 so we ruled out a hog or skunk or whatever else. So we concluded it was dog man. I’ll note we all were well aware of the talk of a “dog man” be it in the back 40 or in the woods of Land between the lakes.”

The funny thing was our 1SG is super into the “lore” I guess you’d call it and we mentioned it to him and got this huge back story. He mentions stuff about pushing natives off LBL to settle it and then cursing it and some crazy sounding shit.”

Eyewitness #4 – The Attack

“101'st Airborne 1-502 IN REG. There are rumors and superstitions among the infantry about Skinwalkers and old Native American spirits. The Trail of Tears runs right through the base and there are tons of unmarked graves the Army has ignored either intentionally or due to lack of funding. But anyway…

One night During a 4-week training density in the Back 40 of Campbell, a buddy and I are pulling guard on a road under NVGs. We're laying down on the side and there is a storm drain pipe running under the road horizontally a couple of feet to our 7 o clock. It's dark, light drizzle, about 0200 in the morning, I'm watching the road one way and my buddy is watching the other way waiting for the "enemy."

The next thing I know, my buddy is rolling around, hooping and hollering about something touching him.

"IT GRABBED ME BRO!!! HOLY FUCKING SHIT IT TRIED TO PULL ME INTO THE DRAIN!!!"

Not exactly sure what was going on I peeked my head into the storm drain to look. All I heard was grunting, like a boar. Distant but the sound of human feet slapping the concrete as it ran away. I stepped back from the drain and aimed my NVGs across the street towards the exit of the drain pipe, while my buddy crawled away.

What I saw standing across the road in the tree line 75m away looking at us can only be described as a legit Dogman. 8-9 Feet tall, with the head of a canine, the body of a wolf, and standing on its hind legs. Broad shoulders, I couldn't tell if it was hair or dark leathery skin. But I did see ears, pointy and large, almost elvish-like.

What stood out most was its eyes while I looked at it under nods. The eyes were glowing.

Upon seeing it I yelled and let off a burst of sim rounds, not gonna lie it scared the complete shit out of me. The Dogman turned and disappeared into the woods, knocking down trees as it turned on all fours and ran away. It snapped several smaller trees in half as it ran away. Six to seven nights after that incident I was behind my CO, and the company RTO under nods again, walking through the thickest shit you have ever seen in your life. I mean thorn bushes 10 feet tall. And thicker than concrete. The whole company gets separated, and I remember hearing it howl in between the platoons. So much so that the CO called up on the net to ask what it was. No way it was a normal animal moving like that through the type of brush we were in. The shit was freaky.

Some of us were later called into our 1SG’s office and we retold the story. He basically said to keep it to ourselves and never say anything to anyone about this again. I still think about it, I can often see the eyes.”

Implications and more questions than answers

The four stories featured in this article come from four separate Soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division, three of whom share the same Battalion. Not included is an additional fifth Soldier (who told his story off the record), who was located directly behind the squad leader and corroborates his story. That is five Soldiers who all corroborate each other’s story: that a large, bipedal, wolf creature had a confrontation with US Army Soldiers. In my own amateur investigation, what was more shocking was the amount of 1-502 INF BN Soldiers that came forward to corroborate these stories as well.

Numerous additional Soldiers reported to me that the “Back 40 is haunted,” with stories of “Ghost Road” and paranormal happenings occurring in the woods of Fort Campbell. Furthermore, I found that the claims of the Trail of Tears passing through Fort Campbell are correct; the Trail of Tears did in fact pass through the area that is now occupied by Fort Campbell. It’s a legend that mirrors that of Fort Polk’s “Box Witch” legend; something that is quietly cemented in the history of Fort Campbell. Many Soldiers voiced their opinion that something is happening in the woods. They report shadow figures, voices, war chants, poltergeists’ activity, and even weather phenomena. Many Soldiers expressed to me that “Skinwalkers” and “Wendigos” exist in those dark woods. 

What is alarming was that several Soldiers who were a part of 1-502 INF BN shared with me that it's common knowledge that something stalks the training area. Soldiers of 1-502 INF BN report that there is mysterious howling (not that of coyotes), grunts, sniffing, large bipedal shadows, eyeshine, and the innate feeling you are being watched from the wood lines. More interesting is that it appears the leadership of 1-502 INF BN is aware of the strange happenings in the Back 40 and has adopted a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach. Soldiers from 1-502 INF BN paint the picture that it is agreed that something does go bump in the night, but don’t talk about it. 

Which begs the question: Do the higher-ups know about the happenings in the Back 40? A Soldier is attacked by something with claws and another discharges his weapon at a massive wolf-like figure, and the command seems to just want to bury it. It is terrifying to consider if this has happened before and if another encounter like the one detailed above can happen again. How much do the higher-ups believe/are aware of the stories that are creeping out of the Kentucky woods? This raises the concern; are Soldiers in danger of something that people don’t believe exists?

As this story closes out, the question still permeates; does Dogman exist? The stories seem to suggest something, a bipedal wolf creature, is out there. Surely an explanation exists to explain these sightings. But what remains to be seen is if that explanation is something grounded in established science or something beyond our understanding. So the mystery of Dogman continues. Did a creature attack a group of Soldiers in November 2017? We may never know, but for the Soldiers of 1-502 INF BN, legend collides with uncomfortable facts. The fact that something is stomping around Fort Campbell and that the Screaming Eagles aren’t the baddest thing out there. 

“Nick” of Tales From The Grid Square is an active-duty member of the US Army and logistics officer. He has had a long-standing interest in the paranormal and is a self-proclaimed “paranormal military historian” (a term he just made up). Several of his own experiences and experiences of his peers inspired him to start “Tales From The Grid Square,” where he collects and anonymously documents the paranormal stories of military service members. He hopes to elevate veteran/military voices and bridge the gap between the civilian and military. He has authored the book “Tales From The Grid Square Volume I,” a collection of 240 such stories from across the branches of the US Armed Forces as well as foreign militaries.

Twilight Tour - Jeff Ventrella

The kids were the worst part.

The first time I was visiting friends from college while I was on leave. One of their little boys, upon learning that “Mr. Jeff” was a Marine, toddled right up to me, bright blue eyes big as saucers. Mouth open wide, he babbled out his excited questions about the many adventures he assumed I had. 

“Do, do, do you have guns?”

“Yeah buddy I have a few.”

“Have, have you killed bad guys?”

Fuck. That rattled me worse than getting cheated on the week of the Birthday Ball.

“Uh, no buddy, I haven’t.” 

From the mouths of babes. The only point of becoming a Marine infantry officer in a time of active combat. And a little three year old gets it. Not the generals and the politicians and the adult civilians sitting there with me in that picturesque house. If they did, maybe they would start to understand why it is so goddamn hard for us to come back. 

In a cozy Midwest living room, a three year old asked me about stacking bodies. The year before in a Middle Eastern hangar bay, the Commandant just chewed us out: “why do you grunts have such an attitude?!?”

The last time occurred in the final months of my last tour, where I was rotting away at a backwater stateside post whose name you likely have never heard. We had been ordered into some publicity stunt with the Boy Scouts. It was Friday, so we were all wearing our Chucks, another garrison gimmick of the post-war toy soldier Marine Corps. We all went downstairs to the entry foyer of the headquarters building and posed with the little guys in front of some pile of something that they had donated to the command. I cannot remember for the life of me what it was. After the photo they all went around to hand us items individually. We smiled and said thank you like good toy soldiers.

A little black kid came up to me to give me my gift. He was in awe of me. This big strong United States Marine, shiny shoes crisp uniform topped by a sick low reg, standing tall with all these ribbons on his broad chest. 

This little boy, not more than seven or eight years old, was just petrified, shaking as he handed a gift to a real life Marine Captain. He saw a warrior. An officer and a gentleman. I knew better; beneath the immaculate uniform and erect bearing beaten into me by SSgt B at OCS, he was looking at a physically, mentally and morally battered shell of a man. I somehow managed a smile and bent down to receive it and shake his hand with feigned enthusiasm.

“Thanks buddy!”

In this moment I saw up close, for the very first time in my career, what the Marine Corps really means to the American people. The disconnect between what that little boy saw in me and what I saw in myself and what I knew about the Corps shattered me. I felt panic rising in me and struggled to contain the completely unexpected urge to bawl.

This young boy had in his mind the great shining ideal of what the Marine Corps is supposed to mean: honor, courage, commitment, brotherhood and battles won. This was the same ideal that inspired me to sign on the dotted line. It sounds and looks so good because it is true, at least in aspirational form. Still, my time in service demonstrated the institution’s reality fell far short of its noble purpose. 

I probably made that boy’s day, his month. He probably wanted to grow up and be just like me, this shining example of manhood. And I felt like such a fraud. How would his mother feel if he grew up to be just like Captain V in the twilight of his career? 

The Corps I experienced predominantly did not promote honorable people, nor reward courage, whether on the battlefield or the command deck. It was not involved in gunfights, or all that interested in preparing for them. Many of my superiors repeatedly displayed selfishness and cowardice. Others used their combat experience, real or alleged, as a pretext to humiliate and berate me and my peers instead of helping us become the kind of officers our Marines deserved. I came to despise the officer corps and the character traits it incentivizes, reached my breaking point and resigned with bitter disillusionment and cynicism I still carry to this day.

I was angry, rarely sober off-duty and desperately lonely. After almost two years straight in the Middle East, I found myself in a dead end cubicle assignment at a unit full of fat, lazy, deployment-dodgers who just wanted to retire into an even lazier government civilian job. My entire body hurt despite physical therapy four days a week and being doped up on meds after a shoulder operation. On the rare occasion I slept, it was never restful. To be brutally realistic, three years of exile from the Fleet was more likely than not going to end one night in either a DUI or suck-starting a nine.

But these little kids still cared. Why?

At 3 o’clock on a Friday afternoon I realized this young American had an untarnished faith in the Marine Corps and in me, a faith that I no longer had. I lost it somewhere OCONUS and doubted I would ever have it again. In spite of my experience they know nothing about, brave young kids like these may grow up and raise their right hands to serve our republic in peace or war, always faithful. It may fall to them to keep the faith I lost. For the sake of our nation, I hope this young man and others like him never lose theirs. For their sake I hope the Marine Corps once again becomes worthy of the innocent courage of young Americans. 

A few months later, I drove out the front gate for the last time, still wondering if the Corps would ever renew its virtue. For 2000 miles of road across a country I served but did not understand, en route to an address that was anything but a home, I wondered,. 

What the point of it all was. 

Whether I had made the right choice. 

What would happen to me. 

I wondered what would become of my Marines from all the units over the years, most barely kids themselves when they started. I wondered if in fact I truly had served them well as a leader.

I especially wondered what would become of those young kids who were so impressed with me and what I represented to them. I wondered if I stayed whether I would have been the leader they deserved if they grew up to stand on the yellow footprints, like so many brave young kids before them. 

Even before the Abbey Gate, the thought of those kids broke my heart.

The wondering is still the worst part.

Poetry and Art

Poetry and art from the warfighting community.

Perpetual Predestination - Deadlined Poetry

-Perpetua!-

Perhaps it’s the sun in your eyes,

Maybe it’s the heat

from the bodies staring at you

Causing sweat to bead,

All over your body

Eye contact of too many eyes

Before a crowd you stand, 

Limbs bound by their will

Deep within you know

That the crowd will eat you alive,

Set their lions to feast 

As they watch from stands

But you do not fear,

Comfort is but a memory

While the crowd sits, you stand

-J

-Predestination-

Like Father,

Like Sons.

Legacy runs deeper than blood.

Boiling beneath the ego of boys,

Yearning to be men.

Camo paint on our faces,

Playing War wasn’t just a game.

Is it really free will?

When it’s all you know.

Naive minds and testosterone, 

Make dangerous bedfellows,

To prodigal boys who yearn for a tribe. 

Like Great Grandfather.

Like Grandfather. 

Like Father. 

Like Sons.

Brothers.

Predestination is a farce,

When this is what you were born to do. 

- N

A Beast With Burdens - Condition Set

I once met a man sent off to antique lands

Who told me his stories weren’t meant to be

shared

On his vein ridden hands sat many black

bands

Lined with names with those war had not

spared

He said on a lifeless paper sat stamped the

words

“Above and beyond the call of duty”

Such praise made the image of war blurred

But in his flashback to that day he found no

beauty

Round the mound of that smoking brass

The dead stretched blood soaked and bare

In a forest of charred wood and red grass

Those poor lifeless bastards had lost all care

Kin Town Anthem - Cora Reichert

Here was late-night neon noise,

overhanging jaws of strip club 

arches, dead-beat, death-beating 

cats wearing knobs of spine-hunger

and crouched under cars, their 

opaque, cataracted headlight eyes

refracting low spoons of amber

streetlights. Bubbled 

puddles of barfight porch lights

punctuated dark monologues of 

street, reaching out to grab the 

bare, fascinated feet of children, still 

comfortably endangered, frozen

and forever nine. Here were sad,

ordinary heroes, hopelessly American, the

mudroom clatter of nameless 

childhoods tattooed in gods and 

flowered monsters, shameless 

in unsteady dancing. 

And they dance for something,

maybe the silent island,

for narrow night swathes of the 

golden seaborne power grid

at 90 degrees flying into 

Naha International, 

for landing strips lined in lemon

lights, for wide open arms of harbors, 

for basketball courts and chain-link 

beaches, 

hymns

to painted alleyways, beer-piss

and perennial cinderblock 

curb-gardens. Heel-toe dropped on

rough wooden steps

where a beggar watches an

empty cap collapse like lungs.

Strangers sing together from 

inside open plate-glass doors, 

the cold orange light melts the 

boys in autumn, a girl’s hands

warming her heart of gold.

Get That Gun Up - Hoodoggy

The above art, and others like it, are available at hoodoggy.bigcartel.com

Health and Fitness

Fitness and PT Guidance for improving diet, physical performance, health, and leading troops in physical training.

How Far Do You Want to Run: A Basic Marathon Plan - Run Hard, Run Fast, Run Often

Month/Block 2: Lactate Threshold Focus

Congratulations.  If you’re reading this (and paying attention to it), you survived the first month of training.  The first month was a gentle introduction to marathon training.  Now it’s time to ramp it up a little bit. 

During the first month, programming focused on getting your legs to turnover, and building a routine (getting your body used to running multiple times a week).  Now the focus shifts to not only increasing the mileage you’re running, but increasing the speed that you’re able to run those miles at.  Adding an extra running workout day each week may take you out of your comfort zone; get comfortable being uncomfortable. 

As distance increases, intensity decreases.  The weekly Steady State Run (SSR) should be done at a higher intensity than your Recovery Runs (RR), about a 7 on the Rate of Perceived Effort (RPE) scale.  These are great runs to do with a running buddy or friend. You can still carry on a conversation consisting of short sentences.  Tempo Runs (TR) include a lot less conversation.  Completed at an 8-9 RPE, your breathing should be heavy and labored during TR, with your focus being on running and not talking.  

Bring that running buddy back out for the Endurance Run (ER/Long Run) on the weekend, or use the extended time on the roads/trails to clear your head and focus on the race. (Race day will be here before you know it.)  Use these runs as an opportunity to practice what you’re going to do on race day.  Try different fueling strategies to find what works for you.  If you’ve signed up for a race, do a little research and figure out what they’re going to have at the aid stations (Gatorade vs Powerade, Gu vs PowerBlocks, etc).  Unless you’re planning on carrying all of your nutrition/hydration, try using what the aid stations will have during your long runs, to make sure it sits right in your stomach. Also start dialing in your lubrication plan (to avoid chafing), and attire for various weather conditions (so that nothing surprises you during your 26.2mi journey), and get a feel for what your goal will be on race day (throw some Race Pace (RP) miles in during your ER and see how “hard” they are).  

Most of all, enjoy the training, and listen to your body.  Now is the time to take care of any aches and pains that you may have pushed through during the first month.  It’s not going to destroy your training plan if you have to back off the RPE, or even skip, a workout.  Don’t “push through” something now, if in the back of your head you think “this might become something serious that could jeopardize my race”. Enjoy the journey; the final brushstrokes for race day will be published next month.

Climate Optimization for the Tactical Athlete - Jacob M. Braich

An adaptable and useful athlete must possess the capacity to perform in a variety of environments in both “practice” and “play”. Having the ability to create useful range time while firing off of the back of an LHD in the Pacific may translate to more useful outcomes when training on a well funded and well equipped site within the United States, just as being able to get the most out of calisthenics while confined to a room can teach you the value of basics when offered a gym with every machine and gimmick you could ask for. Becoming adaptable for the military and public service athlete will most commonly mean working in environments that would be considered austere, at best

The Cold’s Ticking Hand

Cold hands. Nipped lips. The crunch of ice crusted snow and the bite of the breeze above it. Any locality brushed with the hostility of cold will offer you a clock upon arrival, one which has already started ticking. You can delay and set it back, but as long as it is cold, it will tick ruthlessly. The cold has innate abilities to drain individuals of mental alertness, agility and motivation in completion of tasks. There’s a reason we moved inside millennia ago.

But how do you adapt? Just as with most physical matters, abrupt confrontation with some careful considerations has proven to have the best outcomes. Training for harsh environments by replicating harsh environments offers those trained an ability to adapt and learn within a specific set of circumstances. During the Terra Nova Expedition, some of Scott’s crew members started every morning by stripping down and entering the freezing Antarctic waters to induce a physiological and psychological response. Continual exposure to such cold water causes the basal metabolic rate (BMR) to fall, therefore reducing the average need for caloric intake to sustain regular activity and rest. Just as exposure induces physical responses, it stimulates mental responses as well: cold sucks. It seeps into every crack of warmth and occupies every corner of your mind. It distracts and makes every second feel like an eternity.

Our solution in the Pacific Northwest is exposure in the chilly waters of the Puget Sound. With highs of 54° in the peak of summer and lows of 42° in the dead of winter, the waters offer a year round economical option for cold exposure. Just walk right in. In years past, we’ve experimented with trained athletes preparing for winter courses and seasons doing taxing events (freediving, open water swims and no hands treading) for times exceeding an hour, with absolutely no thermal protection. Anecdotally, the athletes we trained boasted an increased ability to deal with cold exposure, boosted mood, increased mental alertness and an earned sense of pride. Creating simple tasks that required engagement and constant thinking for less trained athletes proved to elicit forced adaptation through forced response. Over days, weeks, months and years, our athletes became unbothered with the cold and learned the useful skill.

 Heat, much like cold, offers a unique problem set for the military athlete.

On the geographical and environmental opposite of the Pacific Northwest, the Atlantic Coastal Region’s Southern States present the issue of average humidity of 75%+ year round, coupled with temperatures crossing into the triple digits. Since our athletes are expected to complete tasks outside year round regardless of environmental factors, there exists an urgent need to adapt with seasonal highs. Acclimatization typically happens after two weeks of exposure for 90-120 minutes while completing aerobic activity. For our thick-necked and sumo-pulling readers, that means cardio. 

In our Dixie circumstances, we turned to sled drags for the similarity to rucking with lower impact and emphasis on the posterior chain. We broke up the day into 90 minute single sessions, or 60 minute double sessions with a break in-between, at the hottest time of day. Our athletes reported frustration, fatigue, headache, and the medically concerning statement of “I feel like shit” for the first 7-9 days of our trial. As the first week ended, our athletes began to show the beneficial outcomes of legitimate acclimatization. Their heart rate monitors showed lower average and lower peak heart rates while completing the same or more amounts of physical work over a similar time. They began to respond positively in view of their performance in the heat, as well as stating, “I no longer feel like shit”, though they may have performed like it. 

In all, our small and anecdotal experiments did not create any groundbreaking or new information, but offered us a replicable and measurable way to adapt our athletes to austere environments.

Cold Weather Adaptation Protocol // Winter Water

20-60 minutes a day for 7-14 days, direct exposure to water temperatures less than 60° under supervision. 

Hot Weather Adaptation Protocol // Summer Sun

90-120 minutes a day (One 90 min or two 60 minute sessions) for 14-21 days, cardiovascular effort under sun during the heat of the day, under supervision.

Transition and Career

Career and civilian transition guidance, geared towards helping servicemembers plan their careers and help transitioning servicemembers succeed in civilian life

Transition Truths - Gage Gatbsy 

Transitioning out. 

The thing we all must do at some point in our military careers if we don’t die first. 

Some do 4, some do 20+. Either way, you must leave eventually. The Army tried to prepare me for how it would be after my six years of active duty, most of the time by telling me I’d never make it in the civilian world. My friends and relatives claimed the exact opposite, saying with veteran status I’d have the world at my feet. 

The following are the realities of life on the outside I wish I knew before I learned them the hard way. 

1) No one cares. 

No one cares that you served. America was at war from the day the twin towers fell to somewhere there in 2008. Otherwise, they were oblivious to us even having a military outside of our massive spending budget. 

The fact that you served will maybe get you a “thank you for service” and a free meal at Applebees once a year if you can swallow your dignity enough to walk in and get it. That is precisely the line where people’s goodwill towards you for being in the military ends. You could’ve punched Bin Laden in the face and single-handedly killed everyone in ISIS; unless you’re a SEAL with a book deal or you’re starring in a videogame, no one in the civilian world cares. 

You do not have life on easy mode now; no one owes you anything, and no job is guaranteed. The days of employers selecting you above your peers because you used to wear a uniform are long gone. Now, if they hire you, it was probably just for the tax break. 

To tell you the truth, I never bring it up outside of my resume. No one cares. Accept it now.

2) There will be a culture shock. 

Like it or not, you were institutionalized into a lifestyle that does not exist anywhere else in the civilian world. None of what you used to do translates to the civilian world, even the little things you don’t consider. In the real world, you can’t be the leader your soldiers loved and the man or woman of conviction you used to be. Civilian side, if you say the wrong thing, use the wrong tone, or even betray your thoughts with body language, you can and will be fired, quickly. 

In the civilian world, your honor, industriousness, and proficiency don’t matter; above all, civilians value like and relatability. I have been in many situations where my peers were barely functional and I was achieving the most of anyone in the company; I put optimal efficiency above all else whilst my peers did nothing except charm the boss. 

Guess who wound up fired? 

Civilians will never understand what it was like to be in uniform. This is not a rallying cry to band together with other veterans and shun the civilian world, this is just reality. The average person will never encounter violence in their day to day and even fewer will ever have a life or death situation. 

Emerging from your past life into the civilian world, most people will be more concerned with the lack of non-vegan sweeteners for their Starbucks than things going on in reality. The most pressure the average person you’ll encounter will have endured was meeting their spouses parents for the first time. 

Outside of Call of Duty, they will never understand what FOB life was like or having to watch your six for weeks at a time. Gone are the days of the hushed reverence, respect, and appreciation for the veteran coming home. Now, if someone finds out you were in the military, the conversation will usually go something like: 

“Wow, you were in the Army?” 

“I was.” 

“Did you see combat?” 

“Yep.” 

“Did you ever kill anyone?”

Sure, stranger I just met, I’ll tell you all about war. Would you rather hear about the 14 year old I saw get shot in the face or the dogs eating corpses? 

The case could be made that the current American populace is the most “out of touch with reality” group of people Earth’s ever seen. 

If I were you, unless you’re shooting the breeze with a fellow vet, keep it to yourself. If they don’t naively tiptoe around asking you about it, they might react like those covered by my next bullet: 

3) Some Americans will be hostile to you for your service. 

Luckily, this is a minority (for now), but the sentiment is growing. 

In colleges, certain states, social circles, and cultures around America, people will actively go out of their way to sabotage you because you served. They’ll spread rumors so you’ll become a social outcast. They’ll manufacture drama and crises to injure your reputation. They’ll downgrade your assignments or demean your performance where they can. 

Especially in college, I have found it far better to keep my service a secret than to open up about it, even if the situation might’ve called for input from an area of my expertise. You weren’t fighting Nazis and you are no longer the valued warrior class of old; for many, you were nothing but a foot soldier in the army of whatever tyrannical regime their mental gymnastics devise. 

For all intents and purposes, the idea of a grateful nation is a far gone myth and you risk far more by making your prior profession known than you stand to gain from letting it slip. 

4) Avoid stagnation at all costs. 

To be successful, you must stay productive. The past is over and done with, no matter how it went; what matters now is what you’re doing to progress and the goal you’re aiming for.

You must create goals for yourself; otherwise, you will fall victim to doing and becoming whatever will put food on the table. Generally speaking, you can either be happy to work or work to be happy; in the former you find a job that makes you happy to show up every day and the paycheck is just the icing on the cake (think sky dive instructor, forest ranger, etc); with the latter, you do a job that doesn’t make you miserable but gives you the money and time off to do what keeps you stoked in your off hours. 

Finding something that both pays well and makes you happy to put in hours every day is super rare, but it is out there; more than likely it’ll require you build your credentials or innovate the job yourself. Either way, you’ll only get there if you continue to make progress. Keep going to school, networking, and learning; otherwise, you’ll find yourself doing whatever you can to survive, and you will be miserable. 

It will be hard at first, but do not fall into the same trap most veterans do when we get out; we go back to our home towns, get angry at the culture shock, we self isolate, start drinking, and eventually find ourselves in situations we can’t easily get out of. 

Luckily in this regard, the military doesn’t totally abandon you, which leads me to my next bullet: 

5) Take advantage of your benefits, all of them. 

Referencing back to my first bullet, no one cares if you fail or succeed, and no one cares if you use your benefits or if you don’t take advantage of them at all. 

The GI Bill is essentially a ticket to do whatever you want with your life and relocate to somewhere new if you play it right. It’s ok if you don’t exactly know what you want to do yet either; it’ll buy you the time to figure it out, decompress, and move forward in a positive direction. 

I got out, wanted to try living somewhere with an outdoor scene, bought a van, and lived in it while going to college in southern Utah. Had no idea what the fuck I wanted to do outside of the vague plan of working in the outdoors, and for a year and a half I busted out my bachelor’s while having the adventures I wanted to do while I was enlisted, tending bar here and there for some pocket change. 

The GI Bill paid tuition, paid housing allowance that put food on my table, and eventually, I figured out what my big picture plan was. Had I gone straight into the work force just looking for a decent pay check, I most likely would’ve never wound up anywhere close to as stoked as where my trajectory is now taking me.

You get 36 months of GI Bill benefits, and its actually worth more than people realize. Nowadays, no one cares where your degree comes from, as long as you have one. If you find a college cheap enough, the GI Bill will pay a lump sum every semester to cover your tuition, and you can take as many classes as you want to bust out your degree. 

In a year and a half, I took no less than 18 credits a semester, and now I still have 20 months of GI Bill left to do whatever I want with. For the hell of it I went to the Florida Keys and became a PADI certified dive instructor. After my MBA (doable in 12 months), I’ll take what I have left and become a fly fishing, hunting, and survival guide. Even after that I’ll still have time to play with and get other credentials that’ll help me out. 

I found out about the chapter 31 benefit from a buddy I made at the dive course. Chapter 31 is similar to the GI Bill, but you have to be at least 10% disabled and still have some GI Bill time left to use it. 

Chapter 31 is Vocational Rehab (or whatever the exact name is, this is the cliff notes version); it’s aim is to provide opportunities for vets who want to start their own business or become freelance contractors that require specialized training or gear the GI Bill doesn’t cover. 

My dive buddy was using it to start his own dive shop. Chapter 31 covered his course tuition from the basic entry level PADI diver all the way to Dive Instructor, it bought him roughly $20k worth of equipment, and paid him BAH the whole time he attended the course. For me, it’ll cover my 3 year master’s degree program and licensing fees to start my own psychology practice, BAH included. Since it’s separate from the GI Bill, I’ll still have my 20 months of GI Bill to use afterwards to continue my education. 

Use your benefits and find something you’ll either love doing, will pay you well, or create something that’ll do both. They’re given to you whether you use them or not; honestly, in my opinion, you’re crazy if you don’t. It might not work out for you how it did for my buddy and I, but its at least worth looking into. 

At the end of my rainbow, I’ll be doing work I’m passionate about, helping people I care for, and I’ll be my own boss; if someone’s a dickhead, I can tell them to get lost, and I’ll get paid either way. Sounds pretty good to me. 

Make your own way in the world, or your way will be made for you; chances are, you won’t like how it plays out if you settle for the latter.

6) The military was harder than anything you’ll have to do in the civilian world. 

One of the good things to keep in mind is that no matter how bad the civilian world can get, you’ve already been through worse. The hardships you’ve previously endured will give you the perseverance to do things most normal people will say isn’t possible. 

The last semester of my bachelor’s degree, I took 26 credit hours of classes. The first month of the semester while taking classes online, I passed my NREMT exam, and then took and completed the two week Wilderness EMT course through NOLS. The second month of the semester, I completed the PADI Dive Instructor course. I finished the semester and graduated with a 3.7 GPA. 

Was it hard? For sure. Did I have a life? Debatable. 

What is, without question, is that it was not a fraction as hard as living in a foreign country where people were actively trying to kill me for months on end, rationing food and drinking dirty water because it was all I had. 

You are prepared to succeed and do whatever it takes to make shit happen; chances are, you’ve already been through worse. College is easy as hell, and most of the people who stress it hard probably haven’t experienced real stress before. 

Whatever it is you want to do, your benefits will give you a head start, and your past life gave you the character building to see it through. Won’t all be a cake walk, but that’s life. 

What transitioning ultimately boils down to: you can either choose to push it to the limit and succeed, or let time go by, and fail. 

Choose what you want to do, and make it happen.

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This ends Volume 4, Edition 1, of the Lethal Minds Journal (01SEPTEMBER2022)

The window is now open for Lethal Minds’ fifth volume, releasing October 1st.

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The Bulletin From The Borderlands Team

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1.  The Ukraine War in data: $9 billion in US military aid; more than $50 billion overall 

Russian Spy Team Left Traces That Bolstered C.I.A.’s Bounty Judgment 

China’s Huawei secretly helped build North Korea’s wireless network, documents reveal - The Washington Post, Exclusive: Newly obtained documents show Huawei role in shipping prohibited U.S. gear to Iran | Reuters  

2. Blasko, Dennis J. The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century. Routledge, 2012. 

“Foreign Policy, July - October 1960 (Folder 3).” Archives Direct - Adam Matthew Digital, Foreign Office, 1 Jan. 1960, www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk/Documents/Images/FO_371_150416/50?searchId=963e4145-3327-475e-bddf-c323daff2fb2. 

Mao, Zedong. Manifesto of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Foreign Languages Press, 1968. 

“People's Liberation Army of China.” Archives Direct - Adam Matthew Digital, Foreign Office,

www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk/Documents/Images/FCO_21_682/1?searchId=963e4145-3327-475e-bddf-c323daff2fb2.

“Political Affairs (Internal): People's Liberation Army (PLA).” Archives Direct - Adam Matthew Digital, Foreign Office, 1 Jan. 1967, 

www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk/Documents/Images/FCO_21_20/2?searchId=.